By Mohamed Elshinnawi
Washington
30 October 2008
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With the November 4th U.S. presidential election just days away, a recent national survey shows large proportions of American Jewish voters favoring Democratic presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama over his Republican rival, Senator John McCain. VOA's Mohamed Elshinnawi has details.
US Democratic presidential candidate Illinois Senator Barack Obama helps make phone calls with volunteers at his campaign office in Brighton, Colorado, 26 Oct 2008
One of the most striking findings in the American Jewish Committee's annual opinion poll - a phone survey conducted in late September with one thousand American Jews - is that support for Obama is not higher than it is.
Republican presidential candidate John McCain speaks at a campaign rally at Zanesville High School in Zanesville, Ohio, 26 Oct 2008
The American Jewish Committee's phone survey makes it clear that Jews in the United States are a diverse population in terms of their political views and how they define their faith. Eight percent of the survey participants identified themselves as Orthodox Jews, 28 percent as Conservatives and 30 percent as Reformed Jews. Another 31 percent said they are just Jewish.
Republican vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin speaks during a rally in Ohio, 29 Sep 2008
"We found that 73 percent of the voters approve of Obama's selection of Senator Joe Biden as his running mate," Bandler says. "On the other hand, of Jews identified as Republicans, 37 percent approved of John McCain's selection of [Alaska] Governor [Sarah] Palin."
WORLD BANK’S NEW POVERTY ESTIMATES
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOBER 25, 2008 31
http://www.epw.in/epw/user/viewAbstract.jsp
A Global Perspective on
Poverty in India
Martin Ravallion
In 2005, one in three of the
people in the world who
consumed less than $ 1.25 a day
(at 2005 purchasing power parity)
lived in India – more than any
other country. They accounted for
about 40 per cent of India’s
population. Twenty-five years
earlier, 60 per cent of India’s
population lived below the same
real line. While this is clear
progress, India’s long-term pace
of poverty reduction by this
measure is no more than average
for the developing world,
excluding China.
This article first discusses the
methodology underlying the
World Bank’s recent revised
estimates of global poverty and
then analyses the Indian numbers.
When discussing absolute poverty
in the world as a whole, there
is a case for using a common
standard for all countries. It would clearly
be questionable to conclude that an Indian
living above India’s poverty line, but
below (say) Brazil’s, is not poor in a global
context, when we count someone at the
same standard of living in Brazil as poor.
Such international comparisons are never
going to be easy as there are inevitably
some confounding contextual factors,
such as differences in poor peoples’ access
to non-market goods and perceptions of
relative deprivation in relatively well-off
countries. But it is of interest to see what
the best available data tell us about the
extent of absolute poverty in the world as a
whole when assessed by a common standard
in terms of command over commodities.
And it is hardly surprising that individual
countries, including India, are interested in
seeing how they are faring in the evolving
global picture of absolute poverty.
An ongoing research project at the
World Bank has tried to offer such a global
account of the extent of absolute poverty
and to track how the picture evolves over
time. The effort has been going on for
almost 20 years, starting with a background
paper [Ravallion et al 1991] done for the
1990 World Development Report [World
Bank 1990]. The latest estimates are reported
in Chen and Ravallion (2008a).
This article summarises the findings and
discusses how India fares in this global
picture of poverty. The article first explains
how we measure global poverty; the box
summarises the key steps, which are
explained in the text of the article. The article
then turns to the implications for India.
Prices for Measuring Poverty
Given a poverty line that accords with
perceptions of what constitutes “poverty”
in a given country, a guiding principle for
poverty measurement within that country
(comparing different regions say) has
been that two people with the same real
consumption level should be treated the
same way no matter where they live. The
real value of the absolute poverty line
should be the same in different places.
The World Bank’s global poverty measures
apply the same principle to the world
as a whole. Thus, along with household
surveys, a key input to measuring global
poverty is data on prices. Only then can
we say whether one can buy more with
(say) 5 yuan per day in China than Rs 10
per day in India. The exchange rates that
equate purchasing power over commodities
(both internationally traded and nontraded)
are called purchasing power parity
rates, or PPPs. The rationale for using a
PPP rather than the market exchange rate
stems from what is called the Balassa-
Samuelson effect in international economics.
This recognises that market exchange
rates, which tend to equate purchasing
power in terms of internationally traded
goods, are deceptive for measuring real
incomes in developing countries, given
that some commodities are not traded;
this includes services but also many goods,
including some food staples. Furthermore,
there is a systematic effect, stemming from
the fact that low real wages in developing
countries entail that labour-intensive nontraded
goods tend to be relatively cheap.
Market exchange rates can greatly underestimate
real income in poor countries.
The Balassa-Samuelson effect provided
the motivation for the International Comparison
Program (ICP), which collects
prices from a large sample of outlets in
each country in each “benchmark year”.
The results of the new 2005 ICP were
released this year [World Bank 2008a, b],
superseding the 1993 ICP, which was the
previous benchmark year used for global
poverty measurement.
The aggregate poverty count will not in
general be independent of the reference
year, even if the underlying data are the
same; this is a widely acknowledged feature
of international comparisons, whether
poverty or national output. However, this
is a moot point given that the data have
changed so much from one ICP round to
These are the views of the author and need not
reflect those of the World Bank or any affiliated
organisation. Gaurav Datt, Dominique van de
Walle and Tara Vishwanath provided helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article.
Martin Ravallion (mravallion@worldbank.org)
is at the Research Department of the World
Bank, Washington.
WORLD BANK’S NEW POVERTY ESTIMATES
OCTOBER 25, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly 32
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WORLD BANK’S NEW POVERTY ESTIMATES
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOBER 25, 2008 33
another. Given these changes, it makes
sense that global poverty measurement
has followed the common practice in other
international comparisons of only doing
the PPP conversion at one date, and using
existing national price data for inter-
temporal comparisons (see box).
The most important change in the
present context is that the 2005 ICP did a
much better job in collecting prices [Heston
and Summers 2008; World Bank 2008b].
Doing reliable price surveys is difficult,
particularly in poor countries where many
goods are not traded internationally. Far
more detailed product descriptions in the
2005 ICP helped to identify comparable
goods, so that we do not make the mistake
of judging people to be better off simply
because they consume lower quality (and
hence cheaper) goods. (An independent
evaluation of ICP rounds prior to 2005 had
been critical of their price surveys for lack
of sufficiently clear product descriptions; see
United Nations 1998.) This new ICP round
is the best data we have had for assessing
how the cost of living varies across countries.
The new price surveys for 2005 reveal
that price levels are higher than we thought
in many developing countries, including
India. The implied upward revisions to the
PPPs tend to be larger in poorer countries,
as one would expect given the likely biases
in past price ICP surveys (whereby it is
poorer countries where the quality bias
noted above is likely to be greater).
This is the first time in 20 years that
India has participated in the ICP, so a fairly
sizeable revision was possible, and may
not be too surprising.1 India’s 1993 consumption
PPP was Rs 7.0 per $ 1, while the
2005 PPP is Rs 16, and the price level index
(ratio of PPP to market exchange rate) went
from 23 per cent to 40 per cent. If one updated
India’s 1993 PPP for inflation in India
and the US one would have obtained a
2005 PPP of Rs 11 rather than Rs 16.
The 2005 ICP is a major improvement in
our knowledge about how the cost of living
varies across countries. Nonetheless,
the new PPPs still have some limitations.
There is a problem of “urban bias” in the
ICP price surveys for some counties, including
in India where rural areas were
under-represented in the ICP price surveys
when used for poverty measurement. I
return to this point below. As was argued
in Ravallion et al (1991), a further concern
is that the weights attached to different
commodities in the conventional PPP
rate may not be appropriate for the poor.
Deaton and Dupriez (2008) have estimated
“PPPs for the poor” for a subset of countries
with the required data; the preliminary
results do not suggest that the implied reweighting
has much impact on the consumption
PPP.2 Another limitation is that
the PPP is a national average. Just as the
cost of living tends to be lower in poorer
countries, one expects it to be lower in
poorer regions within one country, especially
in rural areas. Ravallion et al
(2007) have allowed for urban-rural cost
of living differences facing the poor, and
provided an urban-rural breakdown of
our prior global poverty measures using
the 1993 PPP. We plan to update these
estimates in future work.
‘Dollar a Day’ Revisited
The main international poverty line we
had used in our recent estimates of the
global poverty measures was $ 1.08 per day
($ 32.74 per month) at 1993 PPP. Simply
updating this line for inflation in the US
gives a new line of $ 1.45 per day. However,
that calculation ignores the fact that the
new PPPs imply that the USD values of the
national poverty lines in the poorest
countries have also fallen. An international
line of $ 1.45 in 2005 prices is well above
the average lines found in the poorest
countries [Ravallion et al 2008].
We need to go back to the drawing
board to find a new international poverty
line based on the 2005 ICP data – a line
that is consistent with the original idea of
measuring poverty in the world as a whole
by standards that are typical of the poorest
countries in the world.
With colleagues at the World Bank, I
have applied the new PPPs to a new data
set on national poverty lines across 75
developing countries [Ravallion et al 2008].
Each of these national lines attains stipulated
food energy requirements, which are
similar across countries, with allowances
for what is deemed to be essential non-food
spending in each country. The sources are
World Bank’s Poverty Assessments at country
level and (for low-income countries) the
governments’ Poverty Reduction Strategy
Papers. Naturally, each national line accords
with the prevailing concept of “poverty”
in each country; the lines tend to be more
generous in richer countries, although this
positive economic gradient only emerges
when national consumption is above about
$ 2 per person per day in 2005 prices.
From these data we have recalibrated
the old “$ 1 a day” poverty line, first proposed
20 years ago for quantifying the extent
of “extreme poverty” in the world by
the standards of what “poverty” means in
the poorest countries [Ravallion et al 1991].
Our new international poverty line for
2005 is $ 1.25, which is the average line for
the poorest 15 countries – those consuming
less than $ 2 per day [Ravallion et al
2008]. This is not higher in real terms than
our old $ 1 a day line; indeed, as noted
above, the new line has lower real value in
the US because the new PPPs reduce the
international $ value of the national
poverty lines in the poorest countries.
The present discussion will focus on the
$ 1.25 line.3 However, it is of interest to
compare the estimates using this line with
those for exactly $ 1.00 per day at 2005
PPP, which (as will be explained) is very
close to India’s official poverty line when
converted to PPP $’s.
Revised Estimates
We follow common practice in letting the
national data override the ICP data for
inter-temporal comparisons; this is the
most reasonable position to take given the
changes in methodology between different
Calculating the World Bank’s Global Poverty Measures
· National poverty lines for a reference group of countries are converted to a common currency using the
purchasing power parity (PPP) rate for consumption. Taking an average of these lines gives the international line.
· The international poverty line is converted to local currencies in the benchmark year (2005) using the same PPPs
and then converted to the prices prevailing at the time of the relevant household survey using the best available
CPI for that country.
· Then the poverty rate is calculated from that survey by standard methods.
· Interpolation/extrapolation methods are used to line up the survey-based estimates with these reference years,
including 2005.
· Population weighted aggregate measures are then formed by region and globally.
WORLD BANK’S NEW POVERTY ESTIMATES
OCTOBER 25, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly 34
ICP rounds [World Bank 2008b]. Thus the
PPP conversion is only done once for a given
country, and all estimates are revised
(back to 1981) consistently with the data
for that country. So the PPPs serve the role
of locating the residents of each country in
the “global” distribution, but we do not mix
the new PPPs with those from previous
ICP rounds.
Having converted the international
poverty line at PPP to local currency in 2005
we convert it to the prices prevailing at each
survey date using the country-specific
official consumer price index (CPI). We then
apply this poverty line to the survey data;
the latest estimates use 670 household
surveys for 116 countries. Interpolation
methods are used to “line-up” the surveybased
estimates at the common “reference
years” including 2005 (calendar year).
For the world as a whole, we estimate
that about 1.4 billion people – one quarter
of the population of the developing
world – lived below $ 1.25 a day in 2005
[Chen and Ravallion 2008a]. While that
is far more poverty than our past work
suggested – see for example, Chen and
Ravallion (2004) – we find that the developing
world is making progress against
extreme poverty.
