MANEATERS may not Save the MANKIND! Israel brands 35 groups as terror organisations:Terror tops agenda of US Congress: Hasina is MORE BEUTIFUL Than Kh

MANEATERS may not Save the MANKIND! Israel brands 35 groups as terror organisations:Terror tops agenda of US Congress: Hasina is MORE BEUTIFUL Than Khalida ZIA to have Some ROLE in New South Aisan Strategic Realliance in US LEAD! Why the CIA does not want Dawood in Indian hands? Would Victorious NC in driver's seat would Resolve Kashmir Stand Off? India to emerge as key spender in global security market! Kolkata could be the next target:IB


The Reserve Bank on Thursday allowed non- residents, including FIIs, to pick up equity of state-owned Oriental Bank of Commerce (OBC) under the portfolio investment scheme. The RBI decision follows decline in the investment by foreign institutional investors (FIIs), Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs) and Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) below the threshold limit of 18 per cent in the equity of OBC.

Serial blasts rock Guwahati, 5 dead, many injured.

Anil Ambani tops billionaire blowups of 2008.Corporate India is in for a more painful period, as profitability will take a hit over the next six months, ICICI Bank CEO K V Kamath on Thursady warned and asked the industry to be patient for opportunities as the economy will start recovering in the second half of 2009



l have just returned from Trouble torn Orissa recently in new for Anti christian Anti Tribal Hindutva Violence. I just refer the KANDHAMAL Demography to understand the Demographic adjustment Phenomenon!

In Khurda district, near the CHILKA Lake where Berngali partition Victime Victim SC refugees have been resettled by the government of India way back in fifties and sixties, suddenly TWO HUNDRED and FIFTY families find their names DELETED in the Voters list. In West bengal it self, Seventy Six lacs of refugee names are deleted from the POLL ROLL! All over in Assam, the bengalies even settled for hundreds of years aprt from the partition victims have been branded as doubtful voters. If minority persecution intensifies in Bangladesh once again to retalite the HASINA Regime, we have toexpect more REFUGEE INFLUX from bangladesh resulting as MORE harrassmant for the Indian Resetlled partion victim indigenous refugees and minorities as well!


Troubled Galaxy Destroyed Dreams: Chapter 133

Palash Biswas

Press Statement
Gordon K. Duguid, Acting Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
December 29, 2008



Bangladesh Elections
The United States welcomes the success of Bangladesh’s parliamentary elections. We congratulate the Bangladesh Election Commission and the thousands of government officials involved in organizing this successful election. We applaud the candidates and voters for the manner in which they conducted themselves during the campaign and on Election Day. We also acknowledge the critical role that domestic and international election observers played.

All Bangladeshis can take great pride in the success of these elections. The high voter turnout underscores the people’s desire to see democracy restored as well to have a voice in their future. We also look forward to a continuation of the reforms that have enjoyed wide popular support.

Those elected must prepare to assume their roles as the representatives of all the people of Bangladesh while unsuccessful candidates should continue to participate in the political process. Whether in government or opposition, all political parties have an important role in helping to build a better future for Bangladesh.

The United States will continue to support the people of Bangladesh and its new government as they begin a new chapter in their country’s history.

2008/1103


Released on December 29, 2008
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/dec/113513.htm

Concern over alleged deportation of Hindus
City reporter
GUWAHATI, Dec 7 – The Himalaya Pariwar has alleged that the Hindu people are being harassed by the Government in Assam in the name of deportation of illegal migrants. They are being deported to Bangladesh since many of them are not able to produce requisite papers to prove themselves as Indians. The organization, on Sunday, wrote to the Prime Minister of India asking for enacting a law for the protection of Hindus of Indian origin. The members of Himalaya Pariwar would also meet leader of opposition Lal Krishna Advani and apprise him of the situation.

“Hindus are generally reluctant to maintain such papers for their safeguard because they believe India is their motherland. They are ignorant that there is no law to

safeguard them and above all there is no government which would protect them, since they do not make a vote bank,” said the convener of the organization Shiladitya Dev.

“In Assam today there are about 3.8 lakh Hindus whose names appear in the voter list as “D” (Doubtful) voters. They have been deprived of their right to franchise since 1998 and till now these people could not cast their vote for five consecutive elections. Even the Government of India is indecisive about this class of voters,” stated the memorandum written to the Prime Minister, referring to Israel where the state has declared that the Jews of the world have a place in Israel whenever in need.

Bringing reference of the case of Dinesh Saha, it further informed the Prime Minister. “The 75-year-old person migrated to his country of origin from Bangladesh to save his religion and for fear of persecution. This innocent old man and his family were disgracefully picked up at midnight and deported to Bangladesh. Saha and his family are now stateless since Bangladesh has also refused to accept him as its citizen,” it stated.

“Hinduism, whether it is a religion or a way of life, was born in India and therefore Hindus of Indian origin, whether residing in India or any part of the world, would look towards this nation in times of need,” it added, narrating the pitiable condition of the Hindu people in countries like Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The letter has further mentioned that Hindus believed in equality but the minority vote bank politics practised by a few political parties and a faulty government policy have slowly made the Hindus feel insecure.

After Independence, parts of Assam were also given to Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) and since then the exodus of Hindus to Assam caused lot of conflicts within the communities since the central government had no proper policy to accommodate the migrant Hindus in equal proportions in rest of the country.

“Therefore it has become necessary that a law be enacted which would safeguard the Hindus of Indian origin to take shelter as respected citizens at any point of time from a country where Hindus have been facing persecution,” the memorandum mentioned.
http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/details.asp?id=dec0808/at04

US Ambassador Visited Dhakeswari Temple
Thu, 2008-12-25 03:18
Dhaka, 25 December, (Asiantribune.com): U. S. Ambassador to Dhaka James F. Moriarty met with the minority leaders at the Dhakeshwari Temple on 23rd Dec 2008 at noon. He was there for two hours and had a tour of the temple. Mr. Moriarty sat with the minority leaders for a meeting also. In the meeting, Ambassador Moriarty told the minority leaders that he was fully aware of how the minorities were persecuted / tortured during the 2001 election period and the failure of the Caretaker government to protect the minorities. Dhakeswaei Temple
Then he told them it was particularly because of that, the US government asked the Caretaker Government to take specific measures to make sure that the minorities could vote without fear of reprisal and that they are protected. He said that his office was continuously monitoring the situation and hoped that the Government would indeed protect the minorities this time.

Upon thanking him for his visit/meeting, the minority leaders told the ambassador that the situation was satisfactory but they are scared that minority persecution may begin anytime now that Begum Zia has called upon the nation to save Islam by voting her to power.

The meeting was congenial. Among others it was attended by Professor Nim Chandra Bhowmick, Mr. Chittya Sarker, Advocate Subrata Chowdhury, Mr. Kajal Debnath, Mr. P. K. Hawlader, Ms. Manju Dhar, Mr. Anil Nath and Ms. Sabitri Bhattacharjiya.

Note that: On 19th Dec 2008, BHBCUC, USA met with the State Department official and had requested that the US ambassador needs to visit Dhakeswari Temple before election and Dr. Partha Mazumdar, Bangladesh Desk Officer did forwarded our request to Dhaka and the meeting finally was held. Source: BHBCOP, Dhaka.

- Asian Tribune -

http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/14829

MANEATERS may not Save the MANKIND!India said on Thursday the FBI had presented strong evidence to Islamabad of Pakistani links to November's militant attacks in Mumbai that killed 179 people. India has blamed the assault on the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was set up by Pakistani security agencies in the 1980s to fight Indian rule in the disputed Kashmir region, but was officially banned in 2002.

In INDIAN SUBCONTINENT, in the TRANSITIONAL War ZONE, Two election results have made it a very Interesting Happy new Year in India and Bangladesh which is very significant to understand the latest UPDATES inflicted by Global ILLUMINITY!

Hasina is MORE BEUTIFUL Than Khalida ZIA to have Some ROLE in New South Aisan Strategic Realliance in US LEAD!The Awami League’s victory in the elections held on 29 December has been comprehensive!It has won 260 of the 300 parliamentary seats. Its main, and bitter rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) could barely muster 31 seats. The Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami party, an ally of the BNP, was wiped out at the hustings.
It may be tempting to say that the return of a secular party will now ensure the defeat of Islamist militants and terrorists such as the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJI). That will be a facile conclusion. The years of misrule by the BNP, the abject developmental failures in far-flung corners of the country and the deep inroads made by Islamists in rural Bangladesh preclude this.At the same time, the means available to coax the new government to eliminate these terrorists root and branch are limited. Bangladesh is what many call an “aid-dependent” country. The use of aid to ensure political ends may sound a good idea. But in the context of the dangerous political polarization between Islamists and secular-minded nationalists, it is sure to backfire. Apart from wounding the sense of pride of Bangladeshis, the use of such tactics is sure to give a fillip to the BNP to launch extra-parliamentary resistance to the government. This has been the bane of Bangladesh politics and is sure to prove counterproductive.

The United Nations has congratulated the people of Bangladesh for the peaceful nature of the parliamentary elections in the country, the first polls held in seven years.

"The United Nations congratulates the people of Bangladesh, whose interest in strengthening democracy in the country was reflected by the high voter turnout," UN Secretary General's spokesperson said on Thursday.

The world body also acknowledged the key role played by the election commission in the country in administering the polls in a transparent manner, which has been attested to by both domestic and international observers.The spokesperson underscored the need for cooperation among political parties, including a constructive role for the opposition in Parliament to ensure a peaceful transition.

In December, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon set up a high-level panel, headed by his former personal representative for Afghanistan Francesc Vendrell, to assess and report on the conduct of the last stages of the electoral process and developments in the immediate post-election period.The three-member team, which includes Bhojraj Pokharel, Nepal's Chief Election Commissioner, and Aracelly Santana, the former deputy director of the UN Electoral Assistance Division, is currently visiting Bangladesh for the second time.The panel has held talks with the election commission, observes and political parties, and will brief UN chief upon its return early in February on the conduct of the polls and developments in the immediate post-election period within next few days.


Would Victorious NC in driver's seat would Resolve Kashmir Stand Off?

Israel brands 35 groups as terror organisations!All these organisations have been accused of having links to Taliban and the global al-Qaeda network.just a
month after six Jews were killed in the Mumbai [Images] attacks, Israel has identified 35 Al-Qaeda and Taliban-affiliated groups, mainly active in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan, and declared them terrorist outfits.

India is poised to emerge as a key international spender in the global security market, with an estimated spending of $9.7 billion by 2016.

"The total homeland security spending in the Indian market will amount to a total estimate of $9.7 billion by 2016," Frost and Sullivan research said in a press release issued by Asianet.

Contributing much to this spending is the airport security which accounts for $3.2 billion, it said.

With the mass transport systems acting as soft targets for criminal and terrorist activities, there is a demand of a high level infrastructure construction, which would possibly take spending even higher.

The recent Mumbai terror attacks call for formulation of more developed security measures to protect areas where there is a high level of civilian mobility.

"In light of the horrendous death toll of innocent civilians, the relevant security stakeholders are going to have become more pragmatic when it comes to developing a 'last line of defence' within sites such as hotels, religious places and various tourist destinations," senior consultant Frost & Sullivan, Frisco Buker said

Latest SENSATION to enhance the War Hype and ethnic DIVIDE is the IB report that Kolkata could be the next target of TERRORISM! The report would help the Brhaminical lethal fascist FOREIGNER trio of BUDDHA PRANAB ADWANI to use the Citizenship amendment act and the twin Terror acts to persecute, victimise and deport the Minorities, refugees, indigenous and aboriginal people of India from their home, land and life to achieve a favourable demographic target to sustain the Brahminical hegemonies in south Asia. Hasina factor would be rather a STIMULANT most suitable.

l have just returned from Trouble torn Orissa recently in new for Anti christian Anti Tribal Hindutva Violence. I just refer the KANDHAMAL Demography to understand the Demographic adjustment Phenomenon!

kandhmal is a Forest District inhibited by the Tribals. Ninety Percent of Kandhamal Population consists of KANDH aboriginal tribe. Only four percent of them have converted and the REST NINETY SIX Percent tribal polulation is deeply rooted in their aboriginal religion and culture! They never had been HINDU as non of us, the eighty five percent Black untouchable aboriginal indigenous people never have been HINDU. We were CONVERTED to Hindutva. But some of the aboriginal tribes like the KANDHS in Kandhamal do sustain their identity and sovereignity. Hence, the Hinduisation Campaign planned the Monoploistic aggression agianst the Kandha People brnading them Converted Hindus. Which is a BROAD DAY UNTRUTH. We may trace the roots of Ancient Indian History inthis recent most Aryan Invasion, which is negated by the HINDUTVA Forces to reject our sovereign Identities!

For Eaxample, the most Militant Aboriginal community in East Bengal, My TRIBE, the NAMOSHUDRAS opted for ISLAM when they decided for CONVERSION to ANNIHILATE Predestined CSTE DESTINY. No less than NINTY LACS Namoshudras converted in ISLAM during British rule! They did not OPT for Christianity! Neither it was caused by Aggresive ISLAM as it the Muslims were dominated by Hindutva as well as Christianity! This hard fact proves that Conversion is not a result of INTIMIDATION or KICKBAKS as the Hindutva forces claim and react most violently! More over the Namoshudra ICON HARICHAND THAKUR established MATUA DHARMA rejecting Brahaminical Hindutva. The matuas launched SOCIAL REFORM , EDUCATION, Empowerment and WOMAN LIB movements and got full cooperation from the CRISTIAN Missionaries led by MR REED. But none of them CONVERTED into Christianity!

Communal riot erupted in Kandhmal after VHP leader Swami Laxamandanda Sarswati and four of his disciples were gunned down by some unidentified assailants on August 23.

The Supreme Court had directed the Centre to allow the continuance of the paralamilitary forces till the end of this month while adjudicating a petition filed by Cuttack and Bhubaneswar Arch Bishop Rafel Cheenath.

Recently, the Christians Associations had demanded the continuance of the Central Forces till the Parliamentary and Assembly elections are over.

The Swami Laxamananda Saraswati Shradhanjali Samiti had, meanwhile, called off their bandh on December 25 after Chief Minister Naveen Patnaik assured them to arrest the culprits at the earliest.

But despite the development the Christian leaders in Orissa apprehended danger to the lives of the minority community and requested the authorities to strengthen security to help celebrate the Christmas peacefully.

Bengal is mentioned as a distinct region of South Asia in some of the earliest Hindu texts, and throughout the first millennium AD. it was governed by a succession of Buddhist and Hindu rulers. Islamic armies arrived in the region in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and gradual Muslim conquest—culminating in Mughal rule after 1576—set the stage for widespread conversion of the local population to Islam, especially in eastern Bengal. Not long thereafter, European contact with, and competition for power on, the Indian subcontinent began, and the British period of India's history is usually dated from England's takeover of the administration of Bengal in 1757. Lasting until 1947, British rule had a profound impact on Bengali culture and society, especially with the introduction of English as the medium of higher education after 1835. Hindus responded more rapidly than did Muslims to opportunities provided by English education, and the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries saw the rise of a highly Westernized elite, mostly, but not exclusively, Hindu in composition, whose intellectual attainments were coupled with efforts at sociocultural and political reform. Bengali elites provided major leadership to the Indian nationalist movement as a whole, which began to develop in force after the mid-1800s. Bengali Hindus tended to support a nationalist party called the Indian National Congress in its vision of a free, secular India to follow British rule. But most Bengali Muslims believed, as did many Muslims throughout India at that time, that they had benefited less than Hindus under British rule and feared that they would suffer discrimination in a free India dominated by the country's Hindu majority. The Muslims of Bengal were thus more attracted to another nationalist organization, the Muslim League, which in 1940 advocated a separate postindependence state for Muslims, to be known as Pakistan. The British acceded to India's independence in 1947, at which time the subcontinent was partitioned into two separate nation-states: India, with a Hindu majority, and Pakistan, with a Muslim majority. The predominantly Hindu western districts of Bengal then comprised the Indian state of West Bengal, whereas the mainly Muslim Districts of eastern Bengal formed the eastern province of Pakistan (called East Pakistan). Pakistan's national unity was based on common religious identity of its citizens as Muslims, but it was undermined by the nation's linguistic diversity and growing conflict between the country's ethnic groups. Over time the Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan came into increasing confrontation with the non-Bengali Muslim groups of West Pakistan, where a preponderance of the economic wealth and political power of the country was concentrated. In 1971 the schism between East and West Pakistan erupted into a civil war—a national liberation struggle from the Bengali point of view—resulting in the breakup of Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh as a new nation. This history helps to explain why the Bengali population is divided into its two major political entities: the Hindu-majority Indian state of West Bengal, with its capital at Calcutta; and the Muslim-majority independent nation-state of Bangladesh, with its capital at Dhaka.






Just read this:
Legal Limits on Religious Conversion in India

Several states in India legally restrict religious conversions, particularly targeting conversions via "force" or "allurement." Implementing such laws seems to require judging the state of mind of the converts by trying to assess their motives and volition. After tracing current laws back to various colonial laws (including Conversion, Apostasy and Public Safety Acts) in British India and several Princely States, I compare contemporary anti-conversion laws in Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, Arunchel Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, focusing on embedded assumptions about various groups in society. Skirting the question of individual volition, some states' laws seem to be based on the assumption that certain groups are more easily forced or duped into conversion. For example, those found to be forcibly converting lower castes, women or minors face higher prison terms or fines. Another assumption embedded in some laws is that group or "mass" conversions may signal a lack of agency or volition on the part of converts. Several states have required people to register their change of faith with a local official, in some cases prior to conversion, to enable state tracking of conversion patterns. Finally, I turn to contemporary court decisions to examine how judges have decided whether converts were "lured" or "legitimate."

http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/9/6/3/6/p96363_index.html

In Khurda district, near the CHILKA Lake where Berngali partition Victime Victim SC refugees have been resettled by the government of India way back in fifties and sixties, suddenly TWO HUNDRED and FIFTY families find their names DELETED in the Voters list. In West bengal it self, Seventy Six lacs of refugee names are deleted from the POLL ROLL!

All over in Assam, the bengalies even settled for hundreds of years aprt from the partition victims have been branded as doubtful voters. If minority persecution intensifies in Bangladesh once again to retalite the HASINA Regime, we have toexpect more REFUGEE INFLUX from bangladesh resulting as MORE harrassmant for the Indian Resetlled partion victim indigenous refugees and minorities as well!


Corporate India is in for a more painful period, as profitability will take a hit over the next six months, ICICI Bank CEO K V Kamath on Thursady warned and asked the industry to be patient for opportunities as the economy will start recovering in the second half of 2009. On the other hand, in a move that could further delay auctions, the Finance Ministry has asked the telecom department to double the floor price for 3G and wireless broadband spectrum, executives in two leading telecom companies said.

Serial blasts rock Guwahati, 5 dead, many injured.Serial blasts rocked Guwahati early evening on New Year's Day, killing five people and severely injuring 51 others as Assam opened its A security man inspects the garbage bin where an IED blast took place, in Guwahati on January 1, 2009.The three blasts, masterminded by Ulfa's 709 Batallion, at Birubari, Bhootnath and Bhangagarh happened even as the state was awaiting the landing of home minister P Chidambaram at the Lokpriya Gopinath Bordoloi airport. The third blast which was the most powerful of the three, took place barely 200 metres from the Times of India office in the city.


The US has shared with Pakistan "strong evidence" about involvement of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in the Mumbai attacks, External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said today and asked Islamabad to hand over the perpetrators for which an Extradition Treaty is not required.

"We have been told that there is some strong evidence available with FBI and they have shared it with Pakistan. We expect that Pakistan will act on them and hand over the perpetrators of terror attack in Mumbai to us," said Mukherjee.

The Minister said it was expected of Pakistan to take action against the perpetrators of terror attacks in the wake of evidence provided to them and various international conventions pacts to which Islamabad is party to.

Asked whether an Extradition Treaty was needed for Islamabad to hand over the attackers, he said, "it is not required to take action on these matters" as Pakistan is party to various international conventions and arrangements starting from SAARC to various international conventions against taking hostages, conventions against bombings.

Anil Ambani tops billionaire blowups of 2008.

Industrialist Anil Ambani continues to be on the focus of US magazine Forbes but this time around for topping the list of 'Billionaire Formula for successful biz
|Blowups of 2008' by virtue of turning the biggest loser of wealth in less than a year of being touted as the biggest gainer in the world. Besides ranking him as sixth richest person in the world with a net worth of 42 billion dollars, Forbes had credited him for having added maximum wealth in its last annual rankings in March. Since then, his net worth has declined to 12 billion dollars, the magazine said in a news report titled "Billionaire Blowups of 2008".

"The biggest loser of all was Anil Ambani. Touted on the cover of our 2008 billionaires issue for having added 24 billion dollars to his fortune in one year, Ambani has dropped 30 billion dollars since then," the report said.

The report further added that three of "his fellow countrymen--estranged brother Mukesh, steel tycoon Lakshmi Mittal and Indian K P Singh, all of whom ranked earlier among the world's 10 richest--lost more than 20 billion dollar apiece."

Noting that 2008 was "a dreadful year for the world's wealthiest as markets and currencies around the world tumbled," Forbes said that over 300 of the 1,125 billionaires have lost at least one billion dollars since March.

The meltdown in the global financial markets has taken a toll on the overseas borrowings of Indian corporates. Indian companies raised 24% less from the overseas markets through external commercial borrowings (ECB) in November this year. According to the latest data released by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), Indian firms borrowed $1.7 billion in November 2008 from the overseas markets, 24% lower than the $2.24 billion they raised in the year-ago period. Most have borrowed this money to fund their projects or import of capital goods for periods ranging from 3-11 years. Though the number of borrowers have gone up this year, in terms of value, only three borrowers — Reliance Industries, Bharti Airtel and Vedanta Aluminium — made more than half the borrowings. These three borrowers accounted for $956 million during the month. Another large borrower was Indian Railway Finance Corporation which raised $100 million through the approval route.


In Washington,Indo-American groups ask US not to enhance Pak army's capacity! We have to depend on NRIs for our Safety and security in india as the SUPERSLAVE Governemnet of India Fails to behave SOVEREIGN! newly formed task force set up by seven leading Indian-American groups has demanded that the focus of the United States military aid to Islamabad [Images] should be on resources needed to fight terrorists rather than enhancing the capacity of Pakistani forces.A briefing paper, prepared for distribution among lawmakers, also urges them to demand verifiable proof from Pakistan that it has dismantled the terror training camps. The paper calls for handing over suspects responsible for financing and sponsoring the Mumbai terror strikes to India and asks the lawmakers to ensure that the Pakistan military and intelligence are controlled by the civilian government.The task force has been created to come up with the community's response to deadly terrorist attacks and toformulate short and long term plans to project Indian viewpoint and educate various American audiences.

Maharashtra Chief Minister Ashok Chavan on Tuesday announced that a two-member high-level panel will be set up to probe the recent terror attack on Mumbai. Former Nagaland governor R D Pradhan will head the high-level panel.

Chavan made this announcement in the state Legislative Assembly in Nagpur.

"In a comprehensive discussion held on the issue of global Jihad, Israel's security cabinet recently decided that these organisations, with affiliation to Al-Qaeda and Taliban [Images], will be subject to strict monitoring and enforcement actions as per the laws against money laundering and financing of terrorism," security sources told PTI.

"These declarations are a significant measure in the international struggle against the financing of terrorism and are designed to put Israel in line with those Western countries, especially the US, that are also using economic means in dealing with terrorism," the sources said.

The decision is said to have been based on extensive staff work by the National Security Council and even though these groups do not necessarily act against the Jewish state, Tel Aviv is taking measures to aid international efforts against financing of terrorism.