Tracking trends over time is not easy,
given that survey data availability and
(probably) data quality tend to deteriorate
as one goes further back in time. Using the
best available consumer price indices and
household surveys, we estimate that in
1981, 52 per cent of the population, 1.9 billion,
lived below $ 1.25. Data are poor for
some regions (such as Africa and eastern
Europe and central Asia) for the 1980s.
Focusing on 1990 as the base date, we find
that 42 per cent lived below $ 1.25 per day,
1.8 billion people.
The trend over time is similar to past
estimates. The trend rate of decline in the
percentage living below $1.25 a day is
almost exactly one percentage point per
year (strictly it is 0.98 percentage points
using a regression on time, with a standard
error of 0.06 per cent) – up from about
0.8 percentage points per year using our
old estimates [Chen and Ravallion 2008a].
The trend is virtually identical if one starts
the series in 1990.
An important yardstick for assessing the
developing world’s performance against
poverty has been provided by the first
Millennium Development Goal (MDG1),
which is to halve the 1990 incidence of extreme
poverty by 2015. Simply projecting
the trend measured by Chen and Ravallion
(2008a) forward, the estimated proportion
of the population living below $ 1.25 a
day in 2015 is 16.9 per cent (standard error
of 1.5 per cent). Given that the 1990 poverty
rate was 41.7 per cent, the developing
world as a whole appears to be on track to
achieving MDG1. However, the developing
world outside China is not on track for
reaching the goal, which will require a
higher rate of progress [Chen and Ravallion
2008a]. And, given the lags in survey
data availability, these calculations do not
allow for the effect of the higher food and
fuel prices since 2005, which have probably
set back progress by a few years at least.
So far the discussion has focused on the
“headcount index”, given by the proportion
of the population of living in households
with consumption (or income) per
capita below the poverty line. This is the
most popular measure in practice, but it is
known to have a number of conceptual
problems, including the fact that if a poor
person becomes poorer then the index
does not change. A better measure from
this point of view is the “poverty gap (PG)
index” defined as the mean distance below
the poverty line as a proportion of the
line where the mean is taken over the
whole population, counting the non-poor
as having zero poverty gaps.
The PG index for the developing world
as a whole 2005 is 7.7 per cent for the
$ 1.25 line [Chen and Ravallion 2008b]. To
put this in perspective, world (including in
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation
and Development countries) GDP per capita
in 2005 at 2005 PPP was $ 24.58 per day,
implying that the global aggregate
poverty gap was 0.33 per cent of global
GDP using the $ 1.25 line.4 This can be interpreted
as the minimum cost of eliminating
poverty using transfers, though the
actual cost could be very much higher,
given incentive effects and administrative
costs of targeting. By contrast, the cost of
providing a “basic income” of $ 1.25 in the
developing world – by transferring this
sum to every person, whether poor or not
– would be 4.3 per cent of world GDP. The
mean consumption of the world’s poor by
the $ 1.25 line in 2005 was $ 0.87, which is
about one-thirtieth of global GDP per capita.
Similarly to the headcount index, we find
a continual reduction in the global PG
index over time, from 21.7 per cent in 1981
to 14.2 per cent in 1990, then falling to 7.7
per cent in 2005.
A Global Perspective
on Poverty in India
India has a long tradition of rigorously
measuring absolute consumption poverty,
based on the National Sample Surveys
(NSS) that started in the 1950s, under the
leadership of the distinguished statistician
P C Mahalanobis.5 That tradition has been
inward looking, in that the aim has been to
measure poverty by standards that most
Indians would accept as relevant to what
“poverty” means in India. That is entirely
appropriate. And when discussing policies
for reducing poverty in India, one should use
poverty measures deemed relevant to India.
The use of household surveys, such as
the NSS, in measuring poverty has been
widespread, but it has been questioned by
some observers. It has been claimed by
Bhalla (2002) that the NSS underestimates
consumption levels, leading to an overestimation
of the level of poverty in India
and underestimation of the pace of poverty
reduction. The main reason given is the
large and rising gap between the measure
of aggregate household consumption implied
by the NSS and the estimate of private
consumption that can be derived
from India’s National Accounts Statistics
(NAS).6 The gap is unusually large for India.
The NSS data suggest a consumption aggregate
that is not much more than half of
the household consumption component of
the NAS. Furthermore, the divergence has
tended to rise over time, with lower growth
rates implied by the NSS [Deaton 2005].
We do not know what role NSS survey
methods have played in this divergence
from NAS consumption. National Sample
Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) survey
methods appear to have changed rather
little over many decades. That is probably
good news for comparability reasons, although
it does raise questions about
whether their methods are in accord with
international best practice. This is something
that should be reviewed in the future,
in the light of international experience.
WORLD BANK’S NEW POVERTY ESTIMATES
Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOBER 25, 2008 35
However, the gap in the consumption
aggregates from these two sources does not
imply that the NSS overestimates poverty.
Some of the gap is due to errors in NAS
consumption, which is determined residually
in India, after subtracting other components
of domestic absorption from output
at the commodity level. There are also
differences in the definition of consumption,
and there are things included in NAS
consumption that one would not use in
measuring household living standards.7
Some degree of under-reporting of consumption
by respondents, or selective
compliance with the NSS’ randomised assignments,
is likely (as in any survey), although
it is expected that this is more of a
problem for estimating the levels of living
of the rich than of the poor.8 While we
cannot rule out the possibility that such
problems lead us to overestimate poverty
in India – and an external review of the
procedures used by the NSS, in the light of
international best practice, is called for in
my view – it is hard to justify the practice
used by some analysts of replacing the
mean from the NSS by consumption per
capita from the NAS, while assuming that
inequality is correctly measured by the NSS.
India’s official poverty lines are set by
the Planning Commission, updating for
inflation a long-standing poverty line, going
back to a task force charged with the
job of setting a poverty line in the late
1970s using the 1973-74 NSS round as the
reference [Government of India 1979].9
The poverty line has been essentially unchanged
in real terms for 35 years. In
2005, India’s official poverty line was
about Rs 18 and Rs 12 per person per day
in urban and rural areas respectively.10
Naturally, when discussing poverty in
any one country one should use the
concept of poverty deemed most relevant
to prevailing standards of living in that
country. It would be fair to ask whether
India’s official poverty line for 1973-74 is
still relevant today, given the changes that
have occurred in levels of living, activity
levels and consumption patterns over the
last 35 years. But that is not at issue here.
How does India’s official poverty line
compare to our international line of $ 1.25
per day at PPP? We must first find the rupee
equivalents for both urban and rural areas
of the international line. For this purpose
Chen and Ravallion (2008a) assumed that
the ratio of India’s official urban poverty
line to the rural line of 1.51 is also valid for
the international line; in other words, the
relative cost of living between urban and
rural areas is assumed to be the same. Given
this ratio and the 2005 consumption PPP for
India of Rs 15.60 from World Bank (2008a),
and taking account of the sample design of
India’s ICP, one can back out unique rupee
poverty lines for urban and rural areas corresponding
to any given international line.11
On doing so one finds that the rupee values
of the international line of $ 1.25 at PPP are
Rs 21.53 and Rs 14.24 per day for urban and
rural areas respectively.12 Using the implied
PPPs for urban and rural India of Rs 17.24
and Rs 11.40 respectively, India’s official
line has a value of almost exactly $ 1.00 per
day, well below our international line.13
India’s line is also lower than what one
would predict given the current level of
India’s mean consumption.14
Indian Trends
How does India fare in our global picture of
extreme poverty? Using the NSS for 2004-05,
we estimate that 42 per cent of the population
lived below $ 1.25 a day in 2005 (in 2005
prices); 24 per cent lived below $ 1.00 per
day. Twenty-five years earlier,
the proportion living
below $ 1.25 was 60 per cent
(with 42 per cent living below
$ 1.00). This is clearly
progress, though not enough
to reduce the number of
people living below $ 1.25,
which rose from 421 to 456
million. By contrast, using
instead the $ 1 line the
number of poor fell, from 296 to 267 million.
India’s poverty gap index fell from 20
per cent in 1981 to 11 per cent in 2005. The
mean consumption of those living below
$ 1.25 a day rose from $ 0.84 per day to
$ 0.93 per day over the same period. Noting
that India’s GDP per capita at PPP was $ 5.83
per day in 2005 [World Bank 2008a], the
aggregate poverty gap represents 2.3 per
cent of India’s GDP.
Our calculations point to an important
but often neglected fact: a large and growing
number of people in India live just
above the country’s official poverty line.
Indeed, over this 25-year period, the
number living in the meagre 25 cent interval
of $ 1.00 to $1.25 has risen from 124 million
to 189 million. The poverty rate rises from
24.3 per cent to 41.6 per cent over this interval,
representing an elasticity of 2.8.15
Clearly then we should not be too comforted
by the fact that the number of people
living below India’s official poverty
line has fallen by some 30 million over this
period. It would not take much of a shock
to push them, and many more people,
back below that line.
Figure 1 shows how India has fared over
time in terms of both these poverty lines;
the graph also gives the series for our old
international line of $ 1.08 per day at 1993
PPP. I give results for each of the “reference
years” for the global poverty measures;
these do not coincide with NSS survey
rounds and an interpolation method is
used, as outlined by Chen and Ravallion
(2008a).16 Using the $ 1.25 line, the trend
rate of poverty reduction (using a regression
on time) is 0.72 percentage points per
year (with a standard error of 0.04 per
cent); using the $ 1.00 line the trend is
about the same, namely, 0.71 percentage
points per year (s.e.=0.04 per cent). The
proportionate rate of reduction is clearly
higher for the lower line.
India’s overall rate of poverty reduction
is lower than average for the developing
world. (Recall that the overall trend is 1
percentage point per year.) Figure 2 (p 36)
plots the estimates over time. The country’s
share of the total number of people
living below $ 1.25 a day rose from 22 per
cent in 1981 to 33 per cent in 2005. However,
China is largely responsible for this fact.17
If we look at the developing world outside
China, the proportion living below $ 1.25
a day has fallen from 40 per cent to 29
per cent over 1981-2005, which is about
the same proportionate rate of decline
(about 30 per cent) as India (Figure 2).
Figure 1: Alternative Measures of Poverty in India (1981-2005 )
Headcount index (% below poverty line)
70
60
40
20 | | | | | |
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Old international line
($ 1.08 at 1993 at prices using 1993 ppp)
New international line
($ 1.25/day 2005 ppp)
$1.00/day 2005 prices and ppp
(close to India’s official line for 2004/05)
WORLD BANK’S NEW POVERTY ESTIMATES
OCTOBER 25, 2008 EPW Economic & Political Weekly 36
Indeed, India’s share of poverty in the
developing world outside China has fallen,
but only slightly, from 39 per cent in 1981
to 38 per cent in 2005. The fall occurred
in the 1980s; the proportion was also
38 per cent in 1990. Looking across the
rest of the developing world, many countries
have clearly not had India’s success
against poverty. But many have done
better too.
Judged by the $ 1.25 line, the trend rate
of poverty reduction seen in India over
1981-2005 is not sufficient to achieve MDG1;
the projected poverty rate for 2015 is 34
per cent, while the target is 26 per cent
(half the 1990 rate of 51 per cent). When
one uses the $ 1.00 line (close to India’s of-
ficial line at PPP), the MDG1 will be reached,
though just barely; the projected $ 1.00 a
day poverty rate for 2015 is 16 per cent, while
the target is 17 per cent. However, the likely
impacts on India’s poor of the recent rise in
food and fuel prices make it unlikely in my
view that India will reach the first MDG
even using the official poverty line.
Slow Progress
The potential for economic growth to reduce
India’s poverty rate is evident from
the research results discussed above, comparing
the country’s poverty measures for
the $ 1.00 line (close to India’s official line,
at 2005 PPP) with the new international
poverty line of $ 1.25 a day at 2005 PPP.
Recall that a large share – 17 per cent! – of
India’s population is found in this narrow
$ 0.25 a day interval. The other side of the
coin to the implied vulnerability of India’s
“near poor” to a downturn (as discussed
above) is that any growth process that
raises all levels of living by the same proportion
will have a sizeable impact on the
poverty count. A 20 per cent increase in
mean household consumption without any
change in inequality would be equivalent
in its effect on India’s $ 1.25 a day poverty
rate to lowering the poverty line from $
1.25 to $ 1.00. Such a “distribution neutral”
growth process would reduce India’s
$ 1.25 a day poverty rate dramatically,
from 42 per cent to 24 per cent.