The Pakistani groups included in the list are Aid Organisation of the Ulema, Al Akhtar Trust International, a financier of which has been linked to the murder of Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl, Al Harmain Foundation of Pakistan, Al Masjid Al Aqsa - Aqsa Foundation and Al Rashid Trust.

In washington, Meeting in the midst of an economic crisis, which is said to be the worst-ever after the great depression of the last century, and during the crucial hase of the war against terrorism, US lawmakers are eager to get cracking from day one when the 111th Congress convenes next week.As the Congress now dominated by the Democrats meets the major legislation it would take up would be the President-elect Barack Obama's [Images] election pledge to step up US deployment in Afghanistan to undertake a decisive push to eliminate al-Qaeda and Taliban [Images] and other terrorist groups. The US-led war against terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan too would dominate the proceedings of the House of
Representatives and the Senate as they convene for business on January 4.

On the subject of terrorism, the role of Pakistan, which many in the new administration and key Congressional leaders believe is the source of all terrorist activities, is expected to come in for special attention as lawmakers discuss the next step forward in the war against the scourge specially in Afghanistan.

Plans are afoot by the Congressional leadership in such a way that Obama would have a few legislations on his table to sign them into law as he walks into his Oval office on January 20, after being sworn in as the 44th President of the United States of America. Elections for the 111th Congress were held November 4 along with the US Presidential elections. Riding on a bama-wave the Democrats consolidated their hold over both the House of Representatives and Senate.

The 435-member House of Representatives has 257 Democrats and 178 Republicans, a gain of 21 seats for the Democrats than the 110th Congress. Similarly the 100-member Senate has 58 democrats and 41 Republicans. The Democrats gained seven Senate seats in the November elections; and one race--in Minnessota-- is yet to be decided.

In India,the National Conference has emerged as the single largest party in a hung assembly returned by the voters in Jammu and Kashmir for the second consecutive term. The NC has pocketed 28 seats, the same as last term, while rival People?s Democratic Party has improved its tally by six, winning 21 seats in the 87-member House.
The Bharatiya Janata Party which had just one seat in 2002 elections has sprung a surprise by drastically improving its tally, winning 11 seats this time.

The Congress was the only loser in terms of numbers, with its tally coming down from its old score of 20 to 17 this time.


HASINA mens a REAL Beauty! I have done everything in my younger days to have some FAVOUR of any Hasina around. I hope, anyone who does not suffer from either IMPOTENCY or Personality disorder should have done exactly the same! We all know that Begam khalida Zia is strikingly BEUTIFUL! But the recent History of bangaldesh as well as the divided geopolitics rather betray the Feeling that Hasina, aesthetically beuty personified has proved herself more beautiful to hold State Power in the best interest of the Galaxy Order of Phonix, so she has been chosen once again after the prolonged Reality show of two begums marginalised. It is specially relevant for India as Insurgency and Terrorism in India have some roots in bangladesh, too. But we may not hope any change whatsoever as the news of ASSAM BLASTS herald. Rather I am afraid of the imminent intensity of minority persecution in RETALIATIon in bangladesh and even in India against our indigenous aboriginal people!

However, Awami League chief Sheikh Hasina, who favours strong ties with India, vowed not to allow Bangladesh's territory to be used for terrorism against its neighbours, two days after her grand alliance swept the country's first general election in seven years. The 61-year-old charismatic leader said that "continued good relations with neighbours", particularly with India, would be a major agenda of her government.

"The Bangladeshi soil will never be used to carry out any terrorist act against our neighbours," Hasina, whose grand alliance bagged 262 seats in the 300-member parliament, said in her first post-victory press conference.

Her remarks came in response to a question about New Delhi's assertions in the past that the Bangladeshi territory was being used for carrying out terrorist attacks on India.

"When we were in power we took a strong position on this (terrorism) and we will do that in the future. I have always maintained that we want peaceful relations with our neighbours," Hasina said.

Proposing the formation of a South Asian task force to fight terrorism in the region, Hasina said, "I want continued improved relations with the neighbours."

Image: Bangladesh Awami League president Sheikh Hasina talks in front of a portrait of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of the party, during a press conference in Dhaka on Wednesday.

Meanwhile,India and Pakistan on Thursday exchanged lists of their nuclear installations under an agreement aimed at preventing attacks on each other's atomic facilities inspite of prevailing tension in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks.The Foreign Office handed over a list of Pakistan's nuclear installations and facilities to an official of the Indian High Commission at 1100 hrs in Islamabad In New Delhi [Images], the Indian side handed over its list to an official of the Pakistan High Commission at the External Affairs Ministry.The two sides also exchanged fresh lists of prisoners being held in each other's jails, officials told PTI.

The exchange of lists of atomic facilities is done on January 1 every year under the "Agreement between India and Pakistan on Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities", which was signed in 1988 and ratified in 1991.Officials from both sides had earlier said that the tension sparked by the Mumbai terror attacks [Images] would not affect the exchange of the nuclear lists, which is done as routine every year.According to the agreement signed on December 31, 1988, Pakistan and India have to inform each other on January
1 every year about the nuclear installations and facilities to be covered by the pact.

Islamabad and New Delhi had exchanged lists of prisoners being held in each other's jail but both sides had subsequently expressed reservations about these lists. During talks in Islamabad between home secretaries of the two countries in November, they agreed to exchange fresh lists of prisoners.

Pointing out that India is obliged to pursue its objective of making Pakistan act as people have been killed and properties destroyed, external affairs Minister in the SUPER SLAVE government, bengali KULEEN Brahmin PRANAB Mukherjee said so many times"we have not closed any options." But the planted Anti National government in the Perrihery ECONOMY does everything to feed tha Greedy Money machine on the one hand and the Zionist Galaxy CORE WAR and Weapon Economy on the other hand.

United states of America is determined to help India! From Warmonger SHOEKISSING BUTCHER BUSH, Darling Condy to the President Elect symbolising Black untouchable dream, Barrack Obama, everyone has promised and pressurised to STABlLISE South Asia in accordance with US Corporate Interests on Post Modern MANUSMRITI APARTHEID GALAXY ORDER norms! The Hegemonies in the divided bleeding South Asia do replicate the ways dictated by washington and lick the ZIONIST Feet unashamed and glorified!

Why the CIA does not want Dawood in Indian hands? Here you are! Just think! Anti Muslim Anti Dalit Brahminical Hindutva, blind Nationalism, Marxist capitalism, WAR HYPE and XXXXX Consumer Culture are so much focused without any single determining action to ENSUER the SAFETY and SECURITY of the ENSLAVED Majority Indigenous and Aboriginal people in Soth Asia!

Making it clear that Pakistan cannot escape its commitments on ending terrorism, India Has already Clarified time and again that it has kept all options open to make Islamabad do so but refused to specify if military action was being considered.

On the other hand, The confession of Zarar Shah, a key Lashkar-e-Tayiba [Images] operative, about his involvement in the Mumbai [Images] terror attack has further strengthened India's case against terror elements operating inside Pakistan territory.

Shah, according to Intelligence Bureau officials, is a key operative in the LeT network and headed the technology wing of the terror organisation.

The IB has also picked up intercepts of the emails sent out by Shah, which indicate that the LeT was planning an attack on INS Virat. He had planned to launch suicide attacks on the warship by using choppers.

While LeT's second-in-command Muzzamil recruited men to carry out the terror attack and trained them, Shah made arrangements for the SIM cards, satellite phones and the VOIP connections. IB officials believe that Shah had sent out the mails under the pseudonym Deccan Mujahideen, which had claimed responsibility for the Mumbai attacks.

Shah had ensured that the mail was in Hindi, so that investigators would presume that the attacks were planned in India. He reportedly used a Hindi voice recognition software to type the mail. IB sources say that Shah operated out of Lahore [Images], and the mails were sent from there.

Shah's emails also reveal that he had studied the layout and logistics of the Taj Hotel [Images] and other targets in South Mumbai.

Shah was also in constant touch with IM operatives working on the tech side, according to sources. The LeT had financially assisted the Indian Mujahideen in setting up a technological network, which was used to launch terror strikes on the Indian soil.

Serial blasts rock Guwahati, 5 dead, many injured

Five people were killed and over 50 injured in three blasts set off by insurgent outfit ULFA in Guwahati on Thursday hours before Union Home Minister P Chidambaram's visit to review law and order situation in the state rocked by deadly blasts that left 88 dead two months ago. Three people were killed and 35 injured, including four women, when a bomb planted in front of a closed sweet shop exploded near upmarket Bhangagarh flyover on the busy Guwahati-Shillong road at around 5:45 pm. Two persons died on way to hospital while another succumbed to his injuries at the Guwahati Medical College Hospital, DGP G M Srivastava said. Two of the dead were identified as Amal Das and Kahil Sheikh.

A bomb kept in a bicycle exploded at a market in the Bhootnath area, the route which Chidambaram was to take on his way from the airport, under Baralumukh police station around 5.30 pm in which two persons were killed and 12 others injured, official sources said.

An Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) kept in a Gauhati Municipal Corporation (GMC) dustbin went off at around 3.30 pm injuring three persons in Birubari Tiniali area.

The blasts came a day ahead of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's arrival in Guwahati on Friday enroute Shillong to inaugurate the Indian Science Congress there on January 3.

Chidmabaram arrived at the Lokopriyo Gopinath Bordoloi international airport on a two-day visit to the state to review Assam's law and order situation and attend a meeting of the Unified Command headed by Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi.

The DGP said it was ULFA which carried out the blasts, at least one of them. "We know who were behind the blast but we won't divulge the names at this stage," he said.

Srivastava said the police had intelligence inputs that ULFA would carry out blasts as the group usually indulged in such activities either on December 31 or January 1 and especially when union ministers were in the city.

He said that of the three blasts two were of low intensity and the one at Boothnath was serious.

He said kerosene was found in a stove which burst near the sweet shop during the explosion, which set off fire but there was no casualty.

FBI team visits Faridkot to probe about Kasab

An FBI team visited the village of Ajmal Amir Iman 'Kasab', the lone terrorist captured during the Mumbai attacks, in Pakistan's Punjab province to probe his links to the deadly terror strikes and was still continuing its investigation.
The team visited Faridkot, Kasab's village in Okara district of Punjab province, on Wednesday and conducted inquiries, diplomatic and other sources said.

The sources rubbished reports in the media, particularly in some Pakistani TV channels, that the FBI team had found nothing that proved Kasab was a Pakistani national.

The FBI team was still in the process of conducting its inquiries and would take more time to come to conclusions, the sources said. They declined to give further details.

The team of investigators arrived in Islamabad on Tuesday to carry forward the FBI's probe into the Mumbai attacks, in which six American nationals were also killed. Some reports have suggested the team is led by FBI's director for South Asia William Robert, though this could not be independently confirmed.

FBI spokesman Richard Kolko, when contacted by the Dawn newspaper to comment on the reports of the team's visit to Faridkot, said: "The FBI continues to assist Indian authorities with their investigation. We will work with the Indian authorities and our partners to follow leads wherever they may take us."

Asked if the FBI team had visited Faridkot, Kolko said: "We are unable to provide details of what is being done. We refer you to Indian authorities or the US State Department for any additional information."

Earlier, FBI sleuths had concluded after questioning Kasab for nine hours in India that he was a Pakistani and that the Mumbai attacks were planned and coordinated by the Pakistan-based elements, including Lashkar-e-Toiba operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi.

Kasab's father has admitted in an interview to 'Dawn' that the gunman, whose pictures were beamed around the world by the media, was his son.

Other residents of Faridkot told Geo News channel that Iman had last visited the village about six months ago, when he told his mother he was going away for 'jehad'.

The FBI has registered a case regarding the Mumbai attacks as the US laws require the agency to file charges in case of the death or torture of any American national outside the country.

The Director of US National Intelligence, John Michael McConnell, too visited India to assist in the probe into the Mumbai attacks.

How our MEDIA takes a brahminical Satnce, just see:

Religious divide deepens in Kandhmal

The Kandhmal-Gajapati border has been a Maoist stronghold for over a decade with a large support base among the local Christian population.

The district committee of the Maoists has 22 members, 70 per cent of whom are Christians. Though close links have existed between the Maoists and the Christians, the radical Left has so far never intervened in religious matters.

The first reports of Christians taking up weapons surfaced in December last year after nearly 100 churches and Christian institutions were burnt by rioting Parivar mobs on Christmas eve.

During the backlash, in Brahmanigaon, villagers said they were shot at allegedly by Pano Christians from neighbouring villages.

"Panos are the real culprits. They come from the next village," one of the village woman had said.

During a house-to-house search the police found 20 guns and ammunition were found in Christian homes in Sikaram village, close to Brahmanigaon.

Security analysts believe that repeated provocation by the Sangh Parivar through fiery speeches and rallies demanding that conversions must stop have forced the Christians to retaliate.

In July this year, following clashes over cow slaughter, former MP Nakul Nayak, a Pano Christian, warned action will be taken against Swami Lakhananda if the administration did not take action within 10 days.

On August 22, the Swami handed over a letter from an unknown group threatening to kill him but no effort was made to strengthen his security.

A day later he was shot dead by armed men. Their identity is still not known.

Top police sources who have been monitoring the security situation in Kandhmal said this time the Christians were prepared especially in areas where they dominate.

Going by the evidence, sources also say, the violence was much more organised, a sign that there was a build-up both within the Hindu and Christian groups since the December devastation, in which Christians had suffered extensively.

But it isn't hard to procure weapons in Kandhmal, a tribal dominated area. Adivasis have always used traditional bows and arrows and axes for poaching deer and rabbit.

With time, they have learnt to put together crude, country-made rifles to shoot birds. Police say several manufacturing units can be found deep inside the forests.

But for the first time, investigation teams found that crude bombs and country made firearms had been used in the communal clashes. A police team was shot at in Barkhama village. Two policemen reportedly died.

Digi, a Hindu village, is still smouldering. Days after saffron gangs attacked nearby Pano villages, armed men came after midnight, attacked villagers there and set fire to shops and houses. The sarpanch was brutally assaulted, his hands and legs cut by swords.

"They have had fights before they have even threatened us. But for the first time Christians have picked up arms," said one villager.

The church denies this.

"It is a lie. The church never supports violence. We want peace. We want development. We would never condone violence," said the Archbishop.

Over the years despite several flare-ups, the Orissa government has done little to control the growth of sectarian groups, first Hindu and now Christian.

"The situation in Orissa does not augur well for inter-faith relationships in the country. While there is certainly a case to be made to rein in the Sangh Parivar, especially the VHP and the Bajrang Dal, I think it offers an opportunity for the Christian hierarchy to dwell on the consequences of what some might term 'militant' forms of Christian mission," said Australia-based author and teacher, Pradip Ninan Thomas, who studied the emergence of Christian fundamentalism in Tamil Nadu.

Now both Hindus and Christians are choosing to define their own destinies through violence.

A number of conservative para-church organisations and new churches are involved in a 'numbers' game and conversion and contribute to undoing the good work done by the Roman Catholics and Protestants in the areas of health, education and development. When there is a backlash, all Christians irrespective of whether they are involved in militant forms of mission or not become fair game for Hindu militants," said Pradip Ninan Thomas.

Kandhmal is on the threshold of becoming another laboratory of hate.

http://www.ndtv.com/convergence/ndtv/story.aspx?id=NEWEN20080063875&ch=6...



New year bonanza for armed forces
New Delhi In a major New year bonanza for the armed forces, the Prime Minister's Office has informed the Defence Ministry that the armed forces personnel would henceforth have a separate pay commission, which is delinked from the civilian pay panel.
In a communication to the Defence Ministry the PMO also granted the demand for placing 12,000 odd Lieutenant Colonels under equivalence in Navy and Air Force in the pay band four of the sixth central pay commission.

However, the PMO, which considered the recommendations of the ministerial committee headed by External Affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee, said that the pay band four status with a grade pay of Rs 8000 would be accorded to Lieutenant Colonels who were performing a combat role or were ready for combat.

Those Lieutenant Colonels on deputation to other services would receive the pay band four status only when they return to their parent service.

Another demand accepted by the PMO concerned the jawans, for whom the government would restore the 70 per cent pensionary weightage.

Till the government implements the sixth pay commission's recommendations for allowing retired armed forces personnel's lateral entry into paramilitary and central police forces, the 70 per cent weightage would continue.

The present PMO communication, sent to the Defence Ministry in the last week of December, however, is silent on the two other core demands of the armed forces: placing the Lieutenant Generals in the higher administrative grade plus pay scales and bringing grade pay of officers from Captains to Brigadiers on par with their civilian counterparts.

But, conceding to the Defence personnel's demand the PMO said it would set up a high powered committee to review the command and control functions, and the status of the armed forces vis-a-vis that of their civilian and paramilitary counterparts.


Kolkata could be the next target:IB

Vicky Nanjappa
January 01, 2009 01:48 IST
Intelligence Bureau intercepts have pointed to the movement of terrorists from both the Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Harkat-ul-Jihadi into West Bengal in order to carry out an attack on Kolkata.

IB sources told rediff.com that that attack on Kolkata was always kept on reserve as the city acted as a major hiding and breeding ground for terror operatives.

The IB reports movement of LeT and HuJI militants with the blessings of the both the DGFI of Bangladesh and ISI of Pakistan. The militants had regrouped in Bangladesh and were entering into West Bengal through the 'Chicken Neck' corridor, the IB says.

IB intercepts would point to the fact that the deadly LeT-HuJi combine planned to undertake attacks during the January, 2009. However, like the Mumbai [Images] attack there is a chance of them putting the attack on hold since security is high after 26/11.

The HuJI, the IB says, has teamed up with several local modules. West Bengal records the largest number of terror modules of HuJi following Uttar Pradesh [Images], the IB says. Even for the Mumbai attacks, investigations have revealed that some youth from West Bengal had arranged for the SIM cards as ordered by Zarar Shah, the chief of technology for the Lashkar-e-Tayiba.

Apart from a terror strike, the ISI and the DGFI were planning to take control over the election process in West Bengal. A Union Home Ministry report would suggest that the ISI and DGFI could control at least 53 out of the 294 constituencies in West Bengal since these constituencies are dominated by illegal immigrants. Round-the-clock work to ensure that the names of the illegal immigrants get into the voters list is also on so that these key constituencies could be controlled by ISI and DGFI.

Reports also suggest that the ISI in coordination with the DGFI have given specific instructions to all modules in West Bengal to engage illegal immigrants in all sorts of illegal activities.

The IB says that the illegal immigrants have started drug peddling, trafficking and trans-border gang robbery. The money that is being raised from these illegal activities are being used to fund terror activities in West Bengal.
http://www.rediff.com/news/2009/jan/01mumterror-kolkata-could-be-next-target-says-ib.htm

Holding trial for the accused in the recent communal riots in Kandhmal district of Orissa could turn out to be an onerous and
long drawn process as over a lakh people have been accused of their involvement in the violence.

The police, based on 698 FIRs filed in connection with the carnage that happened mostly in August and September in the southern Orissa district, have found that 11,348 people are named accused, while over 89,424 people have been categorized as others in the complaints. "The number would go further up as 75 more cases have been lodged since we made the assessment a few days ago,'' a senior police officer said.

Conducting investigation, arresting the accused and organizing trial for such a huge number of accused is being viewed as a "big challenge'' for the state administration, admitted officials. "This is an unprecedented situation in Orissa. We have never dealt with a law and order situation of this magnitude,'' pointed out a top cop. Officially, 39 people were killed in the religious mayhem. Police have so far arrested around 700 people in connection with the murders, arson and other violence that took place in Kandhmal. Even incarcerating those arrested has been a major headache as the states prisons are overcrowded. The jails in Kandhmal district could not accommodate such large number forcing us to shift a good person of the under trials to jails in Ganjam and other places, official sources said.

In such a scenario, police are at odds to nab all the accused and, going by sources, want to concentrate on the core elements who number around 200. "Our focus is to punish the core accused. It would be unmanageable if we chase one lakh people. Besides considering it as a social problem we have to tackle the problem tactfully. Else, if we succeed in taking action all named and unnamed accused in the FIRs then peace would never return to Kandhmal,'' said the senior police officer. "We plan to club cases involving the same accused and focus only on those against whom evidence is available.''

DGP Manmohan Praharaj told TOI, "We have already put around 50 police officers of different ranks on the job to assist in investigating the case.''He admitted that the number of people accused in the cases is "huge''. "We will do whatever we can in step with the law.'' Special administrator, Kandhmal, Madhusudan Padhi said, The government has decided to set up fast track courts to expeditiously dispose of the cases.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/Over_1_lakh_accused_in_Kandhmal_case_say_Orissa_cops/articleshow/3905537.cms

Caste System and Untouchability Aryanisation of the subcontinent led to the tendency of resolving the varna divisions into a hierarchical order. Theoretically hierarchy was determined on the basis of the order of precedence of the qualities that the components of the different varnas exhibited in their character and actions. For instance, the Brahmans as the custodians of sattva were considered to be the purest of all. In other words, the Brahmans were believed to be the embodiment of sacredness and were regarded as gods on earth. Significantly, the degree of purity declined successively with the qualities as represented by the Ksatriyas and the Vaishyas - namely, raja and tama. The shudras, who occupied the lowest rung of the social order, were believed to have possessed no such quality. In fact, the Purusa Sukta hymn of the Rg Veda, which is considered to be a later interpolation, provided a religio-cultural justification of the hierarchical divisions based on the four-fold varna system.





Aryanisation of the subcontinent led to gradual absorption of outsiders and the cultural transformation of the castes, more particularly those occupying the lower rungs. The characteristics of the varna system were later elaborated in minute detail in the jati system. Subsequently, the broad-based division of labour as represented by varna found expression in the jati system, thereby resulting in an elaborate system of occupational distinctions and interrelations among various groups.

In Bengal the gradual spread of Aryan culture led to the classification of different groups with particular occupations as distinct jatis. The cultivating, trading, artisan and service castes came to be recognised as Shudras in terms of varna. Indeed, the proliferation of specialised occupational groups led to an increase in the number of jatis, which by far exceeded the number of varnas. Significantly, the bulk of the people covered under the occupational groups of jatis were invested with the responsibilities of meeting the needs of the society. As a consequence the structure of Hindu society came to be understood in terms of jati rather than varna. Thus, slowly varna lost its significance in daily social life. In regions like Bengal where there was no Ksatriya or Vaishya group in the indigenous population, even the Brahmans were known as a jati, although they were also referred to as Varnashrestha, ie, the highest of the Varnas.

But more importantly, by emphasising the connection between jati and occupation, the proponents of the caste system tried to lay the foundations of an absolutely non- competitive arrangement of production and distribution, that ensured the livelihood of each individual and guaranteed minimum social security. To the society in general the system guaranteed production and distribution in a smooth manner within the constraints of limited resources and conditions of scarcity and stagnation that prevailed in the localised economy of India since the seventh century AD.

However, variations did prevail in the caste system in different parts of India. Interestingly the impression that one gathers about the caste system, more particularly from the smrti literature, does not fully correspond to the social conditions prevalent in Bengal in ancient times. It needs to be asserted that none of these ancient smrtis was composed in Bengal. Therefore attempts to garner reliable information about the hierarchical division of Bengali society based on Varna from the pages of ancient smrti literature would be totally unjustified. As some scholars have argued, prior to the eleventh century hardly any smrti literature composed in Bengal could throw light on the Bengali social scenario. Moreover, on the basis of reliable historical evidence it could only be presumed that from the eleventh century onwards compilers of Bengali social commentaries consciously accepted the very basis of the Brahmanical logic of the hierarchical division of the Hindu social order.

During the Sena-Varman rule several smrtis and other literary texts were composed in Bengal. In this context, the works of Bhabadeva Bhatta and jimutavahana deserve special mention. In fact, these literary texts contain reliable information on society and history and could justifiably be utilised by historians for constructing historical narratives on Bengal's past.

Apart from the smrtis and other literary texts, Puranic and classical texts such as the brahmavaivarta purana, brihaddharma purana provide important information on Bengali society. At the same time, the genealogical texts also contain some relevant information. Similarly, there are two texts by the name of vallalacharita. One of the texts was supposed to have been composed by Ananda Bhatta at the behest of the Raja of Nabadvip, Buddhimanta Khan. This text was composed around 1510 AD. However, the first and the second volumes were supposed to have been authored by Gopala Bhatta under the directives of vallalasena, roughly around shaka 1300.

The picture that one gets of the caste system in the Brhaddharmapurana is quite different from the one that emerges from the Vallalacharita. In the case of the former, Ksatriyas and Vaishyas are classified differently, and the Shudras have been divided into two broad categories, namely, Sat Shudras (from whom higher castes could accept food and drinks) and Asat Shudras (whose touch was considered to be polluting). At the same time in terms of social ranking Brahmans were said to have been immediately followed by Ambasthas (Vaidya) and Karanas (Kayasthas). Similarly, Shankharis, Modakas, Tantubayis, Das (Peasants), Karmakaras, Suvarnavanikas and various other sub-castes and mixed castes (Sankara castes) also found a place in the narrative of the Brhaddharmapurana.

On the other hand the Vallalacharita offered a narrative that was much different from those of the Puranic texts. To be precise, it could be argued that during Vallalasena's time, the caste system in Bengal underwent significant changes. For instance, according to the authors of the Vallalacharita, Subarnavanikas had been relegated to the ranks of impure Shudras and Brahmans were forbidden to supervise their religious functions. At the same time, the authors of the Vallalacharita have also stated that in order to withstand the challenge posed by the Vanik (merchant) and Das (Servile peasants), Vallala raised the Kaivartas to the ranks of sat Shudras. Moreover, it has also been averred that Malakaras, Kumbhakaras and Karmakaras too were elevated to the ranks of sat Shudras.

But more importantly, it needs to be stated that though in the Brhaddharmapurana, Tantis, Gandhavanikas, Karmakaras, Taulikas (betelnut traders), Kumaras, Shankharis, Kansaris, Barujibis (Baruis), Modaka and Malakaras had been classified as Uttama-Sankar castes; Subarnavanikas (goldsmiths) were classified with Jal-Achal (from whom Brahmans and other upper castes were forbidden to accept food and water) castes, such as Dhibaras (Fishermen) and Rajakas (washermen). In the Vallalacharita, some reasons have been propounded to explain the phenomenon. It has been argued that such transformations took place for political and social reasons. At the same time, it also needs to be asserted that though the narrative in the Vallalacharita might not be fully acceptable to historians, there is no doubt that it is certainly more reliable than the genealogical texts composed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Some details relating to the lower castes in Bengal can be highlighted. Relevant historical information about the Kaivartas was available for the first time from the documents of the Pala period. Kaivarta chief Divya or Divvok had been a powerful official during the Pala period. He in collusion with several feudal lords revolted against Pala dominance and killed Mahipala II. Following the death of Mahipala II, some parts of Bengal passed into the hands of powerful Kaivarta overlords namely, Divya, Rudoka and Bhima. This historical development might have brought about a change in the social position of the Kaivartas, particularly in North Bengal.

The Pala documents also provide some information about the untouchable castes, which were outside the frontiers of Hindu society. In the list containing the names of the beneficiaries of landgrants in the Pala copperplates, high governments officials were immediately followed by Brahmans, who in turn were followed by various peasant communities. In fact, there was no reference either to the Ksatriyas or the Vaishyas. But, beyond such social groupings there were several other groups who were referred to as Medh, Andhra and Chandalas. The Chandalas were considered to be the lowest of all the social groupings. Social commentators like Bhabadeva Bhatta have referred to them as an Antyaja Jati. In several charya songs information about several other low castes such as Doms or Dombs, Chandalas, Shabaras and Kapalikas have also been found. In some medieval texts it has been pointed out that contact of Brahmans with such lower castes was forbidden.





Bhabadeva Bhatta classified lower caste groups such as the Chandals, Pukkashakas and Kapalikas as untouchables. The Kapalikas were regarded as an uncivilized community, who followed bizarre rituals and practices. The Shabaras, who mostly inhabited the mountainous regions, also were regarded as lower castes. However, it could be argued with some certainty that they did occupy a higher social standing than the Doms and Chandals, who were regarded as antyaja jatis.

Antyaja jati or untouchable groups were essentially composed of Badhs/Banars, Kapalikas/ Kols (belonging to the Adivasi grouping), Koncho (who were also referred to as Koche and were generally classified within the Adivasi grouping), Hadis (who were also referred to as Handis), Doms, Bagtits (Bagdis), Sharakas (considered to be a part of the ancient community of Shrabakas), Byalgrahi and Chandals. The majority of the antyaja castes remained outside the varnashrama system. In most cases they were regarded as servants of the society and as such were assigned the lowest social standing. From the charya gitis, one gets an impression about the vocations pursued by the untouchable communities in Bengal. For instance, they were mostly engaged in making objects out of bamboo, felling trees, rowing boats, preparing liquor and hunting. Interestingly many of these Antyaja jatis were also believed to have practiced various forms of black magic.

Significantly, there was hardly any major social movement in Bengal between the tenth and the fifteenth century aimed at the elevation of the Antyaja jatis in the Hindu social scale. In fact, there was hardly any case of social mobility among them, and for the great majority of the population comprising essentially the lower castes, the major sources of social mobility remained inaccessible. Prolonged pursuit of a particular occupation for generations in the absence of alternative job opportunities naturally gave rise to strict social conventions, which in the traditional context were overlaid with rituals. Similarly, if the sources of mobility remained inaccessible to a caste for generations its position in the caste hierarchy sometimes assumed an element of permanence and the duties of the caste, including its occupation, appeared inviolable. In other words, scrupulous observance of caste duties too often resulted in social rigidity, much to the detriment of the interests of the lower or untouchable communities. [Rajsekhar Basu]

Bibliography Hitesranjan Sanyal, Social Mobility in Bengal, Calcutta, 1981; Niharranjan Ray, Bangalir Itihas: Adi Parba, (1 Edition), Calcutta, 1356 BS.


The role Dawood Ibrahim , the underworld kingpin who heads the D-Company and has known ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and even the Central Intelligence Agency, is apparently being whitewashed. His capture and handover to India might prove inconvenient for either the ISI or the CIA, or both.
http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/C_0055.htm

Caste, Class and Family Structure in West Bengal Villages



by SATADAL DASGUPTA , SEANA HENNESSEY , RAJAT SUBHRA MUKHOPADHYAY


SATADAL DASGUPTA [*]

SEANA HENNESSEY [*]

RAJAT SUBHRA MUKHOPADHYAY [**]

One of the major questions which has been of interest to researchers on family in India is whether the family structure is influenced by caste or class. Caste and family structures have been found to be related in several studies. Both Basu (1962: 88) and Sarma (1964: 200-201), for example, found a significantly higher proportion of joint families among high and middle castes than among low castes in the villages of Burdwan district of West Bengal. In his study of the family structure in four villages belonging to the same district, Sen (1965: 7) observed that while both high and low castes had almost identically low proportions of joint families, the middle castes had the highest. Since middle castes are often landowning agricultural castes, Sen explained (1965: 8), they both need the manpower supplied by the joint family and can afford to maintain it. Among low castes, on the other hand, nuclear families are found to predominate (Sengupta, 1958: 384-389; Cohn, 1961: 1051-1055; Desai, 1964: 77; Shah, 1973: 93-98; Dasgupta, 1993: 116). Indeed, the joint family among low castes has been described as a transitional "structural contingent" rather than a "fixed form' (Cohn, 1961: 1055) which becomes nuclearized almost immediately after it comes into existence.

The relatively high incidence of the joint family among high and middle castes and the predominance of the nuclear family among low castes have been explained in two ways. One view is that since the joint family is highly idealized in Indian rural communities and especially by Hindu villagers, there is a close association between the status of a caste in the ritual hierarchy and the incidence of the joint family within it. According to the second view, the association between caste status and family structure is primarily a function of economic factors such as occupation and landownership rather than any normative ideals associated with the caste hierarchy. Sen (1965), for example, reported a statistically significant relationship between family types and landownership and occupation. His data further revealed that there was a significantly higher proportion of joint families among agricultural rather than among nonagricultural castes regardless of their position in the caste hierarchy. In explaining the high incidence of joint families among the high caste Brahmans compared...
http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5001854481

Bengal's Caste Prejudices

By Sandip Bayopadhyay

24 July, 2004
The Statesman

A gruesome incident in a village in West Bengal in April this year didn't spark off the public reaction it deserved probably because election waves were rocking the country and one had the time for such "trivial" matters. The story involves the love affair between a Brahmin boy and a girl belonging to the Hari community, traditionally a "low caste". The boy's family didn't want the relationship to develop into wedlock, allegedly on the ground that a Hari bride would pollute the family goddess. Driven to extreme frustration, the young couple committed suicide.

The tragic incident, however, didn't end there. It took a bizarre turn when the couple's dead bodies were left to rot for several days because the villagers refused to touch them and arrange for cremation. The incident took place at a time when the vote-seeking political leaders were mouthing concern for the downtrodden, promising to take up their cause if voted to power.

Compared with some other states, discrimination on grounds of caste or religion is certainly less in Bengal. One may therefore brush aside the above incident as an exception. But even an exceptional case loses none of its gravity when it involves an inhuman practice that tainted Indian (Hindu) society for ages together and continues to prevail in some form even today. Moreover, even in West Bengal, such cases are not too rare. In November 2000, in a village in Hooghly, a Hari woman was humiliated for having dared to enter a Kali temple and smear her forehead with the sindoor of the goddess. On 14 October 2002, The Statesman reported on a Murshidabad village incident in which members of the Mochi community were not allowed to participate in the local Durga puja celebrations. In July this year, the press again informed us of another incident where a Bauri family in a Bankura village was forced to leave their home because they belonged to a "low" caste.

Ironical as it may seem, the Government of India has declared this year as the year of Scientific Awareness and is spending crores of rupees to spread such awareness among the common people. But let alone the development of scientific/rational thinking, even the basic tenets of human equality continue to elude our "civil" society.It is true that after Independence, the Indian State made specific provisions for the uplift of neglected communities. This has, to some extent, led to the upward mobility of some "low" castes that are now in a position to use caste as an instrument of power. But in the kind of democracy we have, a caste's position in the power hierarchy is not always an index of the actual social status of its rank and file.

In West Bengal, for example, politics does not follow caste lines and the education system is free from any caste-related discrimination. But several surveys, including one carried out by Pratichi Trust, bear out that in school Dalit and tribal children are not always treated on equal terms.

Two examples from the author's personal experience will elucidate this. In a primary school at Rajarhat, not very far from Kolkata, the head teacher claimed, "Now a days, all families are sending their kids to school." On my way, I had found some boys fishing in a canal. Do they attend school? The teacher remarked, "They are Kaoras, you know. How can you expect them to come to school?" Obviously, the teacher excluded the Kaoras, an extremely underdeveloped community, from "all the families" he had earlier referred to.

On another occasion, in a Bankura village, a secondary school teacher lamented, "These days, children from Bagdi, Bauri and Khaira families are coming to school. There is no hope for development in education in this situation."

This is the mindset of many and it is precisely this that helps perpetuate discrimination or exclusion in one form or another. In
West Bengal, the increasing participation of Dalits and tribals in the panchayats is undoubtedly a significant phenomenon. But this does not always reflect the lived reality of some branded communities and the treatment that they receive at the hands of the "upper" castes.

In the Hooghly incident, the Hari woman's family was forced to pay the money needed for "cleansing" the temple. What did the local panchayat do? And why didn't the panchayat move forward to cremate the dead bodies of the lovers who laid down their lives as a mark of protest against caste prejudice?

West Bengal's ruling Marxists seem to have failed to properly address this specificity of Indian society. This holds true for Marxists in general who believe that class consciousness will automatically lead to eradication of caste consciousness.

The caste question, in fact, has taken on a peculiar form in West Bengal. Political leaders rarely talk about it; there's a general feeling that caste is no longer a problem in the state. Any reference to the caste-identity of a person is considered taboo and people prefer to avoid certain caste-names in view of the age-old stigma attached. Even better economic position does not always raise one's social status. The Murshidabad case is an example of this. The puja organisers explained the exclusion of the Mochis as a matter of convention.

Namasudras have a long history of struggle against Brahminical dominance and a section of them are now in a position to assert themselves as a powerful social group. The Pods of South Bengal, now known as Paundrakshatriyas, have also been able to improve their social status. But this does not hold true for the Bagdis, Bauris, Haris, Mochis, Kaoras and other groups. Spread of education among them is also very low. A UGC survey of two districts in West Bengal found 64 per cent of the Dalits (scheduled castes) to be illiterate. Thanks to Leftist politics holding sway for over two decades, people
in this state, however, have become cautious about the caste question. There is a conscious attempt to keep politics free from caste; the issue does not find place on the agenda of any political party. The Bahujan Samaj Party does exist in West Bengal, but it has little influence on the politics of the state. In the public sphere, even those who harbour a prejudice do not speak their hearts out publicly. The author came across one such incident in a village in the Canning area, South 24 Parganas. While talking about his village and its population, an old man suddenly stopped and asked the local panchayat leader, who was also present there, "Should I speak freely?" The latter hesitated a bit and then said, "Go on". The old man then introduced himself as a member of a "superior" caste and identified some others as belonging to "lower" castes. "They are all Bunos and sardars, you know," he said.

Such terms as Bunos and Sardars actually denote the names of communities in various areas in West Bengal. People, in general, hardly bother about knowing their ethnic identities. This seems to be the covert expression of a deep-seated prejudice against certain communities. Naming is an important part of cognition. To deny a community its name is to treat it as not worthy of recognition. Untouchability, as a social practice, is not very far from this prejudiced mentality.

(The author is a freelance contributor.)
http://www.countercurrents.org/dalit-sandip240704.htm

Cultural dose for youths in Kandhamal from today


Express News Service First Published : 01 Jan 2009 05:08:00 AM ISTLast Updated : 01 Jan 2009 02:51:42 PM ISTPHULBANI: As part of the ongoing peace initiatives in the strife-torn Kandhamal, the district administration has decided to organise 10-day cultural festivals for youths in the 10 most sensitive places of the district.


The programmes, a part of the ‘Santi O Sadbhavana Abhiyan’, would be kicked off tomorrow from Gadaguda village of Tikabali block. Other villages where the programme would be performed are Bodimunda and Paburia villages of Tikabali, Katingia and Raikhol of G.Udaygiri block, Mandakia and Gumamaha of Raikia block, Chanchedi and Gunjibadi of K.Nuagaon block and Baligeda village of Balliguda block.

Gandhian leader Prof S.N. Subba Rao of Nationl Youth Programme, would conduct the programmes, which are being organised by the Orissa Santi O Sadhavabana Abhijan Kandhmal wing, Phulbani Action Group, Nehru Yuva Kendra and the district administration. ‘‘During these 10 days, the message of peaceful co-existence among members of all religions would be spread through various cultural programmes and sports events,’’ said District Collector Kishan Kumar. After the success of the youth festival organised at the Kandhamal stadium from December 21 to 23 by the Shanti O Sadbhabhana Abhijan, Kandhamal wing, in collaboration with the district administration, this is the second in the series, which will help in spreading the message of peace in the district,’’ said organisation conveners Promod Pattnaik and Md Ziauddin.

Meanwhile, though there is peace in Kandhamal, the district administration wants security forces to stay back for one more month as a precautionary measure.

‘‘Presence of forces is helping build confidence among the riot-hit people and they are gradually returning to their houses. This is evident from the closure of relief camps at Phulbani and the return of more than 220 persons to their homes from K.Nuagaon and G.Udaygiri camps,’’ the Collector said.
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=Cultural+dose+for+youths+in+Kandhamal+from+today&artid=Z8SmuwqoLyM=&SectionID=mvKkT3vj5ZA=&MainSectionID=fyV9T2jIa4A=&SectionName=nUFeEOBkuKw=&SEO=

The word "Bengal" is a misnomer. There is no such space in
our time called "Bengal". Those who consciously or
unconsciously think, talk, or write about a space called
"Bengal" -- are either misguiding their own imagination to a
space that does not exist in the late twentieth century, Or,
their imaginations are being exogeneously manipulated and
misguided by a wide range of cultural products and by-products
to that non-existent imaginary land called "Bengal". Anyone
who has difficulty in accepting the historically and politically
evolved boundaries of the ONLY-BENGALI-NATION-STATE in the world
today, is motivated to live on that non-existent imaginary land
called "Bengal" in the refuge of his imaginary community.
Since the reality of historically and politically established
Nation-State does not allow the imaginary communities to create
physically the land of their imagination, they tend to
delegitimize in their mind and imagination, the existence of
the nation-state that is so real.
My paper is about the long cultural history of
delegitimization of the cultural boundaries of the ONLY-BENGALI-
NATION-STATE-IN-THE-WORLD (The Peoples Republic of Bangladesh)
and the transgression of it's cultural boundaries by those who
consider themselves (in their imagination) the alien cultural
insiders of Bangladesh from the West bank of the Ganges.

History, as it is known, is a sequential process
ordered by time. But the assumptions of History can be
modified by a theoretical investigation into the structure of
time. Historical events, structures, or phenomena can be grouped
into different classes of time which have different qualitative
properties, different frequencies' and unequal power. With that
in mind, let us ask the question, How do people in different
time periods and different places recognize themselves as being
part of a common set, whether that set is defined by
Ethnicity, Language, Religion or Geography ? Or let me ask,
How do the Ethnic Bengalis of pre-partitioned India and their
siblings recognize themselves as part of the Republic of
Bangladesh ?
Is it by their Ethnicity ? By their Language ? Or By their
Religion ? Or even by Geography ?
The fact that they do so, atleast in their imagination and
as evident in the outpour of their imagination in literature
and other forms of cultural expression, has never been in any
doubt. But the principle through which notions of continuity
and discontinuity, boundaries, and ruptures are established is
highly complex and variable. It is as variable as Sunil
Gangopadhay's self-referring utterances of his implied Bangladeshi
subjects in "Purbo Paschim" to Taslima Nasrin's Focculdian
"Shame" enchanting and pleasing the smug and complacent Bengali
Hindus, who have long ceased their active participation in
Hinduism.
The historian's classic preoccupation, observed Michel
Foucault, was an overwhelming compulsion to seek out
continuities and unities so that "discontinuity" was the stigma
of temporal dislocation that is the historian's task to remove
from history.
The over-representation of the West Bengalis and Upper-caste
Hindu Bengalis, both as scholars and as topics for research in
South Asian Studies world-wide, points out single-handedly to
the stigma of the temporal dislocation of Bengal, the
discontinuity of Bengal as a space and the overwhelmingly
and over-representatively compulsive manner in which the
West Bengali Hindus have tried to sought the continuity of
the non-existent and imaginary "Bengal" in research and
scholarship to skirt their stigma of the temporal dislocation
of Bengal. In the process of doing so, they have all too
often transgressed and delegitimized the cultural boundaries of
the Only Bengali Nation State in the world as well evident in
Nirad Chaudhuri's "BANGreji" notion of "TATHA KAATHITA BANGLADESH".
The geographic displacement of Bengal by Bangladesh and the
unequal transformation of the remaining and incomplete Bengal
within the Indian state-hood of West Bengal is another reason
for the compulsive West-Bengali Hindu over-representation in all
frontiers of South asian Studies. This is a concealed effect
of West Bengal's attempt to a complete and total cultural
representation by always shifting and switching between two sets
of identities-- the INDIAN IDENTITY and the IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI
IDENTITY. Both the INDIAN and the IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI
identities are very effectively used by the West Bengalis for
different situations and under different circumstances.
The INDIAN IDENTITY is used to legitimize the place of the
West-Bengalis in the competitive race of the Nation-States.
Whereas, the IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI IDENTITY is used by the
West Bengalis to distinguish the uniqueness of their cultural
variety among a diverse set of people in India.
The IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI-IDENTITY is also used by the
West-Bengalis to stir the imagination of
"ONCE-A-FIRST-MODERN-STATE-OF-INDIA and of the "BENGAL RENNAISSANCE,
that can very easily stereotype itself as a progressive
modernity from an underdeveloped caste-based identity.


**** This paper was presented by Chowdhury Irad Ahmed
Siddiky, PHD, at the Annual Bengal Studies Conference, 1999,
held at the University of North Carolina.
Email : Csidd...@Worldnet.att.net


Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/



Bhabadeva Bhatta classified lower caste groups such as the Chandals, Pukkashakas and Kapalikas as untouchables. The Kapalikas were regarded as an uncivilized community, who followed bizarre rituals and practices. The Shabaras, who mostly inhabited the mountainous regions, also were regarded as lower castes. However, it could be argued with some certainty that they did occupy a higher social standing than the Doms and Chandals, who were regarded as antyaja jatis.

Antyaja jati or untouchable groups were essentially composed of Badhs/Banars, Kapalikas/ Kols (belonging to the Adivasi grouping), Koncho (who were also referred to as Koche and were generally classified within the Adivasi grouping), Hadis (who were also referred to as Handis), Doms, Bagtits (Bagdis), Sharakas (considered to be a part of the ancient community of Shrabakas), Byalgrahi and Chandals. The majority of the antyaja castes remained outside the varnashrama system. In most cases they were regarded as servants of the society and as such were assigned the lowest social standing. From the charya gitis, one gets an impression about the vocations pursued by the untouchable communities in Bengal. For instance, they were mostly engaged in making objects out of bamboo, felling trees, rowing boats, preparing liquor and hunting. Interestingly many of these Antyaja jatis were also believed to have practiced various forms of black magic.

Significantly, there was hardly any major social movement in Bengal between the tenth and the fifteenth century aimed at the elevation of the Antyaja jatis in the Hindu social scale. In fact, there was hardly any case of social mobility among them, and for the great majority of the population comprising essentially the lower castes, the major sources of social mobility remained inaccessible. Prolonged pursuit of a particular occupation for generations in the absence of alternative job opportunities naturally gave rise to strict social conventions, which in the traditional context were overlaid with rituals. Similarly, if the sources of mobility remained inaccessible to a caste for generations its position in the caste hierarchy sometimes assumed an element of permanence and the duties of the caste, including its occupation, appeared inviolable. In other words, scrupulous observance of caste duties too often resulted in social rigidity, much to the detriment of the interests of the lower or untouchable communities. [Rajsekhar Basu]

Bibliography Hitesranjan Sanyal, Social Mobility in Bengal, Calcutta, 1981; Niharranjan Ray, Bangalir Itihas: Adi Parba, (1 Edition), Calcutta, 1356 BS.


The role Dawood Ibrahim , the underworld kingpin who heads the D-Company and has known ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and even the Central Intelligence Agency, is apparently being whitewashed. His capture and handover to India might prove inconvenient for either the ISI or the CIA, or both.
http://banglapedia.search.com.bd/HT/C_0055.htm

Caste, Class and Family Structure in West Bengal Villages



by SATADAL DASGUPTA , SEANA HENNESSEY , RAJAT SUBHRA MUKHOPADHYAY


SATADAL DASGUPTA [*]

SEANA HENNESSEY [*]

RAJAT SUBHRA MUKHOPADHYAY [**]

One of the major questions which has been of interest to researchers on family in India is whether the family structure is influenced by caste or class. Caste and family structures have been found to be related in several studies. Both Basu (1962: 88) and Sarma (1964: 200-201), for example, found a significantly higher proportion of joint families among high and middle castes than among low castes in the villages of Burdwan district of West Bengal. In his study of the family structure in four villages belonging to the same district, Sen (1965: 7) observed that while both high and low castes had almost identically low proportions of joint families, the middle castes had the highest. Since middle castes are often landowning agricultural castes, Sen explained (1965: 8), they both need the manpower supplied by the joint family and can afford to maintain it. Among low castes, on the other hand, nuclear families are found to predominate (Sengupta, 1958: 384-389; Cohn, 1961: 1051-1055; Desai, 1964: 77; Shah, 1973: 93-98; Dasgupta, 1993: 116). Indeed, the joint family among low castes has been described as a transitional "structural contingent" rather than a "fixed form' (Cohn, 1961: 1055) which becomes nuclearized almost immediately after it comes into existence.