Realising that potential is another
matter. The overall response of India’s
poverty measures to growth in GDP per
capita has clearly fallen
short of this potential.18 An
important factor is that (as
noted above) growth in
mean consumption as measured
by the NSS has been
lower than either GDP
growth or growth in mean
consumption as measured
by the NAS. The sources of
this divergence are not yet
well understood. There are
two competing interpretations that can be
offered based on what we know. On the
one hand, it is possible that India’s pace of
poverty reduction is being underestimated
using the NSS; on the other hand, it is no less
likely that the extent of inequality and its
increase over time has been underestimated,
thus reducing the impact of GDP
growth on poverty in India.
There appears to be wide (though not
universal) agreement that growth in GDP
per capita is necessary for sustained poverty
reduction; the main differences lie
in how much impact is expected from
economic growth (depending, in part, on
how one interprets the gap between NSS
and NAS consumption). There is even more
debate on the role played by inequality.
The data do not suggest that India is a
high inequality country. For example, based
on the same NSS data used for measuring
poverty, the poorest 20 per cent account for
about 8 per cent of total household consumption;
in high inequality countries such
as Brazil or South Africa, the poorest 20 per
cent account for 4 per cent or less of total
consumption [World Bank 2007]. (Indeed,
if India had been a high inequality country,
we would not have expected to find that
much potential for growth in mean consumption
to reduce poverty.)19
Nonetheless, the extent of inequality
and how it evolves during the growth
process, matter to India’s progress against
poverty. Inequality is relevant in two (conceptually
distinct) respects.20 First, the way
inequality evolves in a growing economy
naturally determines how much the poor
share (absolutely) in the benefits of that
growth. If the bulk of the growth is found
in places and/or sectors of the economy
where the poor are not concentrated, then
poverty will not fall much. There is evidence
that the (geographic and sectoral) pattern of
growth in India has not been particularly
“pro-poor”, which is putting upward
pressure on inequality in India.21
Second, high inequalities in certain dimensions
can undermine the growth
process itself, and (hence) retard progress
against poverty. Specific sorts of inequality
in India entail that poor people lack the
opportunities others enjoy for taking
advantage of new economic opportunities,
including those unleashed by marketoriented
reforms.22 Unequal access to
the advantages of good schooling is an
important example; there is evidence
that such inequalities greatly attenuate
the poverty-reducing impact of growth in
India’s non-farm economy.23 This can be
reinforced by inequalities in access to
credit for financing productive investment
opportunities. The geography of economic
Figure 2: Poverty in India Compared to the Rest of the Developing World
Headcount index (% below $1.25 a day at 2005 PPP)
| | | | | |
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
70
60
40
20
Developing world
as a whole
Developing
world less China
India
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW OCTOBER 25, 2008 37
activity and public spending can also
make it harder for people in disadvantaged
locations to escape poverty. The
relative disadvantages facing certain social
groups, such as defined by caste and
gender, can also come at a cost to India’s
long-term growth and (hence) progress
against absolute poverty.
Redressing these often deep-rooted inequalities,
while maintaining the economic
growth that is needed for sustained poverty
reduction, is the long-standing challenge
facing all developing countries, including
India. However, while specific trade-offs
will be inevitable at all levels of policymaking,
effectively reducing the inequalities
of opportunity found within India will
almost certainly do more to promote
aggregate growth than to reduce it.
Notes
1 An even larger adjustment was required for China,
which had not officially participated in the ICP
before 2005 [World Bank 2008b]. On the implications
for global poverty measures for China see
Chen and Ravallion (2008b).
2 The Asian Development Bank (2008) has taken a
further step of implementing special price surveys
for Asian countries to collect prices on explicitly
lower qualities of selected items than those identified
in the standard ICP. Using lower quality goods essentially
entails lowering the reference standard
of living used to define the poverty line.
3 Chen and Ravallion (2008a) present results for a
line of $ 2 per day (the median poverty line amongst
developing countries) and $ 2.50 a day (the median
amongst all except the poorest 15 countries).
4 This assumes that nobody lives below our international
poverty line in the OECD countries.
5 The National Sample Surveys provide data on the
consumption expenditures, including imputed
values for consumption in kind, notably from own
farm products, of large random samples of Indian
households.
6 Ninan (2008) claims that there is an inconsistency
between the World Bank’s estimates of poverty
in India (as reported in Chen and Ravallion
2008a) and the World Bank’s estimates of the
shares of consumption held by India’s poor (as reported
in, for example, World Bank 2007). However,
the inconsistency is in Ninan’s calculations, not
the World Bank’s estimates. He compares the poor’s
share of household consumption as estimated from
the National Sample Surveys (NSS) with a version
of the same share but using instead the private consumption
component of India’s national accounts.
Ninan is wrong to infer that there is any inconsistency
between the World Bank’s estimates from the
two sources: both are based on NSS consumption
and they are perfectly consistent.
7 For further discussion of the differences between
the two data sources see Ravallion (2000, 2003)
and Deaton (2005).
8 Korinek et al (2006) examine the implications of
selective compliance for measures of poverty and
inequality. They find that correcting for selective
compliance in the Current Population Survey for
the US leads to a higher inequality measure but
has little effect on measures of poverty.
9 The task force estimated the poverty lines for
1973-74 to be Rs 49.09 and Rs 56.64 for rural and
urban areas respectively. These were the expenditure
levels at which average food energy requirements
were met, which were determined to be
2,400 and 2,100 calories per person per day for
rural and urban areas respectively. (In 2004-05
prices the corresponding lines were Rs 538.6 and
Rs 356.3 per month after adjusting for inflation,
using separate indices for urban and rural areas.)
10 More precisely, India’s official poverty lines for
2004-05 were Rs 538.6 and Rs 356.3 per month.
11 The weights on urban and rural process in India’s
ICP can be derived from the sampling information
available from the ICP. For food, clothing and
footwear, 72 per cent of the 717 sampled price outlets
for India’s ICP were in urban areas and only
28 per cent were rural, while for other goods the
outlets were solely urban. The ICP took simple averages
of these prices. It is assumed that goods
other than food, clothing and footwear had the
same prices in rural and urban areas. Then the
implicit urban and rural international poverty
lines for India consistent with the 2005 ICP have
weights of 0.72 and 0.28 respectively.
12 These are the solutions to two equations: ZU/
ZR=1.51 and 0.72ZU+0.28ZR=15.60×1.25 where
ZU and ZR are the urban and rural international
poverty lines in rupees respectively.
13 Recall that India’s official poverty lines for 2004-05
were Rs 17.71 and Rs 11.71 per day for urban and rural
areas (Rs 538.6 and Rs 356.3 per month). Using our
urban and rural PPPs for 2005 given above these
represent $ 1.03 per day [Chen and Ravallion 2008].
14 For India the national poverty line of $ 1.03 per
day is one-third below the value of $ 1.63 per day
that we predict based on India’s NAS consumption
per capita, based on the cross-country relationship
in Ravallion et al (2008).
15 A 71 per cent proportionate increase in the poverty
rate is associated with a 25 per cent increase in
the poverty line.
16 We decided to drop that NSS survey round for
1999-2000 given the well-known comparability
problem with other rounds (as discussed in Datt
and Ravallion 2002, and Deaton and Drèze 2002)
and the fact that we now have a new survey for
2004-05 that is comparable to the previous round
of 1993-94. We also decided to only use the
5-yearly rounds of the NSS, which have larger
samples and more detailed and more comparable
consumption modules.
17 Chen and Ravallion (2008a) estimate that the
$ 1.25 a day poverty rate in China fell from 84 per
cent to 16 per cent over the period 1981-2005. Yet
again, the gold medal must go to China (and in a far
more important game than any Olympic event).
18 For further discussion see Datt and Ravallion
(1996, 2002) and Ravallion and Datt (1996).
19 If the poor start off with a very small share of the
pie, then they will tend to gain less from a bigger
pie. For recent evidence on how much high inequality
limits the potential for growth to reduce
poverty see Ravallion (2007).
20 For further elaboration of these points see Ravallion
(2007).
21 See Datt and Ravallion (2002) and Deaton and
Drèze (2002).
22 See World Bank (2006) for a full discussion of
how inequalities of opportunity impinge on economic
development.
23 See Datt and Ravallion (2002) and Ravallion and
Datt (2002).
References
Asian Development Bank (2008): Comparing Poverty
across Countries: The Role of Purchasing Power
Parities, Asian Development Bank, Manila.
Bhalla, Surjit (2002): Imagine There’s No Country:
Poverty, Inequality and Growth in the Era of Globalisation,
Institute for International Economics,
Washington DC.
Chen, Shaohua and Martin Ravallion (2004): ‘How
Have the World’s Poorest Fared Since the Early
1980s?’, World Bank Research Observer, 19/2: 141-70.
– (2008a): ‘The Developing World Is Poorer Than
We Thought, but No Less Successful in the Fight
against Poverty’, Policy Research Working Paper
4703, World Bank, Washington DC (http://econ.
worldbank.org/docsearch).
– (2008b): ‘China Is Poorer Than We Thought, But
No Less Successful in the Fight against Poverty’ in
Sudhir Anand, Paul Segal and Joseph Stiglitz (eds),
Debates on the Measurement of Poverty, Oxford
University Press.
Datt, Gaurav and Martin Ravallion (1996): ‘India’s
Checkered History in the Fight against Poverty:
Are There Lessons for the Future?’, Economic &
Political Weekly, 31: 2479-86.
– (2002): ‘Has India’s Post-Reform Economic
Growth Left the Poor Behind’, Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 16(3), 89-108.
Deaton, Angus (2005): ‘Measuring Poverty in a Growing
World (or Measuring Growth in a Poor World)’,
Review of Economics and Statistics, 87: 353-78.
Deaton, Angus and Jean Drèze (2002): ‘Poverty and
Inequality in India: A Re-Examination’, Economic
& Political Weekly, September 7: 3729-48.
Deaton, Angus and Olivier Dupriez (2008): ‘Poverty PPPs
Around the World: An Update and Progress Report’,
mimeo, Development Data Group, World Bank.
Government of India (1979): Report of the Task Force
on Projections of Minimum Needs and Effective
Consumption, Planning Commission, New Delhi.
Heston, Alan and Robert Summers (2008): ‘Interview
with Alan Heston and Robert Summers’, ICP
Bulletin, 5(1): 3-6.
Korinek, Anton, Johan Mistiaen and Martin Ravallion
(2006): ‘Survey Nonresponse and the Distribution of
Income’, Journal of Economic Inequality, 4(2): 33-55.
Ninan, T N (2008): ‘Questionable Numbers’, Business
Standard, September 8.
Ravallion, Martin (2000): ‘Should Poverty Measures
Be Anchored to the National Accounts?’ Economic &
Political Weekly, 34(35 and 36), August 26: 3245-52.
– (2003): ‘Measuring Aggregate Economic Welfare
in Developing Countries: How Well Do National
Accounts and Surveys Agree?’, Review of Economics
and Statistics, 85: 645-52.
– (2007): ‘Inequality Is Bad for the Poor’ in John
Micklewright and Steven Jenkins (eds), Inequality
and Poverty ReExamined,
Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Ravallion, Martin, Shaohua Chen and Prem Sangraula
(2007): ‘New Evidence on the Urbanisation of
Global Poverty’, Population and Development
Review, 33(4): 667-702.
– (2008): ‘Dollar a Day Revisited’, Policy Research
Working Paper 4620, World Bank (http://econ.
worldbank.org/docsearch).
Ravallion, Martin and Gaurav Datt (1996): ‘How Important
to India’s Poor Is the Sectoral Composition
of Economic Growth?’, World Bank Economic
Review, 10: 1-26.
– (2002): ‘Why Has Economic Growth Been More
Pro-Poor in Some States of India than Others?’,
Journal of Development Economics, 68, 381-400.
Ravallion, Martin, Gaurav Datt and Dominique van
de Walle (1991): ‘Quantifying Absolute Poverty in
the Developing World’, Review of Income and
Wealth, 37: 345-61.