The relatively high incidence of the joint family among high and middle castes and the predominance of the nuclear family among low castes have been explained in two ways. One view is that since the joint family is highly idealized in Indian rural communities and especially by Hindu villagers, there is a close association between the status of a caste in the ritual hierarchy and the incidence of the joint family within it. According to the second view, the association between caste status and family structure is primarily a function of economic factors such as occupation and landownership rather than any normative ideals associated with the caste hierarchy. Sen (1965), for example, reported a statistically significant relationship between family types and landownership and occupation. His data further revealed that there was a significantly higher proportion of joint families among agricultural rather than among nonagricultural castes regardless of their position in the caste hierarchy. In explaining the high incidence of joint families among the high caste Brahmans compared...
http://www.questia.com/googleScholar.qst?docId=5001854481

Bengal's Caste Prejudices

By Sandip Bayopadhyay

24 July, 2004
The Statesman

A gruesome incident in a village in West Bengal in April this year didn't spark off the public reaction it deserved probably because election waves were rocking the country and one had the time for such "trivial" matters. The story involves the love affair between a Brahmin boy and a girl belonging to the Hari community, traditionally a "low caste". The boy's family didn't want the relationship to develop into wedlock, allegedly on the ground that a Hari bride would pollute the family goddess. Driven to extreme frustration, the young couple committed suicide.

The tragic incident, however, didn't end there. It took a bizarre turn when the couple's dead bodies were left to rot for several days because the villagers refused to touch them and arrange for cremation. The incident took place at a time when the vote-seeking political leaders were mouthing concern for the downtrodden, promising to take up their cause if voted to power.

Compared with some other states, discrimination on grounds of caste or religion is certainly less in Bengal. One may therefore brush aside the above incident as an exception. But even an exceptional case loses none of its gravity when it involves an inhuman practice that tainted Indian (Hindu) society for ages together and continues to prevail in some form even today. Moreover, even in West Bengal, such cases are not too rare. In November 2000, in a village in Hooghly, a Hari woman was humiliated for having dared to enter a Kali temple and smear her forehead with the sindoor of the goddess. On 14 October 2002, The Statesman reported on a Murshidabad village incident in which members of the Mochi community were not allowed to participate in the local Durga puja celebrations. In July this year, the press again informed us of another incident where a Bauri family in a Bankura village was forced to leave their home because they belonged to a "low" caste.

Ironical as it may seem, the Government of India has declared this year as the year of Scientific Awareness and is spending crores of rupees to spread such awareness among the common people. But let alone the development of scientific/rational thinking, even the basic tenets of human equality continue to elude our "civil" society.It is true that after Independence, the Indian State made specific provisions for the uplift of neglected communities. This has, to some extent, led to the upward mobility of some "low" castes that are now in a position to use caste as an instrument of power. But in the kind of democracy we have, a caste's position in the power hierarchy is not always an index of the actual social status of its rank and file.

In West Bengal, for example, politics does not follow caste lines and the education system is free from any caste-related discrimination. But several surveys, including one carried out by Pratichi Trust, bear out that in school Dalit and tribal children are not always treated on equal terms.

Two examples from the author's personal experience will elucidate this. In a primary school at Rajarhat, not very far from Kolkata, the head teacher claimed, "Now a days, all families are sending their kids to school." On my way, I had found some boys fishing in a canal. Do they attend school? The teacher remarked, "They are Kaoras, you know. How can you expect them to come to school?" Obviously, the teacher excluded the Kaoras, an extremely underdeveloped community, from "all the families" he had earlier referred to.

On another occasion, in a Bankura village, a secondary school teacher lamented, "These days, children from Bagdi, Bauri and Khaira families are coming to school. There is no hope for development in education in this situation."

This is the mindset of many and it is precisely this that helps perpetuate discrimination or exclusion in one form or another. In
West Bengal, the increasing participation of Dalits and tribals in the panchayats is undoubtedly a significant phenomenon. But this does not always reflect the lived reality of some branded communities and the treatment that they receive at the hands of the "upper" castes.

In the Hooghly incident, the Hari woman's family was forced to pay the money needed for "cleansing" the temple. What did the local panchayat do? And why didn't the panchayat move forward to cremate the dead bodies of the lovers who laid down their lives as a mark of protest against caste prejudice?

West Bengal's ruling Marxists seem to have failed to properly address this specificity of Indian society. This holds true for Marxists in general who believe that class consciousness will automatically lead to eradication of caste consciousness.

The caste question, in fact, has taken on a peculiar form in West Bengal. Political leaders rarely talk about it; there's a general feeling that caste is no longer a problem in the state. Any reference to the caste-identity of a person is considered taboo and people prefer to avoid certain caste-names in view of the age-old stigma attached. Even better economic position does not always raise one's social status. The Murshidabad case is an example of this. The puja organisers explained the exclusion of the Mochis as a matter of convention.

Namasudras have a long history of struggle against Brahminical dominance and a section of them are now in a position to assert themselves as a powerful social group. The Pods of South Bengal, now known as Paundrakshatriyas, have also been able to improve their social status. But this does not hold true for the Bagdis, Bauris, Haris, Mochis, Kaoras and other groups. Spread of education among them is also very low. A UGC survey of two districts in West Bengal found 64 per cent of the Dalits (scheduled castes) to be illiterate. Thanks to Leftist politics holding sway for over two decades, people
in this state, however, have become cautious about the caste question. There is a conscious attempt to keep politics free from caste; the issue does not find place on the agenda of any political party. The Bahujan Samaj Party does exist in West Bengal, but it has little influence on the politics of the state. In the public sphere, even those who harbour a prejudice do not speak their hearts out publicly. The author came across one such incident in a village in the Canning area, South 24 Parganas. While talking about his village and its population, an old man suddenly stopped and asked the local panchayat leader, who was also present there, "Should I speak freely?" The latter hesitated a bit and then said, "Go on". The old man then introduced himself as a member of a "superior" caste and identified some others as belonging to "lower" castes. "They are all Bunos and sardars, you know," he said.

Such terms as Bunos and Sardars actually denote the names of communities in various areas in West Bengal. People, in general, hardly bother about knowing their ethnic identities. This seems to be the covert expression of a deep-seated prejudice against certain communities. Naming is an important part of cognition. To deny a community its name is to treat it as not worthy of recognition. Untouchability, as a social practice, is not very far from this prejudiced mentality.

(The author is a freelance contributor.)
http://www.countercurrents.org/dalit-sandip240704.htm



Cultural dose for youths in Kandhamal from today


Express News Service First Published : 01 Jan 2009 05:08:00 AM ISTLast Updated : 01 Jan 2009 02:51:42 PM ISTPHULBANI: As part of the ongoing peace initiatives in the strife-torn Kandhamal, the district administration has decided to organise 10-day cultural festivals for youths in the 10 most sensitive places of the district.


The programmes, a part of the ‘Santi O Sadbhavana Abhiyan’, would be kicked off tomorrow from Gadaguda village of Tikabali block. Other villages where the programme would be performed are Bodimunda and Paburia villages of Tikabali, Katingia and Raikhol of G.Udaygiri block, Mandakia and Gumamaha of Raikia block, Chanchedi and Gunjibadi of K.Nuagaon block and Baligeda village of Balliguda block.

Gandhian leader Prof S.N. Subba Rao of Nationl Youth Programme, would conduct the programmes, which are being organised by the Orissa Santi O Sadhavabana Abhijan Kandhmal wing, Phulbani Action Group, Nehru Yuva Kendra and the district administration. ‘‘During these 10 days, the message of peaceful co-existence among members of all religions would be spread through various cultural programmes and sports events,’’ said District Collector Kishan Kumar. After the success of the youth festival organised at the Kandhamal stadium from December 21 to 23 by the Shanti O Sadbhabhana Abhijan, Kandhamal wing, in collaboration with the district administration, this is the second in the series, which will help in spreading the message of peace in the district,’’ said organisation conveners Promod Pattnaik and Md Ziauddin.

Meanwhile, though there is peace in Kandhamal, the district administration wants security forces to stay back for one more month as a precautionary measure.

‘‘Presence of forces is helping build confidence among the riot-hit people and they are gradually returning to their houses. This is evident from the closure of relief camps at Phulbani and the return of more than 220 persons to their homes from K.Nuagaon and G.Udaygiri camps,’’ the Collector said.
http://www.expressbuzz.com/edition/story.aspx?Title=Cultural+dose+for+youths+in+Kandhamal+from+today&artid=Z8SmuwqoLyM=&SectionID=mvKkT3vj5ZA=&MainSectionID=fyV9T2jIa4A=&SectionName=nUFeEOBkuKw=&SEO=

The word "Bengal" is a misnomer. There is no such space in
our time called "Bengal". Those who consciously or
unconsciously think, talk, or write about a space called
"Bengal" -- are either misguiding their own imagination to a
space that does not exist in the late twentieth century, Or,
their imaginations are being exogeneously manipulated and
misguided by a wide range of cultural products and by-products
to that non-existent imaginary land called "Bengal". Anyone
who has difficulty in accepting the historically and politically
evolved boundaries of the ONLY-BENGALI-NATION-STATE in the world
today, is motivated to live on that non-existent imaginary land
called "Bengal" in the refuge of his imaginary community.
Since the reality of historically and politically established
Nation-State does not allow the imaginary communities to create
physically the land of their imagination, they tend to
delegitimize in their mind and imagination, the existence of
the nation-state that is so real.
My paper is about the long cultural history of
delegitimization of the cultural boundaries of the ONLY-BENGALI-
NATION-STATE-IN-THE-WORLD (The Peoples Republic of Bangladesh)
and the transgression of it's cultural boundaries by those who
consider themselves (in their imagination) the alien cultural
insiders of Bangladesh from the West bank of the Ganges.

History, as it is known, is a sequential process
ordered by time. But the assumptions of History can be
modified by a theoretical investigation into the structure of
time. Historical events, structures, or phenomena can be grouped
into different classes of time which have different qualitative
properties, different frequencies' and unequal power. With that
in mind, let us ask the question, How do people in different
time periods and different places recognize themselves as being
part of a common set, whether that set is defined by
Ethnicity, Language, Religion or Geography ? Or let me ask,
How do the Ethnic Bengalis of pre-partitioned India and their
siblings recognize themselves as part of the Republic of
Bangladesh ?
Is it by their Ethnicity ? By their Language ? Or By their
Religion ? Or even by Geography ?
The fact that they do so, atleast in their imagination and
as evident in the outpour of their imagination in literature
and other forms of cultural expression, has never been in any
doubt. But the principle through which notions of continuity
and discontinuity, boundaries, and ruptures are established is
highly complex and variable. It is as variable as Sunil
Gangopadhay's self-referring utterances of his implied Bangladeshi
subjects in "Purbo Paschim" to Taslima Nasrin's Focculdian
"Shame" enchanting and pleasing the smug and complacent Bengali
Hindus, who have long ceased their active participation in
Hinduism.
The historian's classic preoccupation, observed Michel
Foucault, was an overwhelming compulsion to seek out
continuities and unities so that "discontinuity" was the stigma
of temporal dislocation that is the historian's task to remove
from history.
The over-representation of the West Bengalis and Upper-caste
Hindu Bengalis, both as scholars and as topics for research in
South Asian Studies world-wide, points out single-handedly to
the stigma of the temporal dislocation of Bengal, the
discontinuity of Bengal as a space and the overwhelmingly
and over-representatively compulsive manner in which the
West Bengali Hindus have tried to sought the continuity of
the non-existent and imaginary "Bengal" in research and
scholarship to skirt their stigma of the temporal dislocation
of Bengal. In the process of doing so, they have all too
often transgressed and delegitimized the cultural boundaries of
the Only Bengali Nation State in the world as well evident in
Nirad Chaudhuri's "BANGreji" notion of "TATHA KAATHITA BANGLADESH".
The geographic displacement of Bengal by Bangladesh and the
unequal transformation of the remaining and incomplete Bengal
within the Indian state-hood of West Bengal is another reason
for the compulsive West-Bengali Hindu over-representation in all
frontiers of South asian Studies. This is a concealed effect
of West Bengal's attempt to a complete and total cultural
representation by always shifting and switching between two sets
of identities-- the INDIAN IDENTITY and the IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI
IDENTITY. Both the INDIAN and the IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI
identities are very effectively used by the West Bengalis for
different situations and under different circumstances.
The INDIAN IDENTITY is used to legitimize the place of the
West-Bengalis in the competitive race of the Nation-States.
Whereas, the IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI IDENTITY is used by the
West Bengalis to distinguish the uniqueness of their cultural
variety among a diverse set of people in India.
The IMAGINARY-BENGAL'S-BENGALI-IDENTITY is also used by the
West-Bengalis to stir the imagination of
"ONCE-A-FIRST-MODERN-STATE-OF-INDIA and of the "BENGAL RENNAISSANCE,
that can very easily stereotype itself as a progressive
modernity from an underdeveloped caste-based identity.


**** This paper was presented by Chowdhury Irad Ahmed
Siddiky, PHD, at the Annual Bengal Studies Conference, 1999,
held at the University of North Carolina.
Email : Csidd...@Worldnet.att.net


Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/


Jeremy R Hammond writes:

December 22, 2008
The role Dawood Ibrahim [Images], the underworld kingpin who heads the D-Company and has known ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and even the Central Intelligence Agency, is apparently being whitewashed. His capture and handover to India might prove inconvenient for either the ISI or the CIA, or both.
It was Ibrahim who was initially characterised by press reports as being the mastermind behind the attacks. Now, that title is being given to Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi by numerous media accounts reporting that Pakistan security forces have raided a training camp of the group Lashkar-e-Tayiba [Images], which evidence has indicated was behind the attacks. Lakhvi was reportedly captured in the raid and is now in custody.

At the same time Ibrahim's role is being downplayed, Lakhvi's known role is being exaggerated. Initial reports described him as the training specialist for LeT, but the major media outlets like the New York Times and the London [Images] Times, citing government sources, have since promoted his status to that of commander of operations for the group.

The only terrorist from the Mumbai attacks to be captured alive, Ajmal Amir Kasab , characterised Ibrahim, not Lakhvi, as the mastermind of those attacks, according to earlier press accounts.

Kasab reportedly told his interrogators that he and his fellow terrorists were trained under Lakhvi, also known as Chacha (uncle), at a camp in Pakistan. Indian officials also traced calls from a satellite phone used by the terrorists to Lakhvi.

But the phone had also been used to call Yusuf Muzammil, also known as Abu Yusuf, Abu Hurrera, and "Yahah". And it has been Muzammil, not Lakhvi, who has previously been described as the military commander of the LeT. It was an intercepted call to Muzammil on November 18 that put the Indian Navy and Coast Guard on high alert to be on the lookout for any foreign vessels from Pakistan entering Indian waters.

Kasab told his interrogators that his team had set out from Karachi, Pakistan, on a ship belonging to Dawood Ibrahim, the MV Alpha. They then hijacked an Indian fishing trawler, the Kuber, to pass through Indian territorial waters to elude the Navy and Coast Guard that were boarding and searching suspect ships.

Although the MV Alpha was subsequently found and seized by the Indian Navy, there have been few, if any, developments about this aspect of the investigation in press accounts, such as whether it has been confirmed or not that the ship was owned by Ibrahim.

Upon arriving off the coast near the city, they were received by inflatable rubber dinghies that had been arranged by an associate of Ibrahim's in Mumbai.

The planning and execution of the attacks are indicative of the mastermind role not of either Lakhvi or Muzammil, but of Ibrahim, an Indian who is intimately familiar with the city. It was in Mumbai that Ibrahim rose through the ranks of the underworld to become a major organised crime boss.

At least two other Indians were also connected to the attacks, Mukhtar Ahmed and Tausef Rahman. They were arrested for their role in obtaining SIM cards used in the cell phones of the terrorists. Ahmed, according to Indian officials, had in fact been recruited by a special counter-insurgency police task force as an undercover operative. His exact role is still being investigated.

One of the SIM cards used was possibly purchased from New Jersey. Investigators are looking into this potential link to the US, as well.

Dawood Ibrahim went from underworld kingpin to terrorist in 1993, when he was connected to a series of bombings in Mumbai that resulted in 250 deaths. He is wanted by Interpol and was designated by the US as a global terrorist in 2003.

It Is believed Ibrahim has been residing in Karachi, and Indian officials have accused Pakistan's ISI of protecting him.

Ibrahim is known to be a major drug trafficker responsible for shipping narcotics into the United Kingdom and Western Europe.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, most Afghan opium (or its derivative, heroin, which is increasingly being produced in the country before export) is smuggled through Iran and Turkey en route by land to Europe; but the percentage that goes to Pakistan seems to mostly find its way directly to the UK, either by plane or by ship.

Afghanistan is the world's leading producer of opium, a trend that developed during the CIA-backed mujahedeen effort to oust the Soviet Union from the country, with the drug trade serving to help finance the war.

A known drug trafficker, Dawood Ibrahim is naturally also involved in money laundering, which is perhaps where the role of gambling operations in Nepal comes into the picture.

Yoichi Shimatsu, former editor of the Japan [Images] Times, wrote last month after the Mumbai attacks that Ibrahim had worked with the US to help finance the mujahedeen during the 1980s and that because he knows too much about the US's 'darker secrets' in the region, he could never be allowed to be turned over to India.

The recent promotion of Lakhvi to 'mastermind' of the attacks while Ibrahim's name disappears from media reports would seem to lend credence to Shimatsu's assertion.

Investigative journalist Wayne Madsen similarly reported that according to intelligence sources, Ibrahim is a CIA asset, both as a veteran of the mujahedeen war and in a continuing connection with his casino and drug trade operations in Kathmandu, Nepal. A deal had been made earlier this year to have Pakistan hand Ibrahim over to India, but the CIA was fearful that this would lead to too many of its dirty secrets coming to light, including the criminal activities of high level personnel within the agency.

One theory on the Mumbai attacks is that it was backlash for this double-cross that was among other things intended to serve as a warning that any such arrangement could have further serious consequences.

Although designated as a major international terrorist by the US, media reports in India have characterised the US's past interest in seeing Ibrahim handed over as less than enthusiastic. Former Indian deputy prime minister L K Advani [Images] wrote in his memoir, My Country, My Life, that he made a great effort to get Pakistan to hand over Ibrahim, and met with then US secretary of state Colin Powell and then national security advisor Condoleezza Rice [Images] (now secretary of state) to pressure Pakistan to do so. But he was informed by Powell that Pakistan would hand over Ibrahim only "with some strings attached" and that then Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf [Images] would need more time before doing so.

The handover, needless to say, never occurred. The Pakistan government has also publicly denied that Ibrahim is even in the country; a denial that was repeated following the recent Mumbai attacks.

Others suspected of involvement in the attacks and named among the 20 individuals India wants Pakistan to turn over also have possible connections to the CIA, including Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the founder of LeT, and Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Maulana Masood Azhar, both veterans of the CIA-backed mujahedeen effort.

Azhar had been captured in 1994 and imprisoned in India for his role as leader of the Pakistani-based terrorist group Harkut-ul-Mujahideen. He was released, however, in 1999 in exchange for hostages from the takeover of Indian Airlines Flight 814, which was hijacked during its flight from Kathmandu, Nepal to Delhi [Images], India and redirected to Afghanistan. After Azhar's release, he formed JeM, which was responsible for an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 that led Pakistan and India to the brink of war. LeT was also blamed for the attack alongside JeM.

Both LeT and JeM have links to the ISI, which has used the groups as proxies in the conflict with India over the territory of Kashmir.

Saeed travelled to Peshawar to join the mujahedeen cause during the Soviet-Afghan war. Peshawar served as the base of operations for the CIA, which worked closely with the ISI to finance, arm, and train the mujahedeen. It was in Peshawar that Saeed became the protege of Abdullah Azzam, who founded an organization called Maktab al-Khidamat along with a Saudi individual named Osama bin Laden [Images].

MaK worked alongside the CIA-ISI operations to recruit Arabs to the ranks of the mujahedeen. The ISI, acting as proxy for the CIA, chose mainly to channel its support to Afghans, such as warlord Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. The US claims the CIA had no relationship with MaK, but bin Laden's operation, which later evolved into Al Qaeda [Images], must certainly have been known to, and approved by, the CIA.

But there are indications that the CIA's relationship with MaK and Al Qaeda go well beyond having shared a common enemy and mutual interests in the Soviet-Afghan war. A number of Al Qaeda associates appear to have been protected individuals.

Another former head of the ISI is now being privately accused by the US of involvement with the group responsible for the Mumbai attacks, according to reports citing a document listing former ISI chief Lieutenant General Hamid Gul and four other former heads of Pakistan's intelligence agency as being involved in supporting terrorist networks. The individuals named have been recommended to the UN Security Council to be named as international terrorists, according to Pakistan's The News.

The document has been provided to the Pakistan government and also accuses Gul, who was head of the ISI from 1987 to 1989, of providing assistance to criminal groups in Kabul, as well as to groups responsible for recruiting and training militants to attack US-led forces in Afghanistan, including the Taliban [Images].

Hamid Gul responded to the reports by calling the allegations hilarious. The US denied that it had made any such recommendations to the UN.

But the US has similarly accused the ISI of involvement in the bombing of India's embassy in Kabul last July. This was unusual not because of the allegation of an ISI connection to terrorism but because it was in such stark contrast with US attempts to publicly portray Pakistan as a staunch ally in its 'war on terrorism' when the country was under the dictatorship of Musharraf.

The US attitude toward Pakistan shifted once an elected government came to power that has been more willing to side with the overwhelming belief among the public that it is the 'war on terrorism' itself that has exacerbated the problem of extremist militant groups and led to further terrorist attacks within the country, such as the assassination of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto [Images] last year or the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in September. While the world's attention has been focused on the attacks in Mumbai, a bomb blast in Peshawar killed 21 and injured 90.

While the purported US document names Gul and others as terrorist supporters, another report, from Indian intelligence, indicates that the terrorists who carried out the attacks in Mumbai were among 500 trained by instructors from the Pakistan military, according to The Times. This training of the 10 known Mumbai terrorists would have taken place prior to their recent preparation for these specific attacks by the LeT training specialist Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi.

But while Lakhvi, Muzammil, and Hafiz Saeed [Images] have continued to be named in connection with last month's attacks in Mumbai, the name of Dawood Ibrahim seems to be either disappearing altogether or his originally designated role as the accused mastermind of the attacks being credited now instead to Lakhvi in media accounts.

Whether this is a deliberate effort to downplay Ibrahim's role in the attacks so as not to have to force Pakistan to turn him over because of embarrassing revelations pertaining to the CIA's involvement with known terrorists and drug traffickers that development could possibly produce isn't certain.

But what is certain is that the CIA has had a long history of involvement with such characters and that the US has a track record of attempting to keep information about the nature of such involvement in the dark or to cover it up once it reaches the light of public scrutiny.

Jeremy R Hammond is the editor of Foreign Policy Journal. Reproduced with kind courtesy of Foreign Policy Journal.
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/22mumterror-why-the-cia-does-not-want-dawood-in-indian-hands.htm


HISTORY OF BANGLADESH

The roots

Bangladesh is a new state in an ancient land. It has been described by an American political scientist as "a country challenged by contradictions". On the face of it, the recent twists and turns of her history are often inconsistent. It is neither a distinct geographical entity, nor a well-defined historical unit. Nevertheless, it is the homeland of the ninth largest nation in the world whose groupings for a political identity were protracted, intense and agonizing. The key to these apparent contradictions lies in her history.

Proto-history and Pre-history

Geological evidence indicates that much of Bangladesh was formed 1 to 6.5 million years ago during the tertiary era. Human habitation in this region is, therefore, likely to be very old. The evidence of paleolithic civilization in Bangladesh region is limited to a stone implement in Rangamati and a hand axe in the hilly tip of Feni district. They are likely to be 10,000 to 15,000 years old. New stone age in the region lasted from 3,000 B.C. to 1,500 B.C. Neolithic tools comparable to Assam group were found at Sitakunda in Chittagong. Hand axes and chisels showing close affinity to neolithic industries in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa have been discovered at Mainamati near Comilla.

Political Dynamics in Ancient Bengal (326 B.C. to 1204 A.D.)

The earliest historical reference to organized political life in the Bangladesh region is usually traced to the writings on Alexander's invasion of India in 326 B.C. The Greek and Latin historians suggested that Alexander the Great withdrew from India anticipating the valiant counter attack of the mighty Gangaridai and Prasioi empires which were located in the Bengal region. It is not, however, clearly known who built these empires. Literary and epigraphic evidence refer to the rise and fall of a large number of principalities in the region which were variously known as Pundra Vardhana (northern Bangladesh), Gauda (parts of West Bengal and Bangladesh), Dandabhukti (southern West Bengal), Karna Subarna (part of West Bengal), Varendra (northern Bangladesh), Rarh (southern areas of West Bengal), Summha Desa (south-western West Bengal), Vanga (central Bangladesh), Vangala (southern Bangladesh), Harikela (North-East Bangladesh), Chandradwipa (Southern Bangladesh), Subarnabithi (central Bangladesh), Navyabakashika (central and southern Bangladesh), Lukhnauti (North Bengal and Bihar) and Samatata (Eastern Bangladesh)

There are two schools of opinion regarding the political evolution of ancient Bengal. According to one school, the Bangladesh region in the ancient period was an integral part of mighty empires in north India. These historians maintain Gangaridai and Prasioi empires were succeeded by the Mauryas (4th to 2nd century B.C.), the Guptas (4th-5th century A.D.), the empire of Sasanka (7th century A.D.), the Pala empire (750-1162 A.D.), and the Senas (1162-1223 A.D.). Specially, the Pala empire which lasted for more than four hundred years and reached its zenith in eighth and ninth centuries under the leadership of Dharmapala and Devapala is cited as an example of Bengal's political genius. The revisionist historians are of the opinion that the traditional interpretation overstates the role of all-India empires in the political life of the Bangladesh region. They maintain that epigraphic evidence suggests that only some of the areas which now constitute Bangladesh were occasionally incorporated in the larger empires of South Asia. In their view, political fragmentation and not empire was the historical destiny of Bangladesh region in the ancient times. Inscriptions attest to the existence of a succession of independent kingdoms in southern and eastern Bengal. These local kingdoms included the realms of Vainyagupta (6th century), the Faridpur kings (6th century), the Bhadra dynasty (circa 600-650 A D), Khadaga dynasty (circa 650-700 AD), Natha and Rata dynasty (750-800 A D ), the rulers of Harikela (circa 800-900), Chandra dynasty (circa 900-1045 A D), Varman dynasty (circa 1080-1150 A D), and Pattikera dynasty (circa 1000-1100 A D).

Evolution of Mediaeval Bengal (1204-l757)


The Middle age in Bengal coincided with the Muslim rule. Out of about 550 years of Muslim rule, Bengal was effectively ruled by Delhi-based all India empires for only about two hundred years. For about 350 years Bengal remained virtually independent. The Muslim rule in Bengal is usually divided into three phases. The first phase which lasted from 1204 to 1342 witnessed the consolidation of Muslim rule in Bengal. It was characterized by extreme political instability. The second phase which spanned the period 1342 to 1575 saw the emergence of independent local dynasties such as the Ilyas Shahi dynasty (1342-1414), the dynasty of King Ganesha (1414-1442) and Husain Shahi dynasty (l493-1539). The third phase which lasted from 1575 to 1757 witnessed the emergence of a centralized administration in Bengal within the framework of the Mughal empire. The Mughal viceroys in Bengal curbed the independence of powerful landlords who were known as Bara Bhuiyas and suppressed the Portuguese pirates who frequently interfered with the flow of foreign trade.

There were two major achievements of Muslim rule in the region. First, prior to Muslim rule in this area, Bengal was an ever-shifting mosaic of principalities. The natural limits of Bengal were not clearly perceived till its political unification by the Ilyas Shahi rulers in the fourteenth century. The political unification of Bengal was thus a gift of the Muslim rulers. Secondly, the political unity fashioned by the Muslim rulers also promoted linguistic homogeneity. Unlike their predecessors, the Muslim rulers were ardent patrons of Bengali language and literature. Prior to Muslim rule, the Bengali vernacular was despised for its impurities and vulgarities by Hindu elites who were the beneficiaries and champions of Sanskrit education. The spread of Islam challenged the spiritual leadership of upper caste Hindus. The intense competition between Islam and resurgent Hinduism in the form of Vaisnavism for capturing the imagination of unlettered masses resulted in an outpouring of their stirring messages in the vernacular.

The Muslim rule in Bengal also witnessed the gradual expansion of Islam in this region. Islam was propagated in the Bangladesh region by a large number of Muslim saints who were mostly active from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Among these missionaries Hazrat Shah Jalal, Rasti Shah, Khan Jahan Ali, Shaikh Sharafuddin Abu Tawamah, Shah Makhdoom Ruposh, Shaikh Baba Adam Shahid, Shah Sultan Mahisawar, Shaikh Alauddin Alaul Huq, Shah Ali Bagdadi, Bayezid Bostami, Hazrat Amanat Shah etc. deserve special mention. While similar Muslim missionary activities failed in other regions of South Asia, Islam ultimately succeeded in penetrating deeply into Bengal because the social environment of this region was congenial to the diffusion of a new religion. In much of South Asia, strong village communities were impenetrable barriers to the spread of alien faiths.

The Muslim rule in Bengal contributed to economic polarization and cultural dichotomy. Except the brief interludes of the northern Indian empires, pre-Muslim Bengal was ruled by local potentates. Most of the Muslim rulers either acted as agents of Delhi or tried to use Bengal as a stepping stone for attaining political authority in Delhi. Economic exploitation intensified during this period owing to transfer of resources to north India. The main victims of this exploitative system were locally converted Muslims and low caste Hindus. The sole aim of the Muslim rulers was to mobilize as much resources as possible. The size of the immigrant Muslim ruling elite was small. Furthermore, different factions of the ruling elite did not trust each other. Consequently, Muslim rule in Bengal became, in effect, a coalition of immigrant Muslims and upper caste Hindus

The gradual process of conversion to Islam in Bengal resulted in an intense interaction between Islam and Hinduism. At the folk level, however, there was less confrontation and more interaction between Hinduism and Islam. A syncretic tradition developed around the cult and pantheons of pirs . The actual practices of local Muslim converts were an anathema to both Hindu and Muslim religious leaders. The orthodox Hindus, despite their political reconciliation with Muslim rulers, despised the local Muslims as untouchables ( Mlechhas ). The Muslim religious leaders were equally scornful of the customs and practices of local converts. Hated by immigrant religious leaders for their ways of life and by the local aristocracy for their adherence to an alien faith, local converts faced a dichotomy of faith and habitat which found expression in an emotional conflict between religion and language. This dichotomy can be traced in Bengali literature as early as the fourteenth century. 'Those who are born in Bengal but hate Bengali language", asserted the seventeenth century poet Abdul Hakim "had doubtful parentage. Those who are not satisfied with their mother tongue should migrate to other lands".

British Rule in Bangladesh (1757-1947)

The greatest discontinuity in the history of Bengal region occurred on June 23, 1757 when the East India Company - a mercantile company of England became the virtual ruler of Bengal by defeating Nawab Siraj-ud Daulah through conspiracy. Territorial rule by a trading company resulted in the commercialization of power. The initial effects of the British rule were highly destructive. As the historian R.C. Dutt notes, "the people of Bengal had been used to tyranny, but had never lived under an oppression so far reaching in its effects, extending to every village market and every manufacturer's loom. They had been used to arbitrary acts from men in power, but had never suffered from a system which touched their trades, their occupations, their lives so closely. The springs of their industry were stopped, the sources of their wealth dried up". The plunder of Bengal directly contributed to the industrial revolution in England. The capital amassed in Bengal was invested in the nascent British industries. Lack of capital and fall of demand, on the other hand, resulted in deindustrialization in the Bangladesh region. The muslin industry virtually disappeared in the wake of the British rule.

The British rule in Bengal promoted simultaneously the forces of unity and division in the society. The city-based Hindu middle classes became the fiery champions of all-India based nationalism. At the same time, the British rule brought to surface the rivalry between the Hindus and Muslims which lay dormant during the five hundred years of Muslim rule. The class conflict between Muslim peasantry and Hindu intermediaries during the Muslim rule was diffused by the fact that these intermediaries themselves were agents of the Muslim rulers. Furthermore, the scope of exploitation was limited in the subsistence economy of pre-British Bengal.

The conflict between Muslim peasants and Hindu landlords was reinforced by the rivalry between Hindu and Muslim middle classes for the patronage of the imperial rulers. In the nineteenth century, both Hindu and Muslim middle classes expanded significantly. The Muslim middle class did not remain confined to traditional aristocracy which consisted primarily of immigrants from other Muslim countries. The British rule in Bengal contributed to the emergence of a vernacular elite from among locally converted Muslims in the second half of the nineteenth century. This was facilitated by a significant expansion of jute cultivation in the Bangladesh region. The increase in jute exports benefited the surplus farmers ( Jotedars ) in the lower Bengal where the Muslims were in a majority. The economic affluence of surplus farmers encouraged the expansion of secular education among local Muslims. For example, the number of Muslim students in Bengal increased by 74 percent between 1882-83 and 1912-13.

The communal politics of confrontation and violence which erupted during the partition of Bengal was interrupted by a brief honeymoon during the non-cooperation movement led by the Indian National Congress and the Khilafat movement of the Indian Muslims in the second decade of 20th century. Bengal witnessed in the twenties the emergence of the charismatic; leadership of Chitta Ranjan Das who had the foresight to appreciate the alienation of the Muslim middle classes. In 1923 Das signed a pact with Fazlul Huq, Suhrawardy and other Muslim leaders. This pact which is known as the Bengal Pact provided guarantees for due representation of Muslims in politics and administration. The spirit of Hindu-Muslim rapprochement evaporated with the death of C.R. Das in 1925. However, even if Das were alive he might not have succeeded in containing the communal backlash. The communal problem was not unique to Bengal, it became the main issue in all India politics. As the communal tension mounted in the 1930s, the Muslim ashraf in Bengal which had close ties with the Muslim leadership in other parts of the sub-continent pursued a policy of communal confrontation.

The Road to Pakistan

The Pakistan Resolution of 1940 at Lahore was the outcome of the political confrontation between Hindus and Muslims. The Lahore Resolution demanded that geographically contiguous units "be demarcated into regions which should be constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary so that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constitutional units be autonomous and sovereign". From the constitutional point of view, the Lahore Resolution asserted that South Asia consisted of many nations and not of two nations. It was, in effect, a blueprint for the balkanization of South Asia and not merely for its partition into two units.

The fervor for the Lahore Resolution sprang not merely from the disillusion of the Muslims with the Hindu leadership. It was also facilitated by the vagueness of the Resolution which promised everything to everybody. The vernacular Muslim elites in Bengal maintained that the Lahore Resolution was legally a charter for a Muslim dominated independent and sovereign Bengal. The immigrant Muslim ashraf in Bengal thought that the Lahore Resolution was a mandate for merging geographically dispersed Muslim majority areas into an Islamic state. Ultimately the demands of the vernacular Muslim elite for an independent Bengal was opposed by both the ashraf and the Hindu middle class. Ironically the formal decision for partition of Bengal was taken not by Muslim but by Hindu leaders who fought for an undivided Bengal four decades ago.

The partition of the South Asian sub-continent into two independent states in 1947 was a defeat for the British policy. It partially undid the Pax Britannica which was the greatest achievement of the Raj . Nevertheless, the partition forestalled the balkanization of the sub-continent which would have swept away the entire political structure which was so laboriously built by the British rulers. The eastern areas of Bengal were constituted into a province of Pakistan and her political boundaries were drawn up arbitrarily.

The Birth of Bangladesh and Resolution of the Identity Crisis

Pakistan, which emerged constitutionally as one country in 1947, was in fact "a double country", the two wings were not only separated from each other by more than one thousand miles, they were also culturally, economically and socially different. "The cure, at least as far as the East Bengalis were concerned, proved to be worse than the disease".

The relationship between the East and the West wings of Pakistan was the mirror image of the Hindu-Muslim relations in the undivided sub-continent. The creation of East Pakistan did not resolve the identity crisis of the majority people in the Bangladesh region. The political leadership in Pakistan was usurped by the ashraf and their fellow-travellers. The spread of secular education and monetization of the rural economy swelled the ranks of the vernacular elite who was intensely proud of the local cultural heritage. This compounded the dichotomy of language and religion. As a recent scholar rightly observes, "The Bengali love affair with their language involves a passionate ritual that produces emotional experiences seldom found in other parts of the world". The Language Movement during 1948-52 which demanded the designation of Bengali as the state language of Pakistan undermined the authority of the ashraf and reinforced the role of the vernacular elite. In British India, the Muslims of Bengal united under the banner of Islam to escape from the exploitation of Bengali Hindus who shared the same mother tongue. In the united Pakistan, the Bengalis of East Pakistan reasserted their cultural and linguistic identity to resist the exploitation of their co-religionists who spoke in a different language. Though history repeated itself in Pakistan, the lessons learnt from Hindu-Muslim confrontation were forgotten. Neither in undivided India nor in united Pakistan, the dominant economic classes agreed to sacrifice their short-term interests. Democratic verdicts were brushed aside and economic disparity between the two wings widened under the aegis of military dictatorships in Pakistan.

The disintegration of united Pakistan is not, therefore, in the least surprising. However, the way in which Bangladesh was born is unique to South Asia. Bangladesh was the product of a sanguinary revolution. The Pakistan army had to be defeated physically in 1971 to establish the new state. The birth of Bangladesh resolved the dichotomy between religion and habitat, and between extra-territorial and territorial loyalties by recognizing both the facts as a reality in the life of the new nation.

The above article is summarized from BANGLADESH TOWARDS 21ST CENTURY, published by the Ministry of Information, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh.
http://www.orgs.ttu.edu/saofbangladesh/history.htm


Caste System in Bengal
See also this web page for a different discussion of the caste system in bengal and the associated myths. A somewhat different perspective is also available as part of a book description.

Even though formally there are four castes in hinduism: brahmins, ksatriyas, vaishyas and shudras, the social reality is very different in different parts of India. The social rules enjoined by the religions also differ in different regions. In Bengal, much of the development of the first distinct bengali hinduism took place during the rule of the sena and barman kings: and is described in the writings of bhavadeva, aniruddhabhaTTa, vallAlasena, lakSmaNasena, guNaviSNu, halAYudha etc, as well as in the bRhaddharma and brahmavaivarta purANas. To a large extent, they codified, formalized and made immutable some of the existing social structure, as well as making it very much more rigid. In fact according to traditional stories, which however are not history, brahmins originated in bengal during this time.

The society described therein does not contain (though they still appear in origin myths) any kSatriYas or vaishyas except when some of the rulers are referred to as kSatriYas and today most of the people who call themselves kSatriYas have variations of varman or malla as their surname; and some jewellers claim descent from the vaishyas. The brahmins were divided geographically into rADh.I and bArendrI with a variety of village associations, but according to aniruddha had forgotten their vedic tradition. The rADH.Is are divided into kulInas and vaMshajas, and the Barendras into kulInas and Kaps. The Kulins are organized into 56 villages and 36 mels and thAks like phUle, vallabhI, khardA and sarvAnandI. In addition, there were vaidika brahmins who came (according to tradition, during shyAmalavarmA's rule) from the north (including sarasvati region) and south (including utkala) India, who acccording to halAYudha were the only brahmins who knew the vedic tradition. They are organized as a pAshcAtya and a dakSiNAtya group. Mention is also found of brahmins from shAkadvIpa (who, according to tradition, came during shashAGka's rule and were called grahavipra; the latter, according to brahmavaivarta purANa, however, are children of devalas, who are true shAkadvIpI brahmins, and vaishya women) who were not respected in society. A subcaste of them called agradAni used to perform shrAddha ceremony for the shudras. Also found is another group of brahmins not respected in society: the bhaTTa brahmins, presumably related to the Bhattacharyas.

According to the rules developed in this period, the respected or shrotriya brahmins could not perform priestly duties for anyone other than the 20 high shudra subcastes. (According to vRhaddharma purANa, these shUdra subcastes arose from mixture of castes forced by king veNa; the upper subcastes had parents belonging to unmixed caste, the middle ones had fathers of unmixed caste, and the lowest had both parents of mixed caste.) Those that violate the rule get the subcaste of that person and thus we find, in addition, varNa brahmins who could not even serve water to the true brahmins. In additions, certain occupations like teaching shudras, doing priestly duties for them, practicing medicine or astrology, or performing painting or other artistic activities, were forbidden; though certain others like farming and fighting, or working as a minister, go-between, religious leader or general were all allowed.

The non-brahmins in Bengal were almost all classified as formally 36, but actually 41, subcastes of shudras and came in three categories. The exact enumeration varies somewhat, but the list in vRhaddharma purANa is presented here as an example. The top subcaste (from whom the brahmins can drink water, and for whom they can be priests) consist of record keepers (karaNa or kAYastha; karaNa seems to become less prevalent with time, kAYastha more, though there are exceptions), doctors and medicine makers (ambaSTha or vaidya; doctors in the early part are being described as karaNa; in south India some doctors were also brahmins; in bihara, one can also find the ambaSTha kAYastha caste, said to be descendants of citragupta and zobhAvatI; in bengal, ambaSThas seem to merge into vaidyas), fighters (ugra), envoys and messengers (mAgadha), weavers (tantuvAYa), scent traders (gAndhikavaNika), barbers (nApita), writers (gopa), ironsmiths (karmakAra), betelnut traders (taulika), potters (kumbhakAra), brass smiths (kaMsakAra), conch smiths (shaGkhika), farmers (dAsa), betelleaf farmers (vArujIvI), sweetmeat makers (modaka), florists (mAlAkAra), praise singers (sUta), rAjaputra, and betelleaf traders (tAmbulI). Some of these people, the kAYastha/vaidyas (these terms have taken much broader meanings) often call themselves (in accord with their origin myths as found in, for example, brahmavaivarta purANa) kSatriyas or vaizyas, and some of their origin myths are closely tied to those of the brahmins. Manu also provides origin myths for many of these as arising out of violation of caste rules: thus ambaSThas of brAhmaNa father and vaizya mother (two degrees apart is not considered proper), karaNas of some kSatriYas who had given up his duties. As a result, some of them consider themselves vaidya-brahmins (and use both the vaizya indicator gupta and brAhmaNa indicator sharmA), and like the non-shudra castes in ancient texts have limited rights to the veda and sacred thread ceremony.

The Kayasthas divide themseves into the uttararADh.Is, the dakSINarADh.Is, and the vaMgajas. The dakSINarADh.Is include the kulIna ghoSa, basus, and the mitras and the maulikas who divide themselves as the upper dey, datta, kar, pAlit, sena, siMha, dAsa, and gUha, and the lower seventytwo. Among the vaMgajas the gUha are the only kulInas.

The middle subcaste consisted of engravers (takSaNa), washermen (rajaka), goldsmiths (svarNakAra), gold traders (svarNavaNika), milkmen and cowherds (AbhIra), oil traders (tailakAraka), fish traders (dhIvara), alcohol traders (shauNDika), actors and magicians (naTa), descendants of buddhist leaders(?,shekhara), fishermen (jAlika; possibly, buffalo keepers arose from these later) and another unidentifiable category (shAbAka). The lowest subcaste (who are untouchables) consist of cleaners (malegrahi), those that cremate the dead (cANDAla), carpenters (takSa), leatherworker (carmakAra), boatmen (ghaTTajIvi), chairbearers (dolAvAhI), wrestlers (malla) and two unidentified groups (varuD.a and kuD.ava). In addition are desribed the mleccha or foreign groups like pukkasha, pulinda, khasa, thara, kamboja, yavana, sumha, shavara etc, who were left outside the entire classification. In contrast, brahmavaivarta purANa mentions the top subcaste exemplified by gopa, nApita, bhilla, modaka, kuvara, tAmbuli, svarNakAra (later demoted), and vaNika; followed by karaNa and ambaSTha. Then of the nine sons of vishvakarmA by a shUdra: mAlAkAra, karmahAra, shaGkhakAra, kuvindaka, kumbhakAra, and kaMsakAra are explained as being high, and sUtradhara and citrakara are also demoted. suvarNavaNika is also demoted because of association with svarNakAra. After this there is a long list of fallen subcastes including aTTAlikAkAra, koTaka, tIvara, tailakAra, leTa, malla, carmakAra, shuNDI, pauNDraka, mAMsaccheda, rAjaputra, kaivarta, rajaka, kauYAlI, gaGgAputra, and yuGgI. The really low subcastes included vyAdha, bhaD.a, kola, koJca, haDDi, Doma, jolA, vAgatAta, vyAlagrAhI, and cANDAla. Traditional stories try to explain the bizarre patterns with mythological stories: thus the goldsmiths claimed they were vaishyas who were insulted by vallAlasena who invited and placed them with the satshUdras at dinner, and who, furthermore borrowed a lot of money by force. When they tried to revolt against him, he lowered their status; and he further disallowed wearing of the sacred thread by traders. Overall, however, the low position of the artisan class fit well with the agrarian turn at the beginning of the pala period.

The rules developed in this period prescribe strict limits on brahmins intermixing with the rest of the society. Some examples can be provided. They were not allowed to eat food cooked by shudras, except for fried items, rice cooked in milk and in time of distress. However they could not drink even water touched by the untouchables, neither could they be touched by untouchables. Elaborate rituals were needed to clean oneself of violations of these rules. Similarly, even though intermarriage between upper caste men and lower caste women was allowed, the normal rule was marriage within ones own caste. Rules made it clear that a wife of a lower caste had less rights than one of the same caste. Marriage rules for brahmins, and possibly upper category of shudras, had to follow the endogamy/exogamy rules of sapiNDa (exogamy for parts of an extended family), sagotra (exogamy for a group of paternally inherited markers called gotra) and samanapravara (exogamy outside related gotras). Marriage was also forbidden if it took place according to high ceremony and any of the seven male ancestors along the father's line and five along the mother's line coincided. Low marriage ceremony only required exclusion for five and three generations, but pushed one to the shudra caste. Even the kAyAstha kulIna rules are complicated today: the first three sons who married had to obey rules to stay in the caste, whereas the fourth (madhyAMsha dvItIya), fifth (kaniSThya), and the younger (vaMshaja) ones had laxer rules, as they were not considered as high in caste status: they traditionally married elder maulikas.