United Nations (1998): Evaluation of the International
Comparison Programme (‘Ryten Report’) (http://
siteresources.worldbank.org/ICPINT/Resources/
UNSC30_ICP1_1999.pdf ).
World Bank (1990): World Development Report: Poverty,
Oxford University Press, New York.
– (2006): World Development Report: Equity and
Development, Oxford University Press, New York.
– (2007): World Development Indicators, World
Bank, Washington DC.
– (2008a): Global Purchasing Power Parities and
Real Expenditures, 2005 International Comparison
Program, World Bank, Washington DC (www.
worldbank.org/data/icp).
– (2008b): Comparisons of New 2005 PPPs with
Previous Estimates (Revised Appendix G to World
Bank 2008a), World Bank, Washington DC (www.
worldbank.org/data/icp).
[© by the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Deve lopment/The World Bank, Washington DC, United
States.]
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Assamese Nationality Question
By SAJAL NAG
http://www.manipurresearchforum.org/assam_national_sajal_arch4.htm
A misinformed idea of nation making subdues smaller linguistic communities by a so-called majority community. Assamese nationalist assertion is driven by its desire to break the Bengalee domination of its language and culture. But overridden by the anti-Bengalee movement and the politics of dominance underneath, the smaller communities which formed parts of the composite Assamese identity have today got alienated and parted ways.
Until very recently the making of an Indian was seen as a unilinear, mono-dimensional process manifesting itself in the Indian national movement. The sole objective of the national movement was to rally all the Indians together to combat British colonialism and establish itself as a ‘nation’. (1) The only diversion in this process came from the separatist attitude of the Muslims who played into the ‘divide and rule’ manoeuvres of the colonial administrators and brought about the partition of the country.
One of the foremost challenges to this historiography came when Indian national movement was refused to be seen as a ‘hallowed and blemish-less’ movement. It was pointed out that Indian national movement failed to channelise the currents of national and the social discontents into one single anti-colonial, anti-feudal revolution—a lapse which was described as ‘tragic’.(2) This movement also failed to ensure ‘perfect mobilisation’ (3) which happened due to its bourgeois character.(4) This radical historiography also pointed out that there has been a tendency of the ‘elitist’ historiography to concentrate on the Gandhian uprisings as ‘abnormal outgrowth’ peripheral to the study of the development of Indian nationhood.(5) These critics depicted that it was a distortion of the reality. The Congress-led movement and the popular upsurges in various parts of the country were coeval processes. In fact, often, at opportune times, the Congress leadership attempted to seize control of the latter so as to curb the outburst of any undesirable militancy. The third challenge disputed the theory that the achievement of Indian freedom was solely the work of the Indian National Congress. It brought to light vast new materials to show that the British attempted to retain the ‘jewel of the crown’ until the last-moment (6) but it was the immense panic created by the widespread revolt throughout the country that prompted the war-devastated Britain to make a hasty withdrawal from India.(7) The fourth dimension of the Indian nation making process was discovered by another group of historians who rejected the notion that India was already a nation. It brought into light the fact that colonial India experienced two streams of coeval processes as far as its nationality question was concerned. One was based on its pan-Indian identity and the other on its regional linguistic-cultural identity. While the former stimulated fight against the colonial rule, the latter at the same time worked towards self-assertion.(8)
This school rejected the pre-conceived one-nation-one-national movement theory and formulated that considering the diverse and multiple linguistic, cultural and even racial communities that India consisted of, who are all advancing towards a nation like entity, India can be described as a multi-nationality and multi-ethnic country.(9) India is, therefore, a country which contained a number of nationalities, both nascent and consolidated, who are at various historical stages of development. None of these, however, theoretically speaking, yet by themselves form a nation. Together they form the Indian nation-in-the-making.(10) The nationalist aspirations of self-rule of these entities are either satisfied or neutralised by the federal structure of the union. The period of Indian freedom struggle coincided with the period of awakening of these nationalities. These awakenings manifested themselves in the form of agitations and movements for recognition to their respective vernaculars, formation of unilingual provinces and separation from the dominant nationalities. These movements based on regional identities have been variously termed as ‘little nationalism’,(11) ‘regionalism’,(12) ‘sub-nationalism’ (13) and even full-fledged ‘nationalism’ (14). In general, historically speaking these movements flowed under the shadow of the anti-colonial movement during the colonial period and did not oppose the interest of the latter. In fact, these were not isolated movements but an integral part of the nation-making process itself. But, after independence, these movements occurred with more frequency and intensity as recognition to regional identities and regional autonomy was a promised nationalist agenda. It, therefore, often had to fight against the post-colonial state itself as it went back on its promises and failed to recognise the urgency of reorganisation of the colonial policy.(15) These struggles and the response to it by the colonial state thus form an important chapter of the history of modern India. Unfortunately, the text books of modern Indian history do not include these processes. Although, the resurgence of radical schools of Indian historiography in recent times has forced the entry of peasants, workers, tribals and dalits into the textbooks of modern Indian history(16) which so far were ‘elitist’ and ‘politics’ oriented, ethnic and nationality movements still remain excluded. But the developments that post-colonial India have experienced have made it amply clear that without the inclusion of these streams any understanding of the making of Indian nation would be in-adequate.
In India, the nationality formation process hastened with the advent of British capitalism in colonial form. The new mode of production required a homogeneous market, unified political territory and a common language. The British, therefore, administratively unified the country. In the process, among the groups which first came into contact with the British, the language of the major group was designated the official language of the area indirectly recognising the group as the major nationality. This resulted in suppression of small nationalities whose language was not developed or who were yet to come into contact with the British. Their linguistic-cultural claims were brushed aside. The big nationalities flourished while the small ones remained subdued. The big nationalities spread their social and economic domination(17) by controlling the employment sector owing to the head start they had in the new education system. To assert their nationality status the small groups had to break the domination of the big groups and reinstate their own language and culture in their rightful place. In this nationality formation process, language played a crucial role. It became a rallying point and a symbol of crusade. In Assam, Bengali was introduced as the official language overlooking the claims of the Assamese. The Assamese strongly resented this. The situation was aggravated by the dominance of Bengalees in the employment sector and suppression of Assamese culture. Complaints were voiced in Orrissa also about the unequal status of Oriya vis-à-vis the Bangali language. The situation here was similar to that of Assam. The Oriyas lamented that ‘the Bengalees assert that Oriya is merely a dialect of Bengali and has no claim to be considered as an independent language (though) at a period when Oriya was already a fixed and settled language, Bengali did not even exist.’(18) To this were added other issues which further strained the relationship between the two groups. ‘The new education system was dominated by the Bengalees. There was a movement in progress to replace Oriya by Bengali in administration and education.(19) The movement for the separation of Bihar from Bengal was Bihar’s first effort to ‘assert its own regional identity’.(20) Bihar was tagged to Bengal during pre-British times. This slowed its political and economic development. The emergence of British power sealed Bihar’s fate for another century. On the one hand, the official language of Bihar—‘Hindi’—was not the mother-tongue of any major population group.(21) While on the other, Bihar had to grow under the cultural shadow of Bengal. Bengalees were also the preponderant group in education and jobs. Thus, the agitation for separation of Bihar from Bengal was essentially an anti Bengalee movement.(22) In Madras presidency, the Telegus outnumbered the Tamils but because the Tamils were educationally advanced, they dominated Government service which was then the most important employment sector. This incited jealousy between the two communities.(23) Such conflicts between communities in India, though are often violent and a source of destabilization, were signs of development of nationalities.(24)
FORMATION OF THE ASSAMESE NATIONALITY:
The pre-colonial Assamese were settled in a clearly demarcated geographical territory. The Indo-Aryan Assamese language emerged as the lingua franca for group residing within the boundary including the ruling Ahoms who gave up their language in favour of Assamese. There was corresponding development in literature and culture also. While state intervention helped institutionalise folk culture, the rise of the bhakti movement enriched literature. As a result it became easier to distinguish the Assamese as a separate entity. State control of the production process brought about uniformity in the economic life of the people. The geography of the state and royal policies bred insularity, and consequently dislike for outsiders. A greater Assamese community was emerging on the basis of common language, territory, economic life and mental outlook.(25) The community, however, was not stable because the members of the community, represented distinguishable cultural types; it was not unilingual in spite of Assamese being the lingua franca because the Indo-Mongoloid groups retained their languages for conversation; and the concept of a motherland did not extend beyond the local geographical unit and operated only during external attacks. Inner contradictions surfaced owing to the advancement of a feudal mode of production resulting in the Moamaria peasant uprising in religious garb followed by a fratricidal war of succession. In the internecine power struggle the Ahom royalty threw open the insular society and sought British and Burmese help. The Burmese entered and devastated the structure followed by the British who stayed on to annex the province.
The advent of British rule disrupted the social formation. To render it responsive to the requirements of British capitalism, the existing structure of Assam was transformed by force. The ownership of the means of production was changed and the self-sufficiency of the economy was destroyed. Production for satisfaction of needs was replaced by production for trade. A new revenue system along with its superstructure was introduced. An extensive administrative set up along with a new judicial system made their appearance. The new means of subsistence and functioning changed the value system. The cumulative result was the gradual impoverishment of Assamese peasants, the disappearance of the medieval gentry and the emergence of modern social classes.
A number of Bengalee functionaries entered Assam along with the British. They were the functionaries through whom the changes were effected. A new geographical territory was imposed on the Assamese by attaching them to Bengal. The British rule halted the centuries old process of amalgamation and homogenisation in Assam.
When, in the interest of tea plantations and trade, the British separated Assam from Bengal and created a separate Assam Chief Commissionerate, Bengali was introduced as the official language of Assam. This was a setback for the Assamese. Missionaries preaching Christianity through the medium of the local tongue were also affected. Together they started an agitation to compel change in the policy. The government retaliated by saying that Assamese could not be the medium of instruction since it was a mere Bengali patois. The Assamese middle class and Missionaries made serious efforts to disprove the theory. The British, meanwhile, were supported by prominent Bengalees. However, Assamese was finally declared the official language.
While the subjugation of Assamese was viewed as an attack on the Assamese nationality, the employment of Bengalees was considered to be an attack on the economic rights of the Assamese. In a situation where the traditional means of subsistence were fast disappearing, avenues open to the Assamese were the white collar jobs. However, they lost these jobs to competing Bengalees who had better access to modern education and were often preferred by the British. Economic frustration gave birth to ethnic ideas and resentment.
Ethnic polarisation also permeated the social relations between the two groups. Being the functionaries of the British, the Bengalees identified themselves with the ruling class. Their cultural advancement bred ethnocentrism which led them to flaunt their advancement. Bengali cultural activities, therefore, flourished in the Brahmaputra Valley. In contrast Assamese culture was subdued. Attracted by the advancement of the Bengalees a section of the Assamese delinked themselves from the Assamese community and adopted Bengali culture and openly stated that they were proud of doing so. This resulted in partial acculturation. The societal bi-culturalism hampered the development of the Assamese nationality.
The most serious threat to the Assamese came from the increase in the numerical strength of the Bengalees through continuous immigration. Immigration was not confined to job-seeking Bengalees only. It comprised the land-seeking farm settlers also. The massive immigration continued unabated despite protests from the Assamese because the economy needed these immigrants. From a small immigrant community, the Bengalees became a dominating force. The enlargement of their sphere of influence enabled the Bengalees to lay claim to the resources of the province hitherto considered the exclusive preserve of the Assamese. The Bengalees also demanded and won a share in local self-government and state politics. They challenged the Assamese by demanding that some schools should have Bengali as the medium of instruction. Since they were numerically strong, the government acceded to their demand. The establishment of Bengali (medium of instruction) schools in the Brahmaputra Valley was another setback to the aspirations of the Assamese nationality.
To counter the Bengalee dominance the Assamese had to accomplish a number of arduous tasks. One was to curb the growth of Bengalee population. Since immigration was partially government sponsored, their appeals and protests fell on deaf ears. The immigrants, who happened to be Bengalees, along with the Bengalees of Surma Valley were already in a position to be declared as the majority community of the province. Since the existence of the Assamese nationality now depended on the reduction of the number of the Bengalees in the province it was sought to be achieved by transferring Sylhet to Bengal and assimilating the immigrant Bengalee farm settlers.