Note that this does not imply that the society, either before or during the sena period, was very spartan or puritanical in the modern sense of the word. vAtsAyana's kAmasUtra (3rd/4th cent AD), as well as kalhaNa's rAjataraGgini (describing 8th cent AD puNDra), decribes the dancers who attracted the young men. bhaTTa bhavadeva's writings, sandhyAkara nandI's rAmacarita and poet dhoYi's pavanadUta sings praises of the beauty of the city and temple prostitutes, thus providing supporting contemporary and internal evidence. Though brahmins marrying shudra women was looked down upon, extra-marital relationship between them was overlooked. During the 10th day of durga puja, during the shAradotsava festival, men and women with mud and leaves only on their body used to sing and dance to primal images; as descirbed in the contemporary kAlviveka and slightly later kAlikApurANa. bRhaddharmapurANa seems to speak against it, unless the participants were followers of shakti. Similar festivals during holaka=holI and kAma-mahotsava are also known. Poetry (e.g. govardhana's ArYa satashatI, jaYadeva etc.) also desribe physical love. Descriptions of fine clothes, gold, silver and pearl ornaments, palacial houses and temples also abound. The village society, however, often shunned many of these behaviour and considered them shameful as is clear from descriptions in saduktikarNamRta.

Though we can clearly see this in Bengal even today, a lot of this varies as we move across the different districts of Bengal. For example, the kAYasthas who were the top of the non-brAhmin hierarchy, are rate in places like rural bÃkurA, vIrabhUma, varddhamAna, and medinIpUra, where the farming sadgopas are at the top of the hierarchy. The advent of vaishnavism in the middle ages also led essentially to a new caste, which was to be reviled by the traditional society.
http://tanmoy.tripod.com/bengal/caste.html

Mahishya
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Mahishya (Bengali: ???????), often also spelled as Mahisya, is a Hindu caste. Members of this caste are traditionally found in the Indian states of West Bengal and Orissa. Mahishyas are one of the predominant castes in West Bengal especially in the southern districts of Howrah, Paschim Medinipur, Purba Medinipur, Bankura, and South 24 Parganas.[1] Although traditionally an agricultural caste, many members are employed in the business and services sectors.[1] Their food habits and living conditions have also changed over time.[1]

Contents [hide]
1 Origins
2 Social ascendency
3 Success in industry and technology
4 Caste stigma
5 Common Mahishya family names
6 Notable Mahishya People
7 References



[edit] Origins
Historians such as Jagabandhu Singh have referenced the Padma Purana and the Brahmavaibarta Purana and have come to the conclusion that Mahishyas and Kaivarttas (Kaibarttas) are the same caste.[2] In general terms, "the child born of a Kshatriya father and Vaisya mother is called a Kaivartta or Mahisya".[2] If one takes the two terms to be synonymous then as Kaivarttas, the people are spread through a geographic location extending from modern-day Maharashtra, Chattisgarh, and Orissa.[2] The Bengali historian Sevananda Bharati is of the opinion that the ancient home of the Mahishya race is near the present day Ratnavati on the bank of the Narmada River, which was then known as Mahishamati.[2] For whatever reason, the Mahishyas migrated from Ayodhya and entered what is now Midnapore through the Chota Nagpur Plateau.[2] Biharilal Kalye believes that the founder of the Ganga Dynasty of Orissa, Anantavarma belonged to the Mahishya race.[2] Others such as Jagabandhu Singh disagree.[2] Sir Harbert Risley in The Tribes and Castes of Bengal states that five leaders established five kingdoms in Midnapore namely, Tamralipta or Tamluk, Balista or Moynagarh, Turkee, Sujamatha, and Kutabpur.[2] The inhabitants of Tamralipta were a seafaring race and inhabited modern Orissa and the southern coast of India.[2]


[edit] Social ascendency
The Mahishyas were numerically preponderant in Midnapore at the turn of the twentieth century.[3] Apart from being small landowners, many were minor landlords. In 1896, they were identified as local aristocrats by the President of the college of Nadia pandits, since the number of Brahmins and Kayasthas in Midnapore district were relatively small compared to the rest of Bengal.[3] In the absence of other dominant caste groups, the Mahishyas were able to form a tight-knit social group. The movement to gain recognition as a caste separate from the Kaibarttas gained moment from 1897 when the Mahishyas formed the Jati Nirdharani Samiti (Caste Assignment Forum).[3] At the time the Kaibarttas were divided into the Jele Kaibarttas (fishermen) and Hele Kaibarttas (farmers). Not only were the Mahishyas the leading group in Midnapore, but the 1931 census found that 2.71 percent were proficient in English, the language of the upwardly mobile during the British Raj.[3] In 1921, the demand for a caste separate from the Kaibarttas was conceded based on the data which suggested that they were a socially distinct group and that they were the predominant caste in the entire province of Bengal.[3] Data from the 1921 census indicated that they were the largest Hindu caste in Bengal.[3] In the subdivisions Contai and Tamluk, now comprising Purba Medinipur district, they formed 44.2% and 54.9% of the population respectively.[3] The Mahishyas through the mouthpiece the Mahishya Samaj endeavored to enstill pride in their agricultural roots, since they were the actual cultivators of the soil.[3] This peasant pride, along with a politically vocal leadership helmed by the likes of British-educated barrister Birendranath Sasmal forged a Mahishya identity.[3] During the Quit India Movement of Indian independence struggle in 1942, local national governments at Tamluk and Contai resisted British occupation for as long as two years; the backbone of the resistance was the Mahishya community.[3]


[edit] Success in industry and technology


Although the Mahishyas were traditionally laborers and tenant farmers they have excelled in industry.[4] Although many are involved in traditional practices in rural areas, within a generation, Mahishyas gave up agriculture in large numbers in favor of engineering and skilled labor in the urbanized areas of Howrah and Kolkata.[4] In Howrah, the Mahishyas are the most numerous and successful businesspersons.[4] At the turn of the century, much of the land and factories were owned by Brahmins and Kayasthas. By 1967, Mahishyas owned 67% of the engineering establishments in the district.[4]


[edit] Caste stigma
Although the financial, social, and political success of Mahishyas is notable, they have often been stigmatized on account of their agrarian roots. Mahishyas have not been adverse to doing manual labor, often considered demeaning by high castes.[4] For example, Birendranath Sasmal was refused the post of Chief Executive of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation by Chittaranjan Das on the grounds that his appointment would offend the Kayasthas of the city.[5][6] The job ultimately went to Subhas Chandra Bose.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahishya




'Jamaat mulls renaming itself to avoid restrictions'
New Delhi Is Pakistan-based Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), front organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba, preparing to reincarnate under a new name in the wake of a ban clamped on it by the UN Security Council for its involvement in Mumbai terror attacks?
According to sources in New Delhi, JuD may be planning to rename itself as 'Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool' (Movement for defending the honour of God) to avoid restrictions which Pakistan could be forced to impose on it because of UNSC sanctions.

The indication that JuD may be thinking of changing its name came as some senior cadres of the outfit recently organised a rally in Pakistan under the banner of Tehreek-e-Hurmat-e-Rasool (THR), the sources said.

In fact, JuD itself is a reincarnation of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) after the latter was banned by the US seven years ago.

Formed in 1990 in Kunar province of Afghanistan, LeT does not believe in democracy and Saeed, its founder leader, has publicly declared it several times that 'jihad' is the "only way Pakistan can move towards dignity and prosperity".

India feels that Pakistan is using 'jihadis' as "one of the arms of diplomacy" and due to this reason, it is not taking any action except "tokenism" against JuD despite the UNSC ban imposed on December 11 in the wake of November 26 Mumbai attacks.


Pakistan could sink into chaos and anarchy

Richard M Bennett

December 24, 2008

Pakistan is a martial nation with an outstanding reputation for its military prowess and a well deserved pride in its armed forces. However the Pakistan military and intelligence service have played a disproportionately influential role in mainstream politics over the last 60 years.

Democracy does not appear to flourish in this militaristic state and this has played a significant part in Pakistan's appalling human rights record. However it is Pakistan's long standing support for Islamic militants that has rightly seen the regime in Islamabad [Images] condemned by many observers as a home of terrorism.

Infamous intelligence service

Pakistan's infamous Inter-Service Intelligence agency has not only armed and trained generations of Islamic extremists in Kashmir and Afghanistan, it is also believed to have directed many of their terrorist attacks in both territories, and in the crowded streets of India's major cities.

The ISI is a protege of the Central Intelligence Agency and a child of an even larger worldwide political conflict; the Cold War. Created in the US agency's image, it has been regularly used to great effect by Washington in this troubled region.

At one time or another India, Iran, Afghanistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka [Images] have all reportedly been the victims of aggressive intelligence operations on behalf of the CIA and the support shown for terrorist groups by the ISI for reasons of their own..

After the Soviet invasion of 1979, Afghanistan became a major theatre of operation for Pakistan intelligence. Both al Qaeda, and the Taliban [Images] were to benefit hugely from ISI's comprehensive level of support.

Throughout the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, the Iraq occupation and the growing confrontation with Iran, relations between the US and the Pakistani intelligence communities have apparently remained close.

War on Terrorism [Images]

However, the forces within the ISI who sided with Islamic extremism, supplied them with weapons, training and intelligence remain highly influential and despite repeated denials by former President Pervez Musharraf [Images] and the current weak civilian administration, the Taliban's military revival has much to do with the ISI's continued clandestine support.

It is a bitter irony that Pakistan has achieved this position of importance in the US-led coalition by providing bases and support for the campaign in Afghanistan, while on the other hand the ISI is still offering aid to those same terrorists.

Pakistan's perceived long-term self-interest is more than sufficient for it to covertly sanction actions that directly result in the deaths of US, UK and NATO soldiers serving in Afghanistan. Whether this is with the full approval of the government in Islamabad or simply that the ISI remains a law unto themselves is a matter that remains open to question.

This despite repeated claims by ministers that the ISI and the military has been cleansed of its more extreme officers and no longer provides support for terrorist or insurgent movements.

There is a widely held belief that Pakistani intelligence remains a virtual state within a state. Its actions either ignored or even secretly condoned by the military regime.

The al Qaeda connection

It must remain highly questionable whether Pakistan has any real commitment to the War on Terrorism and there are many observers who believe that the government in Islamabad is clandestinely providing cover for leading al Qaeda terrorists.

Indeed if the highly respected journalist Dan Rather of the US CBS network is to be believed, Pakistan's Army [Images] was actively sheltering Osama bin Laden [Images] on September 11, 2001.

At the very time Al Qaeda [Images] crashed loaded passenger jets into the WTC twin towers and the Pentagon [Images], America's 'Enemy Number One' was reportedly receiving life-saving kidney dialysis treatment at a military-controlled hospital in Rawalpindi.

Yet bin Laden was allowed to walk free, to disappear apparently without trace in the tribal border lands between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It is this same troubled area that has seen the recent truce signed between the Pakistan security forces and the militant Islamic tribes.

This alone may have effectively secured bin Laden's continuing freedom of action as well as that of al Qaeda itself and a resurgent Taliban.

It is significant that the ISI, Special Operations Forces and other elements within the army, paramilitary units and police are believed to still provide logistic support and training for militants.

Pakistan undoubtedly deserves to be placed high on the American government's list of those countries guilty of state sponsorship of terrorism along with Syria and Iran. Indeed, Pakistan makes use of the Kashmir militants in much the same way as Iran uses Hezbollah; as a powerful political bargaining chip and to fight a proxy-war against a more powerful neighbour.

Pakistan stares into the abyss

Pakistan can rightly be described as a failing state. Its internal unity has dissolved into open warfare in significant parts of the country and its relations with India, its heavily armed and nuclear capable neighbour, are in tatters.

Even the patience of its long suffering ally, the United States is now wearing decidedly thin.

Pakistan has a militaristic society that has grown tired of its generals playing politics and instead placed in charge a civilian government that soon appeared to be virtually incapable of tackling head-on the main issues threatening to tear apart the fabric of the nation:

The growing influence of Islamic extremists in the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Pakistan-administered Kashmir and many of the northern cities in particular.

The devious role played by the ISI as highlighted by what appears to be solid evidence that it is still supporting terrorist activity in Afghanistan, Kashmir and most significantly within India itself.

The degree to which extreme Islamic beliefs have been wholeheartedly accepted within large parts of the regular army and the junior ranks of the officer corps in particular.

There can be little doubt that besides shoring up the world's shattered economy and dealing with a potentially nuclear armed Iran, high on the list of priorities for the incoming Barack Obama [Images] administration will be the fear of a meltdown in Pakistan some time in 2009.

Obama's choice of Hillary Clinton [Images] as his secretary of state is a highly significant move in relation to South Asia and has been broadly welcomed by many observers in New Delhi [Images].

Clinton developed a close working relationship with both India and the Indian-American community back home during the eight years her husband Bill Clinton [Images] served as US President.

It is unlikely that the new US administration will or would want to continue to excuse Pakistan's wanton unwillingness to at least attempt to deal with the rising tide of Islamic extremism threatening both the integrity of the nation and the stability of an already troubled region.

Pakistan's options




In response to the growing chorus of international criticism Pakistan has hinted at a variety of responses, but looked at carefully these would appear to be largely empty gestures made by an increasingly panicked and confused government in Islamabad.

The Pakistan Army presently deploys at least four regular infantry divisions (including the 7th, 9th, 14th and 23rd) in the FATA, the vital region that borders Afghanistan. Islamabad quickly made it known that in response to any sabre-rattling by New Delhi, it would be forced to move these units back to their old defensive positions on the border with India.

This in theory would expose the Western forces inside Afghanistan and their long supply route which sees some 350 trucks carrying over 7,000 tons through Pakistan every day to even greater danger from Islamic insurgents. The recent attack that destroyed over 100 US and NATO supply vehicles on Peshawar's outer ring road merely served to highlight this threat.

However, as many seasoned observers quickly pointed out, the Pakistan Army with a severely restricted logistic capability would not be able to achieve this massive redeployment quickly or effectively.

Indeed, as many of the army units currently deployed in the FATA have shown little or no interest in actually combating the local insurgency, the withdrawal of one or all of these divisions would probably not have a significant effect on the overall border security situation.

Recently some Pakistan officials have felt it necessary to quietly remind New Delhi -- and the world in general -- that it is a nuclear power. However, there must still be some doubt as to how many usable nuclear devices Pakistan actually has. Some estimates have been as low as just two 20 kiloton warheads.

Whatever the correct figure may be, Washington's studied indifference to Islamabad's implied nuclear warning goes some considerable way to confirming reports that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is very closely monitored, if not actually controlled in some way by the United States.

It is quite possible that any attempt to move these weapons, let alone deploy them would result in a swift US response and their total destruction.

No change yet

Pakistan is also once again going through the pantomime performance of publicly arresting a few leading members of the Islamic extremist groups that proliferate inside their borders.

Short of these prisoners now being handed over to the Indian authorities along with many others listed as terrorists, New Delhi and an increasingly impatient Washington are likely to remain largely unimpressed.

There has still been no serious attempt by the Pakistan authorities to disarm the militants, close down their training camps or dismantle the organizational structure that provides both new recruits and financial support.

The Lashkar-e-Tayiba [Images] and other such militant groups with a long track record of carrying out attacks in both Kashmir and India remain very largely untouched and free to continue planning the next terrorist outrage.

The ISI apparently continues to covertly arm, support and train Islamic militants, and some observers have claimed that they may even play a significant role in planning and directing attacks such as those on Mumbai [Images].

Despite the replacement of Lieutenant General Nadeem Taj as head of the ISI on October 1 by the reportedly more moderate Lieutenant General Ahmed Shujaa Pasha, seen by some as an attempt to placate Washington, little of substance has altered and the ISI seems as firmly wedded to its pro-Taliban, pro-Kashmir, anti-Indian stance as before.

The Pakistan Army also appears content to remain on its path toward radicalization, providing yet more training and -- according to some sources -- playing a large role in protecting and maintaining the militant infrastructure.

However, this level of semi-official Pakistan involvement with national and international terrorism may finally bring significant problems for the government in Islamabad.

India's options.

Despite Indian Premier Manmohan Singh [Images] once stating that "Unless Pakistan takes concrete steps to implement the assurances it has given to prevent cross-border terrorism against India from any territory within its control, public opinion in India, which has supported the peace process, will be undermined", India has remained hamstrung by governments that appear to suffer from some form of strange rictus that prevents anything more than studied inaction and an overwhelming willingness to compromise.

Only may now following the outrage in Mumbai may it be forced to at least consider a positive and if left with no other alternative, a military response.

However if the present Congress party government is removed in the upcoming elections, its replacement by the more nationalistic Bharatiya Janata Party would probably be far more likely to launch a serious military strike at Pakistan.

The BJP has long accused Congress of being insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism and now argues that the Mumbai attack was in part a result of this failure.

If the killing of over 170 civilians, police and military in Mumbai proves to be India's September 11, 2001, then it will not be long before New Delhi now finally accepts that one of the most important ways to protect its citizens is to be viewed as willing to retaliate against those who openly sponsor, house, arm and train terrorists.

This could be by way of limited air strikes and commando raids on the scores of Islamic terrorist camps and arms dumps most likely within Pakistan-administered Kashmir, initially.

Some sources have even suggested that the outline of a suitable plan was shown to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice [Images] recently. Rice is reported to have quietly commented that while the United States was strongly opposed to a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, it might not be totally averse to some form of limited counter-terror operations.

Risk of greater confrontation

However, a lack of serious and successful crackdowns on Islamic extremist groups within Pakistan by the government of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, or the repetition of major terrorist acts against Indian targets, could lead to a far wider and more significant confrontation.

Under those circumstances New Delhi may have no alternative but to launch major punitive military operations across the border into Pakistan itself.

It is possible that a clearly exasperated United States may even sanction this as a much-needed salutary lesson for Islamabad that it must take responsibility for the actions of its citizens and for any extremist groups based safely within its national borders.

A military assault is not, of course, the only means of applying pressure on Pakistan. Other punitive measures have been aired ranging from an Indian naval blockade of Karachi and the coast to the withdrawal of large amounts of vital financial aid used to shore up Pakistan's crumbling economy.

Pakistan's uncertain future

Pakistan is rightfully a proud country, but has little to be genuinely proud about in its current situation. It is a nation that has been constantly let down by a succession of weak civilian governments and heavy-handed military dictatorships.

It now faces economic meltdown, a chaotic political situation, widespread extremism and the growing disaffection of significant numbers of the middle class, civil service and the military.

Some experienced observers have openly suggested that tanks and armoured vehicles may once again be seen on the streets of Pakistan's cities as the military takes back power from yet another failed civilian administration.

Normally this might have been greeted by a resigned and cautious welcome in Washington. However, this time it might just be that militant Islamic elements within the officer corps are staging a coup.

The real fear then is of an unstable Pakistan sinking into chaos and anarchy and vast amounts of territory, weapons and perhaps nuclear materials falling under the control of Islamic extremists linked to al-Qaeda.

This would without a doubt be the United States and India's worst nightmare. Indeed it might turn out to be the last act before decisive foreign military operations to neutralise Pakistan began in earnest.

Pakistan is potentially a powerful ally in the "war on terror" and a firm friend of the West. Sadly it has chosen to play the devious game of running with the fox and hunting with the hounds for far too long.

Islamabad's continued deceptions are having a caustic effect on its international relations and dangerously increasing tension with India.

Having lived by the sword for so long, Pakistan now risks dying by it as well.

Richard Bennett is an intelligence Analyst

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/24mumterror-pakistan-could-sink-into-chaos-and-anarchy.htm

The Rediff Interview/A S Dulat, Kashmir expert

'You can't just wish away problems in Kashmir'

December 31, 2008
A S Dulat is a retired intelligence officer better known for his extraordinary insight into the Kashmir issue acquired through years of handling of the state. As a senior officer of the Intelligence Bureau he has personally and professionally cultivated the entire leadership of Jammu and Kashmir [Images]. That makes him distinct because through his close contacts with Kashmiri leaders, and in some cases through their friendship, he is able to see Pakistan as seen by Kashmiris.
Dulat has this unique advantage and strength when it comes to analysing the Kashmir issue. When he was chief of the Research and Analysis Wing Dulat had a rare chance to understand the diplomatic and strategic side of both India and Pakistan vis-?-vis the Kashmir issue.

And now the winter of 2008 has brought in many changes in Kashmir. In an interview with Sheela Bhatt, Dulat discusses the entire range of issues connected with the Jammu and Kashmir elections and the bigger issue of resolving the Kashmir problem.

What is your broader view on the elections in Jammu and Kashmir?

It is a good result. It is a victory for democracy and victory for everybody who has participated in this election.

Actually, if you look closely, nobody has lost in this election except may be marginally the Congress lost. It was understandable. It was partly due to anti-incumbency and partly due to the Amarnath agitation. The Peoples Democratic Party and Bharatiya Janata Party gained because of the Amarnath agitation. If elections were held in May or June the National Conference would have got 7-8 seats more and the PDP would have got 7-8 seats less.

When you claim the PDP gained due to the Amarnath agitation, what are you implying?

During the Amarnath agitation the whole issue of Kashmir and Kashmiriyat came up. And, talk of Azadi was very much in the air. From the Kashmiris' point of view, at that point of time the National conference was dilly-dallying. Omar Abdullah [Images] was saying they will not consider an inch of land but Dr Farooq Abdullah [Images], on the other hand, was being reasonable. In fact, in the Valley Doctorsaab (Farooq Abdullah) got a lot of flak. The PDP came out aggressively for Kashmiris' rights and Kashamiriyat and what is now referred to as soft separatism. They gained because of it.

In the same way, the BJP gained in Jammu for speaking up for the people of Jammu. Hardliners on both sides have gained. Overall, I would say nobody has lost substantially. It has been a very good election. Lines are clearly drawn. Whether the people like it or not, there has to be a National Conference-Congress alliance. I wish there was an NC government without Congress support because for the sake of Kashmir it would have been better. Now, the obvious alliance is NC-Congress. The only thing wrong with the NC-Congress alliance is that it takes people's mind back to 1986-87.




People say that was when the problem started, because of this alliance. Therefore, if you are going to have a repeat of it, it will not help. We all hope that it will not be a repeat of it. My gut feeling was that Omar Abdullah will be chief minister.

Why?

I told you in last May also that Omar is set to become the CM. It is time for the younger generation to come forward. I still maintain that Doctorsaab is the tallest and the best of Kashmiri leaders we have right now. There is nobody of his stature. But, I think, Omar deserves a chance.

He is young and has in him that dynastic arrogance?

Yes, it's a fact that Doctorsaab understands Kashmir better. It will take a while for him to learn. But, some people feel that as an administrator Omar will be better.

A good thing about Doctorsaab is that he can manage three regions better. The NC is the only party which has done well in all three regions. The NC is the only pan-J&K party in the true sense.

One of the great challenges for the new government is how to manage Jammu.

Acute polarisation has taken place. Managing Jammu will be a problem. The opposition in the new assembly will be robust. When the NC was in the Opposition they were mild and reasonable but Mehbooba Mufti or the BJP will not be as reasonable towards the NC. They will be much more aggressive. Hardliners of both sides are together in the Opposition, which will make life difficult for the coalition government.

Do you agree with the view that there are traces of communal voting in J&K this time? After all, Kashmir is the land of Sufism so it is an extraordinary trend.

I won't call it communal, I won't use that word but yeah, it is polarised opinion, unfortunately. Because of that silly issue which should have never been raised, there has been polarisation. It is unfortunate. I think for some time to come we will have to suffer that.

But, what will be the long-term impact if this polarisation continues?

That is why I said that whichever government comes in they will have to carry Jammu along with them. In one sense, just for the sake of debate, ideally a coalition of the NC-BJP would be better in some ways but they don't match and Omar has said that he will not have an alliance with the BJP.

But that suggestion is doubtful because an NC-BJP combine can provoke separatism.

Why will it get provoked? Why? The NC represents the valley as much anybody else represents the valley. They still have one seat more than the PDP. Why should separatism come up?

Anyway, my point is that the new government will have to make an effort to carry Jammu along. Unfortunately, in Jammu, they are going to come up against a hardliner BJP. This time the management of Jammu has to be tactful.

Do you believe that in Kashmir, accommodation of soft separatism is to be desired?

Surely, in Kashmir soft separatism and separatism will have to be heard. Accommodation of all opinions is important. This election provides a great opportunity.

I know the point you are trying to make. There is some merit if you argue that the Congress-PDP alliance may be better than the NC-Congress alliance. There is some merit in the argument. But, this time, you cannot keep the NC out of power. They are the largest single party. Last time they stayed out of power because they thought they have lost the mandate of the people. Last time, Omar had lost the election. This time father and son both have won. There is no justification for the Congress or anybody to keep the NC out of power.

Also, independents who have won this time would largely go with the NC. Their number is much less this time but they won't support the PDP.

Therefore, a Congress-NC alliance is the logical one. While Delhi [Images] will have to keep in mind a larger Kashmir picture, a coalition of NC-Congress will have to take care of Jammu.

But, what about the sentiments raised by the PDP? How will it be addressed?

Just because we had a good election, if we think the Kashmir problem is over then we are taking things too much for granted. Somewhere or the other serious issues will start cropping up. It can be in the assembly, it can be by coalition partners, it can be by the Opposition parties and it can be raised by separatists or it can be by artificial insemination by Pakistan.

Kashmir always throws up new challenges. Some of it can be unpredictable. Kashmiris themselves are so complex and unpredictable, you can never know them.

So, you can't just wish away problems in Kashmir.

How will New Delhi handle the Kashmir issue in the post-election phase?

You can't have a better picture of Kashmir than this. You need to talk. You know, Doctorsaab is the last person who will talk about having a dialogue with the Hurriyat. He will just dismiss the proposal saying, 'Who are these people?' Now, even he is saying that the government should talk to the Hurriyat. He has also begun to realise the need to talk. Separatist thought needs accommodation in some form. I am not saying that should be the overriding thought. Kashmiris' alienation and grievance has to be addressed by the new leaders in power.

On Sunday, as the results came in, Farooq Abdullah thanked Pakistan for a peaceful election because militancy was absent and people could vote.

Absolutely right! I agree 100 per cent with him. If militancy came down it's not only because of Pakistan but also because our security forces are doing their job and they too deserve credit. But, we must acknowledge that Pakistan has brought down militancy considerably. Infiltration and militancy have come down. Even Geelanisaab (Syed Ali Shah Geelani, chairman of a Hurriyat faction) said similar things. I think Geelani did not know what he was saying, what he said was very right.

When somebody asked him why did your boycott of elections fail he said, 'Because there was not enough violence.' This means he is acknowledging that their politics is only based on the gun. Without the gun it is difficult for them to sustain it. This argument, if we take it further, is also an acknowledgment of what exactly General Pervez Musharraf [Images] had begun to indicate when he invited Omar Abdullah to Islamabad [Images], that as far as Pakistan goes, the mainstream parties of J&K were all right. If they are the ones who represent Kashmiris, then what is the harm? It is all right. They are quite happy with the mainstream parties and leaders.

But, India needs to talk to separatists because it's important to know the people's grievances.

What Farooq said also suggests that Pakistan remains pivotal in the game.

Pakistan is not "pivotal". New Delhi is pivotal. But, when New Delhi doesn't do anything then Pakistan becomes pivotal in Kashmir. We allow Pakistan to become pivotal. We should seize the initiative and keep it with us. It's our absence of action that makes Pakistan pivotal.

Even when Pakistan withdraws and you also don't do anything, then Pakistan will again come into play. Right now, as far as Pakistan is concerned, there are no issues. But, it doesn't take time for issues to be raked up. A testing time for Pakistan has always been summer when the snow melts, to know what new intentions Pakistanis have in Kashmir. We have to wait and watch.

Do you think there is any life left in the Hurriyat?

Pitaai to hui hai, lekin jaan abhi bachi hai (They have been beaten but there is still life in them). It all depends on what is New Delhi's vision for the next round of action. And, Pakistan intends to do in summer. Right now, Pakistan is not doing any mischief to encourage the Hurriyat so the boycott by Hurriyat almost failed.

I think 2009 is a huge opportunity for India to move forward on the issue of Kashmir.

What will happen eventually?

I am not sure if the thought of separatism is as deep and alive as it used to be. Surely, the Hurriyat represents a certain thought. I think that is dwindling. The more they keep themselves isolated, the more it will dwindle. It's time for them to come into the mainstream. In 2002 some separatist leaders were regretting that they didn't participate directly. This time their regret will be much greater. Sajjad Lone would be regretting because his party would have impacted more than 5-6 seats in Kupwara, North Kashmir. Now, they will have to wait for six years more and by then, they will be six years older. The Mirwaiz is a religious leader so he will have his standing otherwise also, but the Lone brothers could be forgotten. How long can you sustain yourself on artificial gas?

See, through this election what is the Kashmiris' message? It is something like this. Let me say that the Kashmiri understands that this movement has been a failure. The idea of Azadi has failed. The guns have failed. Nobody is going to get Azadi. But, Kashmiri leaders say at the end of the day don't rub our nose into the ground.

I too believe the Kashmiri people must get some accommodation. That is what they are looking for. That's where the matter stands. The main concern is to see that the peace process must go forward. Because they have suffered so much in the last 20 years. So many Kashmiris have died. They must be given some honourable settlement. They voted this time because, as Barrack Obama [Images] said, Americans should come out and make their vote count.

I think the Kashmiris voted to make themselves counted. What is the point of sitting at home and being irrelevant? Why has the peace process been halted? There lies their redemption. Kashmiris are worried that if India and Pakistan go to war they will be killed in the crossfire. That's why he wants a little more understanding and accommodation from India.

The new chief minister's agenda has to be good governance, dialogue with a variety of political spectrum, and development.

While commenting on the Mumbai [Images] terrorist attacks some Western commentators say that the unresolved issue of Kashmir is linked to terrorism within India. Some say in the last four years the issue has not moved an inch.


No, I don't want to connect the Kashmir issue to the Mumbai attacks. But, the point really is that the peace process should have moved forward much more. I do think India missed an opportunity when General Musharraf was firmly in control in early 2007. And, after that the peace process doesn't have much impetus. I don't see anything happening in the coming six months. The Kashmir issue will be in cold storage due to many factors for six months, at least.

But, there is no alternative to take this issue further. What we do in retaliation to the Mumbai attacks is another matter.

http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/31inter-interview-with-asdulat-on-the-kashmir-election-outcome.htm




2008 is not our worst terrorism-hit year

B Raman

December 31, 2008
Next to Israel, India has been waging the longest fight against jihadi terrorism of the home-grown as well as trans-national variety. Israel's fight against jihadi terrorism started in 1967 and is 41 years old. The end is not yet in sight. India's fight against jihadi terrorism started in 1989 and is 19 years old. The jihadi terrorism faced by Israel is sponsored by a medley of States -- particularly Syria and Iran now and Libya, Iraq, and many other States in the past. The jihadi terrorism faced by India is sponsored by Pakistan and facilitated by Bangladesh.
In terms of numbers, jihadi terrorists have killed more innocent civilians in India than in Israel. But if one keeps in mind Israel's small size and population, proportionately Israel has suffered immeasurably more than India. More innocent blood has flown in Israel than in India.

The jihadi terrorism faced by India falls into two categories -- that in J&K, and in the Indian territory outside J&K, which for convenience's sake will be referred to as hinterland India, an expression which Ajit Doval, former director of the Intelligence Bureau, often uses.

As 2008 ends and we move into 2009, one has been seeing extremely gloomy accounts of 2008 triggered by the attack by terrorists of the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Tayiba [Images] in Mumbai [Images] from November 26 to 29, 2008, and the serial explosions that preceded it in Jaipur [Images] (May), Bengaluru [Images] ( July), Ahmedabad [Images] (July) and Delhi [Images] (September). Some analysts have even called 2008 the worst year in India's fight against terrorism.

We have faced worse years: in 1985 when Khalistani terrorists blew up Air India's [Images] Kanishka aircraft off the Irish coast killing 329 innocent civilians of different nationalities and in 1993 when a group of Indian Muslims from Mumbai recruited by underworld don Dawood Ibrahim [Images] and trained and equipped by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, targeted a number of establishments of economic significance in Mumbai and killed 257 civilians. It was the first coordinated attack on the economic infrastructure of India's financial capital -- similar to what we saw in Mumbai from November 26 to 29, 2008. It was also the first coordinated attack on the economic infrastructure by terrorists anywhere in the world.

The March 1993 terrorist attack, even though more lethal, did not have the same traumatic impact on the Indian nation and the international community as the November 2008 attacks because it was over in a couple of hours and did not last about 60 hours as it happened in Mumbai this time round. Moreover, private TV channels had not yet mushroomed in India. The Mumbai 1993 attack was in the form of explosions. TV viewers saw the carnage only after it had happened. The November 2008 attack was in the form of a prolonged urban battle between some terrorists entrenched inside famous hotels (the Taj Mahal and the Oberoi/Trident) and inside the offices of a Jewish cultural and religious centre located in Nariman House and the security forces, including the National Security Guards, the special intervention force. This entrenched battle was preceded by nearly an hour of cold-blooded killings of civilians in public places such as a railway station, a hospital, a pub etc with hand-held weapons. TV viewers saw live coverage of the entire terrorist attack.

We had faced a very bad year in 2006 when a group of jihadi terrorists -- Indians and Pakistanis -- carried out a series of explosions in suburban trains in Mumbai killing 181 innocent civilians. It was copy-cat terrorism based on what had happened in Madrid in March 2004 and in London [Images] in July 2005.

The four terrorist strikes in Jaipur, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad and Delhi were instances of heat of the moment acts of reprisal by sections of our own youth angered -- hopefully momentarily -- by local events such as what they saw as the severe sentences awarded to convicts for their role in the explosions of March 1993, the campaign for the early hanging of Afzal Guru for his involvement in the terrorist attack on Parliament on December 13, 2001, by the LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammed as compared (by the jihadi terrorists) to the absence of a similar campaign for the hanging of those found guilty in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi [Images], a resolution allegedly passed by the Bar Association of Lucknow that no lawyer should defend jihadi terrorists etc.

The terrorist attack in Mumbai in November -- like the attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 -- was not heat of the moment act of reprisal terrorism. It was an act of terrorism planned and orchestrated from Pakistani territory for a mix of strategic purposes -- creating nervousness in the minds of foreign businessmen about the security of their lives and property in India, creating doubts in the minds of the Indian public and the international community about the capability of the Indian counter-terrorism community to protect lives and property, disrupting the developing close relations of India with the West in general and the US in particular and with Israel.

Combined with these larger strategic dimensions was also an element of anger against the NATO forces for their operations against Al Qaeda [Images] and the Taliban [Images] in Afghanistan and against Israel for its policy towards the Hamas. This would be evident from the barbarity to which the Israeli and other Jewish victims (9 out of 25) were subjected by the Pakistani terrorists and from the fact that the Westerners killed by the terrorists (12 out of 25) came from countries which are fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan -- the US, the UK, France [Images], Italy [Images], Germany [Images], Canada [Images] and Australia [Images]. It was definitely not Kashmir-related terrorism. Nor was it related to the grievances of the Indian Muslim community against the Government of India.

The Mumbai attack of November 2008 also marked the emergence of the LeT as an international jihadi terrorist organisation on par with the Al Qaeda and also indicated the first possible role of the Al Qaeda in mentoring, if not actually orchestrating, an act of strategic jihadi terrorism in Indian territory directed against Indian, Western and Jewish targets to compensate for its inability to repeat 9/11, Madrid and London till now. The Al Qaeda's suspected orchestration was meant to demonstrate to the world that it is alive and kicking and will strike where it wants to and where it is able to, and not where the world expects it to.

The attack also demonstrated that Osama bin Laden's [Images] April 2006 warning -- in the wake of President George Bush's [Images] visit to India -- of a global jihad against Christians, the Jewish people and Hindus was not an empty threat. November 2008 marked the opening of a new front in global jihad. The terrorists came to kill Indians, Israelis and other Jews and Westerners. They did not come to damage or destroy property. If they had wanted, they had explosives with which they could have caused serious damage to the hotels similar to the damage which the terrorists caused to the Marriott in Islamabad [Images] on September 20, 2008. They did not.

After the serial explosions in UP in November 2007 and in Jaipur, Bengaluru, Ahmedabad and Delhi in 2008, there have been many superficial analytical articles written by analysts in India and abroad as if home-grown jihadi terrorism arrived for the first time in India in 2008. It was not so. India had been facing home-grown, but Pakistan-trained terrorism in J&K between 1989 and 1993 before the Pakistani organisations took over the leadership in 1993. Tamil Nadu had been facing jihadi terrorism unconnected to the ISI and the Pakistani organisations between 1993 and 1999 in the form of the Al Ummah. The March 1993 explosions were carried out by some Indian Muslims recruited by Dawood and trained and equipped by the ISI. The Students Islamic Movement of India was initially a home-grown movement though it subsequently came under the influence and control of the LeT and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, both of Pakistan.

What has been new since 9/11 is the emergence of a new group (not yet quantifiable) of Indians in hinterland India calling themselves the Indian Mujahideen [Images] and denying any links with the ISI and the Pakistani jihadi organisations and individual Muslims in the Indian diaspora in the UK without any proved organisational affiliation, who sought to help or emulate the Al Qaeda. The IM took to terrorism due to anger arising from Indian events and policies. Pro-Al Qaeda individuals like Bilal-al Hindi now in jail in the UK for assisting the Al Qaeda and Kafeel Ahmed who died in hospital after an attempted attack of suicidal terrorism in Glasgow in June 2006, took to terrorism for reasons unconnected with India. They were the first Indian global jihadi terrorists, who were motivated by what is projected by the Al Qaeda as global and historical injustice against the Muslims of the world.

Are there Indians in hinterland India who are similarly motivated by a global and historical sense of injustice and not merely by anger due to purely Indian reasons? No such person has so far been arrested, but one has been seeing openly expressed admiration for bin Laden among some youths. One saw it during the anti-Bush demonstrations in some cities during Bush's visit to India in March 2006, and in the interrogation reports of some arrested SIMI [Images] leaders. From admiration to action is just one step away.

Could any of these youth -- not yet unearthed -- with admiration for bin Laden have played a role in assisting the LeT in its attack in Mumbai? It will be unwise to rule this out just because no evidence in this regard has emerged so far. Lack of evidence does not prove a fact. It does not mean that a threat does not exist. A terrorist attack of this magnitude and precision could not have been so successfully planned and carried out without some local complicity. Only a local or a Pakistani member of the LeT who knew Mumbai well, would have known about the presence of many Jewish persons in Nariman House and about the very weak security at the rear entrance to the Taj Mahal hotel [Images].

The terrorist attacks of 2008 exposed the weaknesses in our counter-terrorism management as no other series of strikes in the past had -- lack of a culture of physical security and lack of coordination and of a culture of joint follow-up action on the intelligence available. Intelligence was available since September about the impending attack by LeT terrorists coming by sea. The available intelligence might not have been 100 per cent complete in all respects, but it was substantial enough to sound the alarm bells in Delhi and Mumbai and to trigger a joint response to foil the attack. There was a shocking failure of follow-up action on the intelligence alerts.

The police, the navy and the Coast Guard have to accept a major share of the responsibility for failing to act energetically to prevent the attack. The intelligence agencies cannot totally wash their hands of the tragedy by saying that their job ended with the collection and dissemination of intelligence. It was equally their responsibility to ensure that the implications of the disseminated intelligence were understood by the agencies responsible for follow-up and that required follow-up action was taken. If this was not done, it was their responsibility to alert the prime minister. It is for this reason that intelligence chiefs have privileged access to the prime minister. That access was not utilised.




In 1998-99, after the nuclear tests of May 1998, the Government of India revamped its national security management system with the creation of a National Security Council, a secretariat to service the NSC, a Strategic Policy Group, and a National Security Advisory Board -- with the entire architecture supervised and coordinated by a national security adviser who works directly under the prime minister and has his ears all the time. This system was further revamped in 2000 on the basis of our lessons learnt during the Kargil [Images] conflict of 1999. The revamped system consisted of an intelligence coordination committee and a technical resources coordination committee, both under the NSA, and a multi-agency centre in the IB to deal with terrorism to promote the culture of joint action.

The entire system set in place since 1998 to modernise our national security management on the pattern of good practices followed in the West and Israel failed. There was total dysfunction by the system as well as by those manning it. Our failure to prevent the November 2008 attack was due to systemic as well as human failures. The human failure was at all levels -- from the top to the bottom. A casual approach to security threats -- from State or non-State actors -- has been part of our culture. The Chinese took advantage of it in 1962. The Pakistanis tried to take advantage of it in 1999, but failed. The jihadi terrorists from Pakistan took advantage of it in November 2008 and succeeded.

To be continued

(The writer is Additional Secretary (retired), Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com)
http://www.rediff.com/news/2008/dec/31raman-first-the-good-news-this-is-not-our-worst-year.htm

On appeasement of Muslims by Arundhati Roy
Submitted by editor on Mon, 12/29/2008 - 18:09
Dr. Dhirendra Sharma, Convenor, Concerned Scientists & Philosophers
Dear Prof. Ansari: I read your Memorandum signed by eminent citizens. Similar view
by Ms. Arundhati Roy appeared in "The Mumbai attacks.... The monster in the mirror"( The Guardian, Saturday Dec. 13, 2008). Since she believes the position of muslims in India, is like Jews in Nazi Germany: 'military occupation in Kashmir and a shamefully persecuted, impoverished minority of more than 150 million Muslims (in India) who are being targeted as a community and pushed to the wall, whose young see no justice on the horizon, and who...totally lose hope and radicalise, would end up as threat not just to India, but to the whole world.'

And she ends her testament by equating Indian state with terrorism :
"to say end terrorism is to look at the monster in the mirror....".

Whereas I share your concern but think that Social discrimination and poverty are not country or religion specific and there are no innocent followers of any faith, state or region. We have witnessed many religious "civil wars" and that is not a choice for us.

A democratic state must be governed by common civil codes, inclusive of all citizens, irrespective of gender, caste, class or creed. Today, we know there is no exclusive Blood Group identity which divides Muslims from Non-muslims - Hindus, Sikhs, Christians or Jews. We are committed to Peace, Justice and Brotherhood for all humanity, inclusive of all religious minorities and Jews. Civic security of all citizens is sacrosanct and that includes the life of unarmed rabbi couple killed in the Mumbai attacks.

Shias and Sunnies had been playing the killing fields for thousand years. Bangladeshi muslims, its president Dr. Mujibur Rehman and family, were massacred - not by any RSS/ Hindu State but by the Punjabi Muslim soldiers of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Historical and religious nature notwithstanding, the conflict, today, is between Science and the cultural belief system. Separation of State and Religion is not acceptable in Islam. To blame the foreign or state policy of India or the West, but 'draw away any critical examination from the real engine of violence: Islamic theology,' said Mr. Hassan Butt, a former active member of an Islamist group in Britain.

According to a media report by Zahid Hussein (Islambad), Taleban have ordered the closure of all girls’ schools in the Swat district and warned parents and teachers of dire consequences. The announcement made in mosques and broadcast on radio, the taleban has set a deadline of January 15, to blow up school buildings and attack schoolgirls. “Female education is against Islamic teachings and spreads vulgarity in society,” said Shah Dauran, the chief of the taleban regime in Swat district of NWFP. Acid attacks on college girls, Fatwa attacks on Taslima Nasreen and Salman Rushdie, and destruction of 2000 year old -icons of the Bamian Buddha, in the Hindukush Himalayas -are symptomatic of the democratic challenge to the Islamic theology. The killers of th e Beslan massacre of 300+women and children, were not fighting for 'justice' for the Kashmiris or the Palestine.

As two Islamic states - Pakistan and Bangladesh - were created in 20th century, why could we not accept a Jewish state? When the Parliament was attacked Dr. Abdul Kalam was President and many top writers, poets, artists, actors, intellectuals and media professionals and political leaders are proud muslim citizens of India. I think, therefore, the conflict is between Science and Religion.

I suggest you ask Iranian President Dr. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to convene a Conclave of Islamic scholars :

1) to end the sectarian hostility between Shias and Sunnies;

2) to accept the Democratic paradigm of separation of Religion and State;

3) to accept the United Nations charter of Equality in Law irrespective of gender, race, religion;

4) to accept Jewish state of Israel and rehabilitate the Palestinian with housing, schools and hospitals.
http://www.webnewswire.com/node/447631





AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

MEDIA BRIEFING



AI Index No ASA 13/011/2008

23 December 2008



Bangladesh: Elections present risks and opportunities for human rights



Parliamentary elections scheduled for 29 December offer a unique opportunity for improving Bangladesh's battered human rights situation. As an immediate matter, the elections signal the end of a two-year period of state of emergency marked by severe restrictions on political rights such as free assembly and free expression. If conducted properly and free of violence, the elections could inaugurate a more responsive, accountable civilian government -- a development necessary for improving the lives of millions of Bangladeshis now living in grinding poverty and without access to proper housing, education, or health care.



Amnesty International welcomes the withdrawal of the state of emergency on 17 December 2008, and the restoration of rights that had been fully or partially curbed in Bangladesh during the past two years. Amnesty International calls on the major actors on Bangladesh's political scene to do their part to respect and protect the right of all Bangladeshis to participate, without discrimination, in the conduct of public affairs. The Caretaker Government must ensure that people seeking to take part in peaceful election campaigning and in the elections themselves are protected against arbitrary arrests, intimidation and violence. Amnesty International urges all political parties to desist from violence and to commit themselves to the protection of human rights, including of minority groups, now and in future, whether in government or opposition.



Amnesty International has identified the following issues as particularly important to the proper conduct of the upcoming elections and the formation of a new government:



Intimidation and violence against voters

As the country moves away from emergency restrictions, both the Caretaker Government and the political parties have the responsibility to ensure that there is no recurrence of the political violence that characterized previous elections and preceded the declaration of state of emergency on 11 January 2007. From late October 2006 to early January 2007, in the run up to the postponed general elections, at least 35 people were killed and hundreds injured during clashes between rival political groups. The last general elections, which took place in October 2001, were marred by frequent clashes between members and supporters of opposing political parties, who used violent means including sticks, knives, firearms and crude bomb against each other during election campaigning. Thousands of people were left injured and more than 150 killed in these clashes during the three-month period of election campaigning before the polls. At least 10 of those killed were believed to have been hit by bullets fired by the police at the crowds.



The Caretaker Government has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring that elections proceed properly and serve to register the genuine wishes of the Bangladeshi people. The Caretaker Government's efforts should now be directed at upholding the newly restored freedoms during the coming elections. The Caretaker Government has mobilized nearly 50,000 troops to provide security and minimize partisan violence that has characterized past polling efforts in the country. Law enforcement personnel can play a major role in preventing threats, intimidation and attacks from non-state actors against voters. In the past, armed gangs acting at the instigation of local politicians have committed such abuses with impunity.

However, Bangladesh's security forces, including police, the Rapid Action Battalion and army units deployed to maintain law and order have a poor track record on human rights. There are credible reports of harassment of human rights defenders, torture and other ill-treatment, and the use of unnecessary or excessive force and extrajudicial executions during law enforcement operations. For instance, between January 2007 and August 2008, more than 200 persons died in what police and RAB have portrayed as "crossfire" but are suspected to be extrajudicial executions. The government has not rigorously investigated these reports and no RAB or army personnel allegedly involved have ever been brought to justice. The government must ensure that law enforcement personnel are held accountable for any human rights violations they have committed.