Meanwhile, the continuing settlement of Bengalee Muslim immigrants destroyed the homogeneity of Assamese society. The immigrants with an alien religion, different languages, social attitudes and behavioural patterns were regarded as pollutants by the Assamese rural folk who valued their ethnic, linguistic and religious affiliations. The prosperity of the immigrant peasants fuelled the Assamese-Bengalee peasant conflict.
The middle class leadership of Assam taking note of the threats and challenges faced by the Assamese nationality and the ethnic conflict, it was involved in responding to the situation. They established Assamese literature by contributing copiously to it and unearthing its past glory. They also successfully demolished the theory that Assamese was a dialect of the Bengali language and affirmed its separate identity. Through a process of meticulous politicisation and socialisation they channelled the fears and aspirations of the emerging Assamese nationality into a social movement.
The movement for the development of the Assamese nationality attracted participation of all classes of the society. Reduction of the numerical strength of the Bengalee was taken up as the most urgent task by the Assamese at the social level. They joined the Bengalees of Sylhet in their demand that Sylhet be transferred back to Bengal. The Assamese now forced the government to stop further immigration and evict the existing immigrants. The unrestricted immigration also increased the percentage of the Muslim population in Assam since a large number of the immigrant Bengalees were Muslims. This led the Muslim League to demand that Assam be transferred to the proposed state of Pakistan. The Grouping plan of the Cabinet Mission which bracketed Assam with Bengal was a simultaneous threat. While the former proposal meant that the Assamese would lose their identity in the proposed Islamic State of Pakistan, the latter proposal meant that they would be absorbed in Bengal. Both were considered equally perilous for the survival of the Assamese nationality which found itself cornered both on linguistic and religious grounds. To fight these threats the entire Assamese society fought as unified group. Eventually, the Assamese leadership succeeded in thwarting the Grouping plan. Soon, Sylhet too was transferred to Pakistan.
The Assamese-Bengalee ethnic conflict, thus, was an integral part of the process of the development of the Assamese nationality. By the fourth decade of the twentieth century the Indo-Mongoloid groups like the Bodos and Ahoms who hitherto formed a part of the Assamese nationality also began to show signs of secession which the Assamese leadership failed to perceive. With its new found chauvinism, the Assamese nationality not only ignored the grievances of such groups, it even brushed aside their cultural aspirations.
Again though the numerical strength of the Bengalees had reduced after the transfer of Sylhet to Pakistan, a few lakhs of Bengalee Hindus entered Assam as refugees in successive waves. They added to the existing Bengalee population. But the potential source of danger was the immigrants who declared themselves as Assamese in the Census Reports without actually going through the assimilation process. In a political structure where ‘numbers’ could make or break a nationality; this turn out to become a major issue of concern. The perpetual fear that the Assamese faced then onwards was that at any time these immigrants might resume calling themselves Bengalees thereby tilting the balance again in favour of the Bengalees
.
The rise and development of the ethnic conflict in Assam had Assamese nationality formation as its backdrop, either of these was not an isolated process. In fact, the ethnic conflict and Assamese nationality formation were inextricable parts of the same process—of the development of Assamese nationality.
POST INDEPENDENCE CRISIS:
After independence ethno-nationality issues began to surface endemically. The outbreak of a strong and violent ethnic conflict after 1947 was perhaps nowhere as prominent as in Assam. The ethnic conflict in Assam had its making during the colonial period. In that period there was no violent clash between the Bengalees and the Assamese. The Assamese wanted to remove the Bengalees from their social unit. The transfer of Sylhet to Pakistan and eviction of immigrants substantially reduced the Bengalee and Muslim population in the Assam Valley. This reduced the threat to the political aspirations of the Assamese. However, the preponderant Bengali culture in the valley worried the Assamese. The influx of refugees from then Pakistan again increased the Bengalee population of Assam. The tension surfaced again. Soon after independence an open clash broke out in 1948 between the two communities. In major towns of Assam valley, Bengalees were assaulted on the streets and Bengali signboards were pulled down. The assaulters were drawn from the student community. The social base of the movement was becoming wider and its manifestation more violent.
1948 also ushered in a new phase in the movement. So far the Assamese had viewed expulsion of the Bengalees as a means of reducing the threat to their aspirations. They now found that a thorough Assamesisation of the province would reduce the fear of Bengali acculturation. The pulling down of Bengali signboards and the demand to use Assamese on signboards was one device. The violent outburst that took place in 1954, 1955 and 1960 were a continuation of the 1948 phase. While in 1954 and 1955, the Assamesistation efforts were more extensive, in 1960 a bolder step was taken. Assamese was sought to be introduced as the official language of Assam. The political leaders of the province also supported the demand and the government took necessary steps to implement it. The Bengalees mainly in the Cachar Valley and the hill tribes offered massive resistance to the move. Violent disturbances took place in various parts of the state in protest against the forcible imposition of the Assamese language. Loot, arson, assaults, injuries and deaths(26) were followed by the hill peoples’ demand for separation from Assam.
The move to impose Assamese proved to be both a disaster and a reve-lation for the Assamese. It showed that the time was not yet ripe for such an attempt and that the Assamese were not the undisputed dominant community in Assam. The resistance offered by the Bengalees showed that they were also a force to reckon within Assam. It also revealed that the Assamese did not have an economic foothold in their own state. The Marwari trading community virtually controlled the economy. Hence, in 1968, a movement was launched against the Marwaris wherein they were asked to quit Assam.
The 1970 and 1972 outbursts were pre-and post-census (1971) attempts at Assamesisation. In 1970, it was an attempt to terrorise Bengalees to declare Assamese as their mother-tongue in the census. In 1972, it was a reaction to the increase in the Bengalee population. It was suspected that many refugees who entered Assam in the wake of the Bangladesh War (1971) stayed back illegally and registered themselves as regular Indian citizens in the Census which further increased the Bengalee population.
The Assamese achieved no significant success in these movements. Hence, in 1979-80, the anti-foreign national movements were launched. It was a renewed attempt to reduce the numerical strength of Bengalees in Assam. It grew into a social upheaval and continued for an incredibly long duration. It unleashed a reign of terror, violence and genocide of a magnitude unknown in Assam. It initiated a constitutional crisis. The professed demand was detection and deportation of illegal Bengalee foreign nationals resident in the state. However, the events in the movements showed that it was really an attempt by the Assamese to expel Bengalees from Assam to retain Assamese hegemony in the state and realise their political aspirations. The development and recognition of Assamese as a full-fledged nationality was sought to be achieved by reducing the numerical strength of Bengalees in Assam. But the move proved disastrous as it not only failed to detect and deport the so called foreign nationals, it alienated other groups of the composite Assamese nationality. The major secessionist movement was launched by the Bodos—the largest tribal community of the Brahmaputra valley. They declared themselves as a full fledged nationality, demanded complete autonomy by dividing Assam ‘fifty-fifty’ and launched a violent movement for self rule. The arrogance and chauvinism of the caste Hindu Assamese also led the Ahoms to break away from the parent community and search an alternate identity. They were followed by the Tiwas, Karbis, Dimasas, and so on, all of whom demanded self rule outside the Assamese hegemony. The grant of autonomous councils has temporarily calmed some of these tribes while other still have launched violent insurgency to achieve their objective.
NOTES & REFERENCES:
1. This has been the general perspective of the historiographical school categorised as ‘nationalist’.
2. Sumit Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, (New Delhi: People’s Publishing House), 1973, pp. 512–16.
3. Gyanendra Pandey, The Ascendancy of the Congress in Uttar Pradesh: A Study in Imperfect Mobilisation, (Delhi: Oxford University Press), 1978.
4. Rajni Palme Dutt, India Today, (London), 1947; A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian Nationalism, (Bombay: Popular Prakashan), (1947) 1966.
5. Gyanendra Pandey, op.cit., p. 217. An entire school of historiography subsequently emerged which launched a crusade against the elitist historiography and highlighted this aspect of Indian national movement. See the series entitled Subaltern Studies (New Delhi: Oxford University Press) edited by Ranajit Guha.
6. Partha Sarathi Gupta, ‘Imperial Strategy and the transfer of power 1939–51’, in Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India 1945–47, (New Delhi: Manohar), 1987.
7. Sumit Sarkar, Modern India, 1885–1947, (New Delhi: Macmillan), 1983, pp. 414–46. Also the articles in Amit Kumar Gupta (ed.), op.cit.
8. Amalendu Guha, ‘Indian National Question: A Conceptual Framework’, in Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 17, Special Number, July 31, 1982, pp. 2–12. Also see his ‘Great Nationalism, Little Nationalism and Problem of National Integration: A tentative View’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 14, Annual, February 1979, pp. 355–458. Also see his ‘Nationalism: Pan-Indian and Regional in Historical Perspective’, Presidential Address, Modern India Section, Indian History Congress, 44th Session, Burdwan, 1983. See, Sudhir Chandra, ‘Regional Consciousness in 19th Century India: A Preliminary Note’, Economic and Political Weekly, August 17, 1982, pp. 1282–86. See, K. Narayana Rao and G. Dasaradha, The Emergence of Andhra Pradesh, (Bombay), 1973. See, Nivedita Mohanti, Oriya Nationalism, (New Delhi: Manohar), 1982. See, Sajal Nag, Roots of Ethnic Conflict: Nationality Question in North East India, (New Delhi: Manohar), 1990. See, N. Ram, ‘Dravida Movement in Pre-Independence Phase’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 14, No. 78, February 1979, pp. 377–402.
9. Irfan Habib, ‘Emergence of Nationalities’, in TDSS, Nationality Question in India, Pune, 1987, pp. 17–25. Also see, Amalendu Guha, op.cit. See, Sajal Nag, op.cit.
10 Amalendu Guha, ‘Indian National Question, etc.’, op.cit.
10. Amalendu Guha, ‘Indian National Question, etc.’, op.cit.
11. —, ‘Great Nationalism, etc.’, op.cit.
12. —, ‘Nationalism: ‘Pan-Indian, etc.’, op.cit. See, Sudhir Chandra, op.cit. Also see, Akhtar Majeed (ed.), Regionalism: Developmental Tension in India, (New Delhi: Cosmo), 1984. See, Paul Wallace (ed.), Region and Nation in India, (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH), 1985. See, G. Hargopal, ‘Dimension of Regionalism, Nationality Question in Andhra Pradesh’, in TDSS, op. cit., pp. 360–90. See, M. Mishra, Politics of Regionalism in India with special Reference to Punjab, (New Delhi: Deep and Deep), 1988.
13. K.L. Sharma, ‘Jharkhand Movement: The Questions of Identity and Sub-Nationality’, Social Action, Vol. 40, No. 4, October–December, 1990, pp. 370–81.
14. Ghanshyam Shah and K.M. Munshi, ‘Gujarat and Indian Nationalism’, paper presented in a seminar on Nationalism: Problems and Challenges, organised by K.M. Munshi Centenary Committee and Government of Gujrat, Centre for Social Studies, Surat (henceforth CSS). Also see, Surjit Hans, ‘Punjabi Nationalism’, ibid. Also see articles by Udayan Mishra on the Nagas, V. Anai Muthu on the Tamils, Shankar Guha Niyogi on Chattisgarh, in Andhra Pradesh Radical Students Union, Nationality Question in India, (Hyderabad), 1982. Prof. Javed Alam called the anti-colonial movement for independence in India as a supra-nationality nationalism and the various national movement of the people belonging to different national groups remained subsumed under it, north withstanding the demand for Pakistan. See his ‘Class, Political and Natonal Dimesions of State Autonomy Movements in India’ in TDSS, op.cit.
15. Sajal Nag, ‘Multiplication of Nations? Political Economy of Sub-nationalism in India’, Economic and Political Weekly, July 17-24, 1993, pp. 1521–32.
16. Sumit Sarkar, op. cit.
17. Anil Seal, Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the 19th Century, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1968, pp. 345–46.
18. John Beams, A Comparative Grammar of Modern Aryan Languages of India, (New Delhi), 1966, pp. 117–19.
19. B.I. Kluyev, op.cit.; also Mayadran Manisha, cited in V. Nagendra (ed.), Indian Literature, (Agra), 1959, p. 464.
20. Shaibal Gupta, op.cit.
21. Paul R. Brass, Language, Religion and Politics in Northern India, (Delhi), 1974, p. 69.
22. Shaibal Gupta, op.cit.
23. Hilbert Slater, Southern India: Its Political and Economic Problem, (London), 1936, p. 312.
24. Jyotirindra Dasgupta, op.cit., pp.1–30 and pp. 225–70.
25. See, Sajal Nag, Roots of Ethnic Conflict: Nationality Questions in North East India, (New Delhi: Manohar), 1990, for formation of Assamese nationality.
26. For a detailed account of the 1960 disturbances see H.C. Barua, A Glimpse of Assam Disturbances, (Gauhati), 1961. Also see, Assam Sahitya Sabha, Assam’s State Language, (Jorhat), 1960. See, K.C. Barua, Assam: Her People and Language, (Shillong), 1960. See, Narayan Choudhury, Asamer Bhasha Danga (in Bengali), (Calcutta), 1963. See, Amitabh Choudhury, Mukher Bhasha Buker Rudhir (in Bengali), (Calcutta), 1961.
Cops work on Ulfa 709 unit & leader
A STAFF REPORTER
Guwahati, Oct. 24: Police have established direct links with Ulfa’s 709 battalion leader Hira Sarania and are now hopeful of bringing overground the last potent fighting arm of the outfit.
A highly placed police officer in Lower Assam said the elusive Sarania had not committed himself but not rejected the idea either. “He has not snapped communication with us, which itself raises a lot of hope,” a police officer said.
He said a “sergeant major” of Ulfa, Bhaskar Rajbongshi, who surrendered in Guwahati a couple of months back, was acting as a go between the police and the battalion commander.
After his surrender, Rajbongshi got in touch with Sarania to persuade him to follow the path of the leaders of the 28 battalion.
Security forces said after the declaration of ceasefire by the Alpha and Charlie companies of the 28 battalion, if they could crack the 709 battalion, then the outfit could be completely neutralised militarily.
“The 28 and 709 are the two main fighting battalions of the outfit not only in terms of striking power, but from a strategic point of view too. The 28 battalion gives the outfit access to Myanmar, while the 709 battalion uses Bhutan and Nepal,” the officer said.
Given the health condition of Sarania and mood of other important functionaries of the battalion, it would be just a matter of time before the 7 09 battalion too joined the peace process, the official said.
Sarania has been accused of masterminding most of the violence in Lower Assam and bomb blasts in Guwahati.
Peaceniks of the 28 battalion are also trying to persuade the cadres of the 709 battalion to come overground.
Ulfa accusation: Ulfa today accused a senior pro-talks leader of 28 battalion, Jiten Dutta, of killing many innocent people while he was in the outfit, to malign its image.
“A teacher was killed in front of his students and many others, including the niece of the outfit’s commander-in-chief Paresh Barua, were killed on charges of being spies by Jiten Dutta in league with Indian security forces to malign Ulfa,” Ulfa spokesperson Anjan Borthakur said in a statement.
Supporting the protest over the killing of five youths at Kakopathar, Borthakur said they were killed by Dutta when he was in Ulfa.
This was done without the knowledge of the outfit’s top leadership, he added.
The protests in Kakopathar against Ulfa over the killings were also instigated by Dutta, the Ulfa spokesperson said.
http://www.telegraphindia.com/1081025/jsp/northeast/story_10018367.jsp
Q&A: What hopes for peace in Assam?
Assam has been plagued by violence since the 1970s
Indian security forces have been fighting separatist rebels in the state of Assam for decades. Who is behind the violence and what are the prospects for peace? BBC News looks at the background to one of India's longest-running insurgencies.
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Why is there so much violence in Assam?
Much of the recent trouble in Assam has been blamed by the authorities on the United Liberation Front of Assam (Ulfa), formed in 1979 to fight for the state's independence. It has carried out a series of campaigns, including targeting oil and gas pipelines, transport and telecommunication facilities and security patrols.
At least 10,000 people have died since 1979. There are other less powerful insurgent groups in Assam but they have mostly reached negotiated agreements with the authorities.
What are the chances of bringing Ulfa to the negotiating table?
Negotiations with the Ulfa broke down in late 2006 after running for about a year. The BBC's Subir Bhaumik says the chances of re-starting the talks are slim.
Is Ulfa united?
Some members of the separatist group - including one of its elite strike battalions - have laid down their arms and are in active discussions with the government. But two battalions allegedly led by the central Ulfa leadership from secret hideouts in neighbouring Bangladesh remain committed to an armed struggle.
What is the strategy of the Indian government?
The government has tried to split the Ulfa - hence its deal with members of the so-called 28th battalion. But members of two other Ulfa battalions - the 27th and 109th - did not reach a deal which prompted the army to intensify its operations against them. The Indian government says that they too must shun violence and agree to direct negotiations if they are also to be brought into the peace process.
What is the strategy of Ulfa?
Ulfa says that the army must stop military operations and release members of its top leadership from military custody before it enters negotiations. Military analysts say that with its support base dwindling, the Ulfa has resorted to "urban terrorism" as the only way to strike back.
What will happen now?
Some experts fear that Assam is now entering another dark period - bomb explosions followed by military clampdowns - which have over the years seriously inhibited economic growth in a state which is only connected to the rest of India by a narrow but strategically important strip of land known as the "chicken neck".
There are also fears for Hindi and Bengali-speaking settlers in the state, who have been attacked in recent years. Authorities blame the attacks on Ulfa rebels.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7699314.stm
Sikkim assembly to bring resolution for Gorkhaland
Gangtok, Oct 27: The ruling Sikkim Democratic Front (SDF) would bring a resolution in Sikkim assembly to support the demand for separate Gorkhaland, Senior SDF leader and Chief Minister Pawan Kumar Chamling's political advisor B B Gooroong said in a press conference on Monday.
Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) president Bimal Gurung had appealed for a resolution in Sikkim legislature to support their demand for Gorkhaland.
On the sensitive issue of Gorkhaland state, Gooroong, a former Chief Minister himself in 1980s, reiterated his party's moral support for the statehood demand.
"SDF president Chamling is doing necessary spadework for the cause and he will also speak on the issue at an opportune time," Gooroong said.
http://www.zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=479257&sid=REG
Posted by barunroy on June 20, 2008
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It is high time that the Darjeeling MP make his personal stance on the issue of Gorkhaland clear… Whether he is personally in favour of Gorkhaland or whether following his party stance he is also against the formation of Gorkhaland? He can no longer wade through the water knee deep and say I am both in land and water writes Barun Roy
The West Bengal Pradesh Congress Committee has decided to launch an awareness campaign on Gorkhaland. “At the first instance, I was overwhelmed when I heard that the Pradesh Congress Committee was going to launch an awareness campaign on Gorkhaland,” a local Congress leader said jubilantly as he sat before me sipping a hot cup of tea. “At last, our party had done the right thing, a statewide if not a nation wide deliberation on Gorkhaland was needed. Let everyone come forward and discuss on everything concerning Gorkhaland. I was excited and elevated. But when PCC President Priya Ranjan Das Munshi told me that instead we were to make the people aware of our party’s negative stance on Gorkhaland, I was left disappointed and disillusioned. Who made the decision? Why had Priya Ranjan Das Mushi to come out in the open saying Congress is not in favour of Gorkhaland. We do not want the formation of Gorkhaland. We do not want the division of Bengal. It all seems crap to me”.
Certainly, the veteran Hill Congress Leader’s sentiments are equivocal to the dissention running deep in the Hills and the Plains. In fact, the very organization of the Congress Party in the Darjeeling District is fraught with ambiguity. The Darjeeling District Congress Committee is divided into Hills and Plains division. While Darjeeling is the headquarters of the District, the decision of the Darjeeling District Congress Committee (Plains) headed by Shankar Malakar is final. Hill Leaders like Chabi Rai and Nakul Chettri are disowned at a whim. A party insider says, “There is always an inherent tension between the Plains and Hills Congress Party men. The Hill leaders most of the time find their words subdued in the remarks of Plains Congressmen whenever a meeting is held in Siliguri. It is rarely that important meetings are held in Darjeeling.”
The Pradesh Congress Committee President Priya Ranjan Das Munshi and the Darjeeling District Congress Committee (Plains) President, Shankar Malakar’s assertion that Nakul Chettri and Chabi Rai are ‘self purported Hill leaders misrepresenting the Congress Party” is unfortunate. A leader like Priya Ranjan Das Munshi disowning his own grass root level leaders and cadres is not just uncalled for but down right preposterous. However, the Union Minister and the Siliguri based Sankar Malakar’s statement and stance on their own party leaders and cadres in the hills is much subdued compared to the Darjeeling Congress MPs assertion that both Nakul Chettri and Chabi Rai were attending the ‘All Party Meeting’ called by Gorkha Janmukti Morcha ‘as observers’ as it was important for the Congress Party to know what was happening in the Hills. The same Congress MP had on the 17 of June said, “Being a representative of the hill Congress, Nakul Chettri, has every right to ‘take part’ in the political congregation in Darjeeling at this critical hour.” I wonder what made the leader change his stance today. As a leader of the Darjeeling District Congress Committee (Hills) will he come to the aid of the Hills leaders or will he quote and misquote himself ultimately confusing himself and a whole lot of others in the whole issue. It is high time that the Darjeeling MP make his personal stance on the issue of Gorkhaland clear… Whether he is personally in favour of Gorkhaland or whether following his party stance he is also against the formation of Gorkhaland? He can no longer wade through the water knee deep and say I am both in land and water.
Why is Congress so worried over its stance on Gorkhaland?
The Congress has strangely enough outdone the Communist Party of India Marxist in making their stance known to the people vis-à-vis Gorkhaland. The Communist Party of India Marxists has thus far restrained themselves from launching an Anti-Gorkhaland Awareness Campaign relying on a dialogue with the ‘Hill People’. The Congress Stance on letting Bengal know that they are against the formation of Gorkhaland and the division of Bengal is aimed at Bengal sans Darjeeling District. The Congress party be it at New Delhi or at Kolkata knows that it cannot risk alienating the majority of Bengal by being in favour of Gorkhaland. Priya Ranjan Das Munshi hopes that with his stance known it will help theoretically help him regain power in the state and at the same time do well in the Lok Sabha elections. A deeper prodding of the Trinamul Congress leadership would also lead to similar conclusions that the national and the regional parties will not come out openly in favour of Gorkhaland. But at least they would not come out as openly and as hastily against Gorkhaland either as Congress has done. No matter what the Congress leadership’s vision both at the AICC and the PCC level; Priya Ranjan Das Munshi’s eagerness to disown the aspirations and dreams of the people Darjeeling Hills and Dooars Terai would be a massive self inflicted injury in a long term. This is also indicative to the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha, Communist Party of the Revolutionary Marxists, All India Gorkha League and Bharatiya Gorkha Parisangha and indeed to all those demanding for a separate statehood in India – Gorkhaland, Telangana or Greater Cooch Behar cannot be achieved merely by sending delegations to the State and the Central Governments. A nation wide newer states campaign must be worked out if the national parties like Congress and BJP are to be made to believe that carving newer states is in their interest. Until this is done, the national parties like Congress and BJP whose primary interest lies only in the formation of a Government at the Centre will not be sympathetic to the formation of newer states. All they are ever interested are in the number of MPs.
http://beacononline.wordpress.com/2008/06/20/a-nation-wide-newer-states-movement-is-the-only-way-out/
The Gorkhaland movement in the north-eastern Darjeeling district of Indian state of West Bengal is in full bloom again, reminding residents of this hilly terrain of the bloody struggle for a separate Gorkha state within the Indian union that reached its peak some two decades back only to be brutally crushed by Indian paramilitary troops.
Normal life in Darjeeling and the surrounding places including Siliguri, which has a large number of Nepali speaking residents has been crippled by the indefinite strike called by the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) in the area demanding "separate statehood within India' since Monday.
In Support of Gorkhaland
(Courtesy: Siddhartha Thapa)
Labels: National Identity
6 comments:
Anonymous said...
Hear, hear and we can put down these troubles to the blatant, deplorable and inexcusable inactivity on Nepal's Ambassador in Delhi. He should simply emulate what his counterpart in Kathmandu is already doing so much of and so well. We also need to blame the international departments of Nepali political parties for the way in which these little local Indian difficulties are evolving - why aren’t they over there following the fine example of Yechuri bhai? Beware – we as Nepaulis simply cannot hide behind principles like non-interference, respect for sovereignty, etc, when our beloved neighbour’s house could conceivably be engulfed by a horrible fire. By the way what’s become of UNMIN and OHCHR? Given the great job they have done in Nepaul, why are they being so coy about opportunities across the border?
http://nepaliperspectives.blogspot.com/2008/06/in-support-of-gorkhaland.html
RSS-BJP-VHP attempt to make Orissa a Hindutva Laboratory
Written by Bhalchandra Shadangi
Wednesday, 17 September 2008
Communal Violence in Kandhamal District
The present dispensation of BJD- BJP of the state came to power with the help of Sangh Parivar. Since the minority vote is very small (2% Christians and 1.5% Muslims) so they are insignificant for the electoral race. Due to this vote bank politics the lives and livelihood of thousands of minority people does not matter for Naveen Pattnaik Govt. It gave a free hand to the communal elements from 24th onwards. While communal leader Tagodia was allowed to enter Kandhamal despite curfew no opposition party leader including minister of state for Home was not allowed to visit Kandhamal. The 25th Aug. Bandh called by VHP was a govt. sponsored one. On 24th Sept. itself Govt. declared holiday for schools and colleges in the state and instructed the police for restraint and not to use force against the Sangh activists.
Kashmir : Peoples Upsurge for Azadi bursts out due to policies of Central and State's Govts.
Written by CPI(ML)ND
Tuesday, 30 September 2008
Speaking from the Red Fort on 15th August 2008, Manmohan Singh talked about the need to provide better arrangements for pilgrims to Amarnath; praising the role of Kashmiris in providing such arrangements upto now, he called it an example of the secular traditions of India, and he opposed 'divisive' politics. However he failed to tell the country why Chief Minister of J&K Gulam Nabi Azad chose to violate the landownership laws of J&K and join hands with the already transferred Governor Sinha to transfer land of Kashmir. He also failed to utter ever a word of sympathy (leave alone express regret) for the around 40 Kashmiris killed by armed forces' bullets over the previous four days or the over 200 injured by them, or for the families of the dead and injured.
To understand the current situation in J&K it is necessary to briefly recapitulate its history. After the defeat of the Sikh Kingdom in 1846, the pro-British colonialism Dogra King of Jammu, Gulab Singh, bought Kashmir Valley from the British for 75 Lakh Rupees and established the state of J&K in the form existing till 1947. It the state he ruled over, all three parts - Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir - were present. During the communal division of the country by British rulers along with Congress and Muslim League in 1947, King Hari Singh associated this state with India in 1947, on certain conditions, By that time the State was divided 60 : 40, with one part under control of India and secured for it by the Army, and the other under Pak control. At that time there was a sharp antimonarchy struggle on in the state in the leadership of National Conference. Hari Singh became the first President of that part of the state which was with India and Shiekh Abdullah (leader of National Conference) its first Prime Minister. Hari Singh's decision to accede to India was not acceptable to all sections of the state which came to India, but due to Sheikh Abdullah's endorsement, people's opinion was divided.
However, leave alone conducting a referendum, India' ruling classes concentrated on consolidating their hold over the state while alienating the Kashmiris who are predominantly Muslims. The conditions accepted at the time of accession have been either violated, modified in 1974, or under mined. India's rule over the Kashmir Valley has been primarily through armed forces. Repressive Laws like Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), Disturbed areas act and other repressive laws have been continually operative in the area, giving the armed forces unbridled powers, Democratic rights have been continually and cruelly suppressed; political rights thrown to the winds. Elections held from time to time have been a farce in the valley. Instead of any attempt to win the confidence of the people of J&K conduct of India's ruling classes has inexorably strengthened their conviction that peace, freedom from repression by armed forces, and unity of Kashmiri people can only be achieved by freedom from India.
There has been a long standing communal opinion in India's ruling classes that this state should be divided into three parts, and the Kashmiris (i.e. Muslims) be allowed to separate out along with as little as possible of the upper part of the Valley. Jammu and Ladakh along with as much of the lower part of the Valley of possible should be retained in India. In its main contours this was the understanding of Sardar Patel; when LK Advani talks about the 'unfinished task' of the 1947 communal division viz a viz Kashmir, it is this understanding he reveals. This is the understanding which Sharma of the Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti has stated in so many words. India's rulers covet the land of Kashmiris and don't care a hoot about its people. Thus they rant about J&K being an 'unalienable part of India' and about unity and integrity' in reference to an area which even India's Govt. has acknowledged before UN as a disputed area. Not only this. Over the years the ruling classes of India have systematically worked to create communal divisions in the state. While there is no need to repeat this long history here in details, it has to be kept in mind to understand the present events.
It is a reality that when Kashmiris study in other parts of India, go there to trade or to work, they are looked upon with suspicion, troubled by the police for no reason, and they live with fear, and this situation is worsening. As is the situation in the rest of the India, there are no jobs for the youth in J&K and inadequate educational opportunities including for higher education.
Jammu Struggle - Blockade of Kashmir
Even as Governor Vohra revoked the demand of the Amarnath Board for land transfer thereby rendering infructuous the transfer and so laying to rest the dispute raised by the trio of Gen. Sinha - Gulam Nabi Azad - Mufti, a movement was launched in Jammu by three congress MLAs of Jammu, Congress MPs and activists of RSS and BJP, This was run under the banner of Amarnath Yatra Sangharsh Samiti. Its leader, Sharma, as also BJP leader Rajnath Singh had announced in July 2008 itself that economic blockade of Kashmir Valley would be carried out and the Kashmiris would be taught a lesson. Trucks coming from Kashmir were stoned, they were stopped and their drivers beaten up, trucks going to Kashmir were stopped enroute not only in Jammu but also in Punjab on the GT Road in the areas of BJP MLAs (the GT Road is the sole road link between Delhi and Jammu). Agitators themselves claimed that in 40 days 10,000 demonstrations were held with many being around the Banihal Pass which is the straight route between Jammu and Kashmir. Thus the easy way to open the blockade was to send army escorts with convoys of trucks and for army patrols for the Pass. This neither the Congress not the BJP wanted (Hindu, 13th Aug. 2008). The intention of the agitators becomes crystal clear also from the fact that they dug up the railway line being laid to link Kashmir with the rest of the country.
The role of the Congress in Jammu agitation is clear along with the active role of the VHP. There is no need to repeat mention of the role of Cong. CM of the state, Gulam Nabi Azad. Apart from this, leaving aside two local Congress leaders, the rest of the Congress leadership in Jammu was in the leadership of the agitation. This included ex Dupty CM of the state Mangat Ram Sharma, Gulchain Singh Charak, R.S. Chib, Shyam Lal Gupta, Manohar Lal and Lal Singh. A report in Hindu (23rd Aug. 2008) establishes that the main Congress leaders of Jammu went to Delhi to demand from the party leadership (they met Sonia Gandhi also) that it support the Sangharsh Samiti.
Two old men committed suicide in Jammu in support of the 'reaction agitation' and there were nine reported deaths in police firings (including deaths of Kashmiris in mixed districts). 10,000 people who were arrested in Jammu on different days of the agitation (quite a few on the charge of attacking police) were all given bail; later of course, as part of the settlement with the agitation, it has been decided to compensate all those who suffered any loss in the agitation. So it was a fight paid for by the Govt. However these 'democratic' methods were not applicable to the Valley. Rather the Hurriyat leaders were put under house arrest for the Muzaffarabad Chalo Call, though Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti leaders roamed free in Jammu to implement economic blockade. Three of the six districts of Jammu have a mixed population - in all three there was anti Muslim violence. On 13th Aug. 2008, when Muslims in Kishtwar came out to protest against the killing of Hurriyat leader Sheikh Aziz, two of them were killed in army firing. On the same day 'shoot at sight' orders were issued for this area. No communal incident of any kind took place during the entire period in the Valley where the Amarnath Yatris were present in huge numbers; the Hurriyat leaders went and met the Yatris, explained the purpose of their agitation to them, ensured that shops were kept open for the Yatris during bandh calls, organized 'langars' for them and accorded them the status of Guests. The national English dailies gave no space to these activities of the Hurriyat leaders.
There was an Economic Blockade of Kashmir
After the 'Muzaffarabad Chalo' call was given, the Govt. of India, the BJP and the Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti have repeatedly claimed that the people of the Valley were purposely lying that an economic blockade was on and Hurriyat was using this false propaganda to instigate the people. Reports claimed that apples ripened at the end of Aug, then how could they be already under threat of rotting (as the Traders Association of Kashmir was fearing) etc. Basically, after threatening a blockade the perpetrators denied the existence of one, and the Union Govt. stood by their denial.
To effect an economic blockade it is not necessary to stop every single truck or beat every single driver - if such incidents start occurring, how many traders will risk their goods anywhere in the country? The Home Minister of India took an all party delegation of parliamentary parties to Jammu, and then he proceeded to Srinagar. Here representatives of the Apple Traders Association of Kashmir and of the Kashmir Chamber of Commerce waited for over two hours after his arrival to meet him. They, however, could not meet the minister. Later, the Home minister announced that there was no economic blockade in place, and if fruits could not leave the Valley they would be purchased by the CRPF and distributed to the Valley's children. If the fruit rotted, the Govt. would give compensation. Along with he advised chemists in the Valley to requisition their needs directly from suppliers in Delhi. Do all these riders not substantiate on economic blockade. Not only this, on 18th Aug, leader of the Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti, Sharma, reiterated that such a blockade would be enforced that the world would come to know of it. Probably because he is a Hindu he is not labeled as a 'separatist' or a 'terrorist' by the communal Govt. of India or the media.
On 21st Aug' 08, the Economic Times made public a secret report of the Central Govt. which substantiated that an economic blockade of the Valley was on. According to the figures quoted, the number of loaded trucks moving in and out of the Valley in July 2008 was 28% less than in the same period in 2007. In the first 18 days of August, in comparison to 2007, trucks coming the Kashmir decreased 49%, while 64% less loaded trucks left the valley in the period compared to the same period last year.
The economic blockade started in spurts from 22nd June 2008 after the announcement of the same by BJP state President Ashok Khajuria. Loaded trucks going to Delhi with fruits were looted at Kathua and Samba. Two drivers, both residents of the Valley, were greviously injured in attacks and were admitted to Govt. Hospitals in Delhi, where eventually one (Shri Mohd Latif Vani) died at the AIIMS. On 17th Aug. 2008, driver Basheer Ahmad Shala was attacked at Kathua using petrol bombs and trishuls. He had to be hospitalized.
Usually 1000 trucks go towareds Srinagar per day during summers and around 400 per day come form Srinagar. In 2007, 4216 laden trucks came out of Kashmir in the first ten days of August; this year the figure was nearly 884 trucks for the same period.
Thi situation in Kashmir Valley is that it anyway gets habitually snowed into isolation for long periods in winter, so people there have a basic storage of foodstuffs. It is vegetables and medicines, especially supplies for the hospitals which were at this time getting hundreds of bullet and bone injuries, that were acutely compromised.
Amarnath Yatra Board
Why was the Amarnath Yatra Board set up in the first place? For over 160 years the Govt. of J&K has been making the arrangements for the annual yatra. The task now includes registration of pilgrims in different states, distributing quotas among the states, deciding the duration of the yatra, making arrangements for pilgrims' stay and food. The army, which is present all over Kashmir, is also involved in security arrangements. The Govt.'s clarification is that a committee was instituted in 1996 which suggested the setting up of the Board. Why was the committee formed? There were landslides in Amarnath area in which 200 yatris were stuck for several days in mountains. The Govt. of India set up the committee which on the one hand setup the Board and on the other recorded that it was because of local Kashmiri people that only such a small number of Yatris faced serious problems. The local people sheltered the pilgrims and rescuing them, helped them to return using alternative routes through the mountains etc. May be reason behind proposing a Board even then was because the committee imagined that the Amarnath Board could stop natural calamities.
Its second aspect is slowly becoming clearer. Till 1947, 'J&K Govt' implied the Dogra King. After this J&K Govt. - where is fact the entire senior administration and bureaucracy is non Kasnmiri since long - is gradually being looked on as the Govt. belonging to a particular religion. If this was not so, what did Sharma of the Amarnath Sangharsh Samiti mean when he stated (Hindu, 18 Aug 2008) that the Tourism Dept of J&K Govt had no right to look after the 'Hindu' Yatra?
The Governor of the State is the president of the Amarnath Board. According to writer David Devdas (HT, 17th Aug 08) the Ex Governor Sinha increased the duration of the Yatra this year from fifteen days to two months. The members of the Board, who are nominated by the Governor, are all non Kashmiris, This year all the material needed for the yatris was purchased by the Board from outside, whereas every year these purchases were made from local Kashmiri traders and these traders where dependent on this income for their annual needs. The Amarnath cave had been found by a Kashmiri shepheard. Traditionally, 1/3 of all offerings at the cave were made over to his family. This year the Board is said to have put a stop to this practise.
On the one hand the propaganda is that Hurriyat is lying to the people - land is being transferred only for a period of two months to build temporary residences (this work anyway was being done every year by the J&K Govt). On the other hand the BJP leaders have raised the clear cut demand that we want facilities like those given for Haj Yatra. For the Haj Yatra permanent structures exist in major cities of India - then is it very difficult to understand actually how 'temporary' a holding of the land is being aimed at.
High Court Order- Giving Grist to Communal Propaganda
Acting on an individual‘s petition before it in 2005, the J&K High Court passed an order on the issue of the Board against which the state government has gone in appeal (pending). BJP leaders demanded that this order be implemented (as events show the final agreement with the Amarnath Sangarsh Samiti-ASS more than meets this demand). According to the order the government has to turn over the land under discussion (this includes forest land) to the Board. The Board will make residential facilities, facilities for generating electricity, pucca drainage system etc. The Board will handle registration of pilgrims instead of J&K Government, quotas to states, decide for how many days the Yatra will continue. It will also be authorized to get ‘air-conditioning’ for the ‘lingam’ (made of ice) which of course means that it will never need to melt! Neither the government nor the court can question the Board for any action done by it with good intentions (Economic Times, 13th Aug 2008) –this clause sounds almost out of AFSPA !
Role of Media
It is necessary to seriously assess the role of India’s media in spreading communal poison and lies. This media carried pictures of broken trucks stranded on the highways, later this very same media propagated the Central Government’s position of ‘no economic blockade exists’ as the sole truth, without presenting its own investigation or explaining anew what it has itself maintained earlier.
On the day the people of Kashmir poured out onto the streets to attend the ‘janaza’ (funeral procession) of Hurriyat leader Sheikh Aziz and others killed in firing by armed forces and police, curfew was clamped on all 10 districts of Kashmir. Despite the killing of 15 people by police and army, fifty thousand reached the Idgah in Kashmir. However the next day the pictures carried by the major English dailies was of an armed policeman being stoned by some people, a photograph of this sort of repression the people of Kashmir are facing.
An article by Editor Vir Sanghvi in Hindustan Times on August clearly states that Kashmir be allowed to leave India because the Government of India has to sink crores of rupees in it and the people of that state ‘do not refuse to take these crores’ but still want to leave India.
In this, no issue has been raised of the democratic aspiration s of the people of Kashmir or the denial of the rights promised to them. Vir Sanghvi also does not specify whether these crores are used to sustain army repression or are ‘sunk’ for people’s welfare. Why is there no electricity in every village in Kashmir, why are there no jobs other than in police for the youth, why is there inadequate provision for education, especially for higher education? Vir Sanghvi further writes that after the cessation of crores of rupees from India, Kashmir will not be able to survive for ‘even 15 minutes’. It would have been better if Sanghvi had clearly informed readers whether or not Kashmir earns anything for India through tourism, through export of fruits and saffron grown here etc? He is only interested in making Dogra King Gulab Singh seem a fool for buying a white elephant from the colonialists for 75 lakh rupees!
In a similar vein a columnist argued in Hindustan Times (18th Aug) that if Banihal was blockaded why did the traders not opt for a route through Manali? Do the people of the area not have the right to expect that the government of India will ensure lifting of the blockade? Will the ruling classes of India- themselves great worshippers of liberalization, members of WTO, implementers of globalization, votaries of ‘free trade’ –only shoot at Kashmiris asking for the right to trade, if not via Jammu route, then at least to trade within entire Kashmir via Muzaffarabad.
People’s Upsurge in Kashmir Valley
Home Minister Shiv Raj Patil went to Kashmir, but as mentioned earlier, did not meet the traders’ representative delegation. After this rebuke, the Kashmir Fruit Growers Association, Kashmir Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Traders Association and Hurriyat gave a call for Muzaffarabad Chalo for 11th Aug ’08.
On 11th Aug ’08, thousands of people from different parts of the valley assembled a Sopore (also known as the apple town) and with fruit laden trucks began a march to Uri. The slogan of ‘azadi’ was on the lips of all. The administration had set up several road blocks, stopped traffic in several areas, but over two and a half lakh people set off towards Barahmullah. Police and armed forces fired on the protestors in several parts of Kashmir, including Kamarwari in Srinagar, Baramullah, Sangarama etc. At least 250 people were injured to various degrees in the police firings. The police and army fired on the main procession going towards Baramullah at Chelan (16 km before Baramullah) in which senior Hurriyat leader Sheikh Abdul Aziz, who was leading the rally, was killed. A total of five people were killed in the firings but the determined and unarmed people did not disperse but marched on till Chelan where the Hurriyat leader was shot at and killed (Chelan is the first gate of Uri which is close to the border).
On 12th Aug i.e. the next day, the entire valley (all 10 districts) was put under curfew for the first time in 13 years so that people could not emerge to participate in the funeral procession of Sheikh Aziz. Thousands violated the curfew, 15 people were killed in firing by armed forces in various parts of Kashmir and 200 were injured simply because they insisted on going to participate in the funeral march of their leader! Roads were closed or blocked by the administration. Among those shot dead by the armed forces was a journalist belonging to and reporting for a local television channel. Despite all this 50,000 people reached the Srinagar Idgah, pulled out the Hurriyat leaders from house arrest and took out a funeral procession under their leadership. On the night of 13th Aug ’08 in Safakadal area of Srinagar, people came out in the dead of night to protest against CRPF forcibly entering their homes. In a similar manner, on 15th Aug, in the Habakadal area of Srinagar people protested demanding the removal of CRPF from their area. 21 people were injured by armed forces firing on these people. The episode on the 13 Aug was so reprehensible that the administration was forced to remove Mr. Jain IG of CRPF, out of the Valley and also cancel the proposal to accord him a distinction in the 15th Aug list of honors! With all this, the Valley also raised a slogan alongside those of Azadi of ‘is the blood of Kashmiri’s cheap?' The Amarnath Samiti raised the demand that ‘they’ should be allowed to leave if ‘they’ want to go. But many intellectuals in the country soberly commented that at least the Govt of India could not hold ISI of Pakistan responsible for the events.
On 15th Aug 2008, CRPF hoisted the tri colour at Srinagar’s Lal Chowk and then took it down themselves-the forces are well aware of the anger they have generated and the aspirations of the people. Later a gathering of 20000 put up green flags at the same spot. On 16th Aug over 5 lakh people gathered at Pampore for a meeting on the martyrdom of Sheikh Aziz. Interestingly here, following the talks between the administration and the Hurriyat, there were no armed forces and police present and the gathering was unarmed and totally peaceful. In the same way on 18th Aug 5 lakh people gathered at Srinagar to give a memorandum to the UN office there. As no army or police was there, there was no violence. Over a 1000 memoranda from various organizations were submitted. If the ruling classes of India still cannot hear the voice of the Kashmiris, it is because they choose to be deaf. The call for ‘azadi’ includes the sentiment that the whole of Kashmir should be united, but it is a rejection of India which is synonymous with repression and violence. The Valley remained decked in black and green flags through the days of the agitation.
The All Party Committee of the Government
Showing great ‘initiative’ the government of India sent an all Party Committee to J&K. In Jammu the Sangharsh Samiti demanded the removal of all ‘Kashmiris’ from the team (who are the separatists!?) and thus PDP, National Conference and some local leaders of the Congress were removed from it. This is astonishing, because members of these parties have been PM/CM of J&K! Equally important and not surprisingly, the parliamentary ‘Left’ parties CPI and CPM did not leave the team to protest this discrimination. It is also important that this all party team stated that the decision to annul the land transfer by the Azad government was wrong. According to some newspapers (Indian Express 13th Aug) the all party committee was one in saying that the High Court orders should be implemented! This committee did not proceed to the Valley.
In the Kashmir Valley the Governor called a separate all Party meet attended by electoral parties. In order to keep themselves relevant in the predominant sentiment in the Valley, the National Conference and the PDP – who ‘win’ elections with the support of the army’s guns – opposed the repression by the police, CRPF and army and demanded opening of the Muzaffarabad road. They demanded withdrawal of AFSPA and Disturbed Areas Act. These demands are all demands raised by a section of the Hurriyat earlier.
The issue of Land Transfer
According to the laws of J&K no land of Kashmiris can be owned by non Kashmiris. The Hindu communal opinion has long been that Sec 370 in which special rights of J&K are protected should be done away with all together. The logic is that since the Indian part of J&K has been with the country for a ‘long time’ there is no more need for such provisions! Thus denying justice and honoring of commitment for a ‘long time’ does away with the right to that justice! Actually the issue of land is highly emotive and is linked to the issue of preserving the Kashmiri identity and of retaining the Kashmiri character of that .
An important issue in this context is the status of Kashmiri Pandits. Mr. Pradeep Magazine, himself a Kashmiri Pandit and a well known sports writer has labeled his people, ‘the most pampered refugees’ in an article in a leading newspaper. There is no known incident of the killing of any Kashmiri Pandit in the Valley by local people in the years preceding their leaving the valley, though a section of this community states they ‘were threatened’. The role of Jagmohan in arranging for their leaving the valley cannot be contested, and the real extent of his involvement has always been an issue of interest. The point is that the movement in the valley is known to have issued a list of the houses of the pundits and prohibited the local people from in any way entering, damaging or occupying the same. Many prominent members of that community have written that their empty homes have been occupied by security forces.
The rulers of India must be forced by democratize movements in India to institute charges against Mufti-Sinha-Azad trio for transfer of land against the laws of the State. When the government itself has no “objections” to trade on the Muzaffarabad route, it should the open the same from its side allowing the testing of its opinion that Pakistan and not India’s government is dilly-dallying over this. It is also the responsibility of the government to bring to book those responsible for the criminal act of blockading the Banihal pass and/or instigating that it should be done.
The assemblies at Pampore and Srinagar have substantiated the charge of people of the valley that the armed forces and police are responsible for violence and indiscipline, not the masses. Thus all armed forces should be withdrawn from civilian areas in Kashmir, all black laws should be revoked and all democratic rights restored. The current situation in Kashmir is that an angry populace is out on the streets in massive numbers, is opposing widespread repression and demanding azadi. Youth in the age group of 15-30 years and women are said to constitute the overwhelming number of protestors. Both sections of Hurriyat, JKLF, etc. have come together in a joint struggle committee. In this there are many sections who want independence for the State and also those who want a relation with Pakistan. They all want freedom from India and unity of the two parts of the Valley. Demanding restoring of democratic rights, immediately stopping rule through military of the valley, the democratic forces of India should agitate for the democratic aspirations of the Kashmiris to be honoured including the right to self-determination of the people of J&K. This is the only position which is just and in accordance with historical truths.
Indian ruling classes and their apologists are extremely touchy about this central democratic demand. They use the phrase of ‘unity and integrity of India’ as something fixed in time and space, forever before and hereafter, and then they use it as a weapon to flay those who speak of the democratic aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir as seditious. In a five-thousand year old civilization at what point and who fixes the cut-off point for “unity and integrity”? This sub-continent was anyway torn into two by the ruling classes of India and Pakistan under the patronage of British colonialists in 1947. Apart from this, India is a multinational country, and unity of people can only exist where there is equality of nations.
Palash Biswas
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