Prior to January 2007, the major political parties have either instigated, supported or directly engaged in violence against their political opponents. The Hindu minority group has also been a target of electoral and communal violence. Student groups of the main political parties have been among the main perpetrators of political violence in Bangladesh. These groups include Bangladesh Chattra Dhal (BCD, affiliated to the Bangladesh Nationalist Party); Bangladesh Chattra League (BCL, affiliated to the Awami League); and Islami Chattra Shibir, (Shibir, affiliated to Jamaat-e-Islami). Political parties have pledged, but failed, to disarm them. None of the political parties has condemned the violence carried out by their members. On the contrary, the leaders have shown tacit support for violent means, and have at times colluded with criminal gangs to attack their opponents. The political parties have the responsibility to ensure that their cadres and student wings participate peacefully in the electoral process and desist from violence before, during or after the elections.



Restrictions on freedom of assembly

Protecting the right to freedom assembly and association requires firm action from the Caretaker Government to inform and train law enforcement agencies to respect these rights. It also requires active support from political party leaders to ensure that their members respect the right all people, including their opponents, to hold rallies and to campaign for elections. The partial withdrawal, on 3 November 2008, of the ban on political rallies was a step in the right direction but it was not implemented until 12 December. With the lifting of the state of emergency on 17 December, the government should fully restore all rights that had been restricted under the emergency.



Restrictions on freedom of expression

The withdrawal of emergency restrictions on freedom of expression in November 2008 was long-awaited and welcome. Although the restrictions were not being enforced strictly, they nonetheless made it difficult for journalists and human rights defenders to carry out their legitimate work free from harassment, intimidation or abuse. They resulted in the arrest by security forces of at least three journalists and two human rights defenders including Tasneem Khalil and Jahangir Alam Akash in 2007, four of whom claimed to have been tortured while in custody.



Amnesty International recognizes that the situation appears to have improved significantly in 2008, with no one taken into custody for defending human rights.



Amnesty International welcomes the Right to Information Ordinance promulgated in October 2008. It will have a positive impact on freedom of expression when it comes into operation in early 2009 by giving citizens access to information held by public bodies. However, the ordinance explicitly excludes security agencies such as the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence, Special Branch of Bangladesh Police and the Intelligence Cell of Rapid Action Battalion from disclosing information unless it relates to human rights violations and corruption.



Attacks against minorities

Fear of attacks against minorities, including Hindus, is a real concern given the electoral violence during and immediately after the parliamentary elections of October 2001. Sporadic attacks against minorities had frequently occurred during parliamentary elections in Bangladesh but the violence took an unprecedented turn during the last elections in 2001. Crowds of assailants, whom journalists and survivors described as members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led coalition, which won the elections, drove hundreds of Hindu families off their land, and in some cases burnt their homes, apparently on grounds of the Hindus' perceived support for the opposition Awami League party. Bnagladeshi newspapers reported that dozens of Hindu women had been raped and at least one Hindu man was hacked to death. Government action -- from late 2001 onwards -- to contain the violence prevented the recurrence of mass scale attacks but no one was brought to justice for the attacks. There are legitimate fears within the human rights community and members of the Hindu minority that similar attacks against Hindus could occur during the forthcoming elections.



Another alarming development since late 2003 has been the rise in attack and hate speech against members of the Ahmadiyya community. The attacks have largely been instigated by Khatm-e Nabuwat, an Islamic group demanding that the government declares the Ahmadiyya sect non-Muslim. Instances of such attacks include the killing of an Ahmadi imam, "excommunication" by laying siege to Ahmadi houses and not letting inhabitants out of their homes, the beating of dozens of Ahmadis, and the marching of crowds attempting to occupy Ahmadiyya places of worship and drive the Ahmadis out. Although the previous government and the present Caretaker Government have prevented agitators from entering Ahmadi places of worship or large-scale abuses against their members, there is a high risk of their exposure to such attacks during the unpredictable times of elections.



Other minorities also need protection. For instance, frequent clashes between Bengali settlers and indigenous communities over the settlers' push to acquire indigenous land in the Chittagong Hill Tracts make the area especially vulnerable to eruption of violence during elections. Indigenous people say army units deployed in the area do not stop settlers from confiscating their land or from attacking them. Indigenous voters need assurance that they can cast their vote freely without fear of attacks or harassment during or after elections. Army units deployed in the area have a responsibility to ensure their safety and security at all times.



Commitment to improving Bangladesh's human rights situation

Political parties must show a more robust commitment to human rights, and refrain from supporting any laws or activity that have been or will be abusing human rights. Upholding freedoms requires support and cooperation from political parties. Although the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party have stated publically that they will uphold human rights, they have not provided a clear explanation of how they will make this happen. Their past poor record on human rights lends little credence to their promises in the absence of concrete plans for implementation.



The Awami League has not provided a concrete plan about how it will follow through on its promise of ensuring the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, ending extrajudicial executions and establishing the rule of law. Their promise to strengthen the Human Rights Commission and increase its effectiveness lacks credibility as they promised, but failed, to establish a human rights commission during their last tenure of office (1996-2001).



The BNP's promise that if voted to power, they will implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is vague and is not backed up by any plan of implementation. It is also in sharp contrast to their responsibility as the government of the day in launching the military operation "Clean Heart" (16 October 2002 to 9 January 2003). Troops deployed during that operation to maintain law and order were involved in extrajudicial executions of some 40 people, but received immunity from prosecution by the then BNP-led government. The BNP-led government set up RAB and failed to investigate the serious allegations of killings and other human rights violations by them.



Statements by Jamaat-e-Islami and Jatiya Party (Ershad) that they will introduce blasphemy laws are of serious concern. In Amnesty International's experience such laws have been used in other countries to suppress freedom of expression and to persecute religious minorities, including in particular members of the Ahmadiyya community.



Specifically, Amnesty International urges the Caretaker Government to:



• ensure full freedom of expression and information to debate public affairs, to criticize and oppose, to publish political material and to advertise political ideas;

• continue to uphold the current trend not to arrest any journalists, human rights defenders or political activists exposing human rights violations or peacefully expressing their views;

• react efficiently and promptly to any instances of political violence by deploying adequate numbers of law enforcement personnel at the trouble spots;

• ensure that law enforcement personnel including police, Rapid Action Battalion and army units deployed to protect people against political violence do so in accordance with international human rights standards, including the UN guidelines against the use of excessive use of force,;

• ensure prompt, impartial and effective investigations by the civilian justice system of alleged human rights violations by military personnel and the RAB, including arbitrary arrest, torture, other ill-treatment, and deaths in custody, or use of unnecessary or excessive force with a view to bringing perpetrators to justice.

• ensure that minority communities, including Hindus and Ahmadis are protected against possible attacks during and after the forthcoming elections; send clear instructions to the army units in the Chittagong Hill Tracts to ensure that indigenous people in the area are protected against attacks from Bengali settlers during or after elections.



Amnesty International urges all parliamentary candidates and political parties to:



• publically pledge to promote and respect the right to freedom of expression, assembly and association during and after the elections, including by their opponents and minority groups to hold and express different opinions, organize rallies and campaign for elections, without being attacked violently;

• publically pledge to take effective steps to strengthen human rights in full conformity with international human rights standards, including by endorsing the measures taken by the Caretaker Government to establish the National Human Rights Commission, freedom of information, independence of the judiciary and tackle corruption;

• refrain from inciting, supporting or participating in political violence and make a clear and public call to all party members and supporters to respect human rights and the rule of law;

• support independent and impartial human rights monitoring (during and after the election campaign).



END/



Public Document




For more information please call Amnesty International's press office in London, UK, on +44 20 7413 5566 or email: press@amnesty.org

International Secretariat, Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WC1X 0DW, UK

www.amnesty.org

http://www.amnestyusa.org/document.php?id=ENGASA130112008&lang=e

Bangladesh Religious Persecutions Continue
Buddhists Drive Bangladeshi Christian from Home
In same district, Muslim land-grabbers murder defender of tribal villagers.

By Aenon Shalom

DHAKA, Bangladesh, December 26 (Compass Direct News) - Buddhist villagers in southeastern Bangladesh's Rangamati district last week beat a young father and drove him from his house for converting to Christianity.

The Buddhists in Asambosti, in the Tabalchari area some 300 kilometers (186 miles) southeast of Dhaka, warned Sujan Chakma, 27, not to return to his home after beating him on Dec. 18. Chakma, who converted to Christianity about four months ago, has come back to his home but some nights the likelihood of attacks forces him to remain outside.

He is often unable to provide for his 26-year-old wife, Shefali Chakma, and their 6-year-old son, as area residents opposed to his faith refuse to give him work as a day laborer. Chakma, his wife and son do not eat on days he does not work, he said.

"I am ostracized by my neighbors since I became Christian," Chakma said. "They put pressure on me to give up my faith, saying otherwise I cannot live in this society. Nothing daunted me, I held firm to my faith in Jesus. On Dec. 18, four of my neighbors came to my home and beat me. They slapped and punched on me. Later they forced me to leave my house. They threatened me that if I come back to my home, I will be in great trouble."

Neighbors have threatened to beat him again and to send him to jail, he said, and they have pressured him to divorce to his wife.

"At first she did not like my conversion, but she liked my change after accepting Jesus," he said. "My wife told openly to those neighbors, ‘My husband is a Christian, so I will be a Christian along with my son.'"

A spokesman for Chakma's church, Parbatta Adivasi Christian Church, said church leaders met with some of the new convert's neighbors and urged them to accept him.

"We told them that our constitution supports that anyone can accept any religion," the church spokesman said. "Hindering their practice is unlawful."

Church leaders said they fear that taking the case to local officials and police would only further anger local Buddhists and harm evangelical activities.

"We do not want to enrage anyone over this incident," said the spokesman. "But Chakma does not feel secure to stay here. He does not spend the night in his house for security reasons."

Rights Advocate Murdered

Earlier this year in Rangamati district, Bengali Muslim settlers killed a tribal Christian for defending indigenous peoples from illegal land-grabs.

On Aug. 19 Ladu Moni Chakma, 55, was stabbed repeatedly and his throat was cut at Sajek in Baghaichuri sub-district in Rangamati district after he reported to the Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission how a military commander helped settle Bengali Muslims on area lands.

A pastor of the Bangladesh Baptist Church in the district told Compass that Chakma was killed because he was a Christian who was an outspoken defender of minorities in the area.

"They do not want any Christian to live here," the pastor said. "They hate Christians more than any other minority religions - it is one of the main reasons to evict and kill Ladu Moni. If people become Christian, many NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] will be set up here, and various local and international missionaries will look after them, so that Bengali settlers cannot grab lands illegally."

Chakma often interceded with the Chittagong Hill Tract Commission on behalf of the indigenous people about their rights and the cruel manner in which Bengali settlers illegally took lands from indigenous people, the pastor added.

Chakma's widow, Cikonpudi Chakma, also known as Minti Chakma, told reporters in Dhaka on Aug. 28 how the Bengali settlers attacked her family around 10:30 p.m. in Aug. 19.

"Some people were shouting, ‘Open the door! Open the door!'" she said. "Without realizing anything what was going on, three Bengali people broke in our shanty hut."

She saw knives in their hand and recognized a local man named Mohammed Ali, who earlier in the year had helped settlers seize lands from villagers.

The attackers blindfolded her and dragged her husband out of their home into the rain. They also tried to take her 13-year old daughter, Minu, she said.

"I resisted them taking out my daughter, and I was injured during the tussle with them," she said. "They hit my forehead with a knife."

She and her children fled through a backdoor and escaped certain rape and death by jumping down a ravine and rolling to the bottom. Drenched, they took shelter at a nearby home.

"I could not contact my husband that night," she said. "The next morning, we were returning [to] our home. On the way near Baghaihat, we saw a blood-stained, stock-still body. It was my husband. His body was mutilated and stabbed with sharp knife and machete."

Police sub-inspector Azizur Rahman Aziz of Baghaichari police station told Compass that his department had arrested three persons in connection with the killing of Chakma.

"We are investigating the case, and after the national election [to be] held on Jan. 29, we will submit the charge sheet," he said.

Chakma's widow urged the army-backed interim caretaker government to withdraw settlers from Sajek in Baghaichari and punish the murderers of her husband.

House Burnings

In April, mainly Muslim Bengali settlers aided by the army and a local businessman burned 77 homes in four villages of the tribal people in Sajek, Cikonpudi Chakma told reporters in August.

"In that arson attack, all of our wealth and assets were destroyed," she said. "Just a week after, we again built a new house. At that time, Mohammad Ali tried to stop us making a new house and demanded that our land was his. The problem started when the Baghaihat zone army commander brought settlers from different areas and took initiative to settle them on our lands."

Survival International director Stephen Corry said in a statement that the attacks were a "criminal human rights violation." According to the Survival International, abuses have escalated since the army-backed emergency government came to power in January 2007.

In the Baghaichari area, at least 13 Christian families lived among 77 tribal Buddhist families until the Christians' homes were burned down in April.

The Chittagong Hill Tracts region comprises three districts: Bandarban, Khagrachuri and Rangamati. The region is surrounded by the Indian states of Tripura on the north and Mizoram on the east, Myanmar on the south and east.

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Communalism in Undivided Bengal: Shrouding Class Conflict with Religion


Taj Hashmi

Simon Fraser University, Canada

Published on May 24, 2006



This paper aims at shedding light on the frequently misunderstood phenomenon called “communalism”, inherently a South Asian _expression connoting much more than its actual meaning implying something very ominous and nasty, in colonial Bengal. This perennial conflict mainly between the Hindu and Muslim communities, supposed to have originated because of the differences in the rituals, beliefs and practices of the two communities, not before but during the British colonial rule, has not died out in independent India and Bangladesh.





As laymen are baffled as to why Hindus and Muslims have been fighting or showing disrespect to each other’s faith, rituals, norms, behaviour or anything associated with the “other”, so are some social scientists, including historians. They associate the problem with religiosity, lack of secular and modern education, and intolerance of the people concerned bred by some religious texts, the Quran or the Vagbad Geeta, depending on who are explaining the enigmatic phenomenon called communal conflict, hatred and antagonism. Contrary to the laymen understanding and lopsided analyses by scholars, journalists and politicians, had religiosity of the people or the alleged hateful teachings of the religious texts been responsible for communalism, then the pre-British (and pre-modern) Mughal period would have witnessed thousands of rioting and embittered Hindu-Muslim relationship. Interestingly, history records only a few sporadic Hindu-Muslim clashes during the Holi Festival in the early 18th century under the Mughals.





The _expression, “Communalism”, has been in use in the Subcontinent since the second-half of the 19th century. Jawaharlal Nehru, a non-communal, agnostic politician and the first prime minister of India, who would have been famous for his scholarship alone, feels that what is “nationalism” for the majority community becomes “communalism” when the minorities do similar things to protect and assert their rights.





Another great mind, socialist historian (Harvard professor) Wilfred Cantwell Smith (1916-2001), in his seminal book, Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis, first published from Lahore in 1943 while this great Canadian scholar was a young lecturer at Lahore Foreman Christian College, aptly reiterates “… the phenomenon called ‘communalism’ has developed into something for which ‘nationalism’ now seems a better name” [Lahore 1969, p.187].





I am citing Nehru and Smith to highlight flaws of their unworthy successors in the realms of politics, pedagogy, scholarship and popular culture in regard to racial, linguistic and religious conflicts in South Asia. In Bangladesh, the situation is abysmally bizarre. Many Bangladeshis cannot differentiate between “communal” and revivalist puritan orthodoxy and political Islam. To them, from the Jamaat-i-Islami to BNP, JMB to Harkatul Jihad, Janata Party to Shiva Sena and RSS are all “communal” parties, groups and organizations.





It is unfortunate that Badruddin Umar’s tireless effort to distinguish between chauvinism/nationalism and communalism since the 1960s, especially through his books, Sampradayikata and Sangskritik Sampradayikata, has gone down the drains. Hence the tendency to lump together all forms of racial, linguistic and religious discriminations and prejudices of the majority communities against the minorities into the amorphous “laddu” or dough of “communalism”. The big difference between religious revivalism and communalism should restrain us from portraying the Jamaat-i-Islami or the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) as “communal”.





As parties and organizations run by members of the majority communities, such as Hitler’s Nazi Party, VHP, Janata Party, BNP, Awami League (during the Pakistani period for asserting majority Bengali separatism), cannot be “communal”, so are Hitler, Advani, Khaleda, Mujib, Tagore or Sarat Chatterjee. They were/are German, Hindu, Muslim or Bengali nationalists. And as someone’s “terrorist” is a “freedom fighter” to others, similarly, the minority community’s “chauvinist/hatemonger” is a “nationalist/patriot” or “hero” to the majority community.





Now, it depends how one classifies Tagore or Chattejees (both Bankim and Sarat). If one considers them as members of the majority Hindu community of the Subcontinent, then they were “nationalists” albeit of the pejorative “Hindu chauvinistic” type. The moment one classifies them as members of the “minority Hindu community of Bengal”, then all three of them (despite their literary genius and kind words for Muslims, reflected in their literary writings) were nothing but arch communal hate-mongers and Hindu separatists. We must draw a line between “Hindu/Muslim supremacist” and “Hindu/Muslim separatist” – the former being nationalist/chauvinist and the latter communal/separatist.





As W. C. Smith has elaborated, one does not have to be “religiously ardent, tepid or cold; orthodox, liberal or atheist; righteous or vicious” to be classified as “communal”, both communalism of the minority and chauvinism of the majority communities are by-products of economic, religious and psychological factors [p.187]. The adherents of supremacist/exclusionist ideology and the separatist minorities are again subject to false consciousness, vainglory and narrow class/group interest. As members of the Muslim minority community in colonial India nourished the wrong ideology of extra-territoriality, considering themselves as descendants of “foreigners” from the Middle East and Central Asia, members of the majority Hindu community, quite expediently accepted their false credentials to marginalize them as “foreigners”. Smith is worth quoting again: “Hinduism has never outgrown its tribalism; has never aspired or claimed to be anything higher than the religion of a group, or rather a series of sub-groups eternalized in the caste system. To the Hindu, every Indian who is a Muslim is an outcast out-caste, an Untouchable with whom dealings must not be so intimate as to transgress certain formal rules. This exclusion is religious; but with Hinduism ‘religious’ means ‘social’ in a highly evolved traditional way” pp.189-90].





The socio-economic base of communalism in undivided Bengal was different from that of northwestern India. Similarly the northwest was almost totally different from South India in this regard. While the Punjab, UP, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Bengal witnessed intense communal hatred, tension and occasional mass killing and rioting during the 1870s and 1950s, the coastal regions of the Subcontinent (excepting Calcutta and Chittagong) in Bombay and Madras Presidencies were almost totally immune to such barbarism. Does this mean the Hindus and Muslims of Bombay and Madras were/are less religious, having little sense of belonging to their respective communities? We know that is not the case. The reason behind Hindus and Muslims living in much more peace and harmony in the South than their co-religionists did/do in the North is their learning English and supporting and opposing the British Raj together.




On the other hand, in the North, especially in Bengal, the bulk of the Hindus supported the Raj for the first hundred-odd years while the bulk of the Muslims were fighting and non-cooperating with the British up to the 1870s and later they reversed their role. Henceforth the bulk of the Hindus joined the anti-British nationalist movement, opposing and non-cooperating with the Raj, while the vast majority of Muslims started collaborating with the British (imitating what their Hindu neighbours had done earlier), learning English for upward mobility under the influence of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1818-1898), Maulana Karamat Ali Jaunpuri (1800-1873), Nawab Abdul Latif (1828-1893) and their likes up to the Partition.





Those who trace the roots of Hindu-Muslim communalism to the invasions and plundering by Sultan Mahmud, and about 600 years of Muslim rule in India are either influenced by British colonial historiography, which not only portrays Babar as the “demolisher” of a temple at Ayodhya and Awrangzeb as the “anti-Hindu bigot” but also depicts the British Raj as the epitome of benevolence, tolerance and justice. Besides the selective use of history by both Hindus and Muslims, the crux of the problem lay with the unequal socio-economic and political developments of the two communities, which mainly contributed to the growth of mutual mistrust, hatred, prejudice and rivalries in every sphere of life in colonial northern India, including Bengal.







A cursory look at the history of undivided Bengal during the British rule reveals that the rulers’ adopting the classical divide-and-rule policy was the ONLY factor behind the growth, development and culmination of communal antagonism between the Hindu and Muslim communities in the province, like elsewhere in northern India. We may highlight the following landmarks in British Indian history, which were responsible for the creation and widening of the cleavages between the two communities:





The Permanent Settlement of 1793: The Mother of All Evils in Bengal



No other British colonial act brought so much of suffering, pain, humiliation on the Bengali psyche and wreaked such havoc on Bengal’s agriculture, industries, social structure, almost by permanently destroying its economy and proverbial prosperity that Bengal had witnessed during the Mughal period than did this monstrous Permanent Settlement of land revenue. This grossly unjust land settlement with revenue collecting officials, known as Zamindars, turned them into landlords in the British sense of the _expression, whose liability to the Government (90% of the revenue collected in an estate) was fixed permanently. The monstrosity of the absurd land system ( “a caricature of British land system”, to paraphrase Karl Marx) was that while the Zamindar’s liability to the Government was fixed permanently for generations, the tenant’s liability (the rent obligation) to the Zamindar remained flexible, turning him almost into a slave of his Zamindar. On top of the rent, the Zamindar could extract illegal duties or taxes (abwab) from his tenants whenever he needed extra cash to buy an elephant, to celebrate a wedding, child birth, or to perform certain rituals or for self-gratifications, sheer greed and caprice.





Incidentally, the bulk of the Zamindars in Bengal since the vice-royalty (Nawabi) of Murshid Quli Khan were Hindus. And by one stroke of the pen, they turned into landlords or proprietors of land, which hitherto had belonged to the Mughal Emperor. The bulk of the peasantry in Bengal, mostly so in the eastern region, were Muslims. Consequently any exaction by the greedy and ruthless Zamindars (who could imprison and torture their tenants with impunity up to the mid-19th century) could be easily perceived as “Hindu” exactions and excesses on “Muslims”. The fast transfer of trading and industrial capital to Zamindari enterprise by Bengali and non-Bengali merchants and entrepreneurs installed rapacious traders, moneylenders and speculators as Zamindars. They were much more ruthless than the traditional Zamindars of the Nawab.





While Bengali peasants and weavers (mostly Muslim) were on the verge of total ruination due to the Zamindari exactions and British traders’ dumping of duty-free British textiles in the local market, a nouveau riche class of English-educated upstarts were fast replacing the powerless Muslim aristocracy, military officers, judges and jurists who had become redundant not long after the disaster of Plassey in 1757. By the 1850s, most of the Muslim aristocrats who had been enjoying revenue free land grants (La Kharaj Waqf endowments) to run schools, shrines and mosques since the Mughal period lost their lands as they failed to produce documents (lost or destroyed) in favour of their claims, as required by the arbitrary and unfair Resumption Proceedings (1820s-1850s) of the Company Raj. Local Hindu traders and Zamindars, who had the cash and government patronage, bought off these acquired estates to the chagrin and anger of the wretched Muslim aristocrats and their Muslim clients. Meanwhile, in 1837, the British rulers had replaced Persian with English as the Court (or official ) Language. Impoverished Muslims of Bengal could neither afford nor willing to learn English, which their Hindu neighbours, beneficiaries of the Permanent Settlement, learnt for upward mobility. Consequently the cleavage between the two communities got further widened and the relationship between them further embittered.





What followed the disastrous Plassey, Permanent Settlement, Resumption Proceedings and the Abolition of Persian as the Court Language was the sharp and rapid decline/disappearance of Muslim aristocracy, well-to-do peasants, artisans, professionals and scholars in Bengal and the equally fast ascendancy of the new classes of Hindu Zamindar-Bhadralok-Mahajan out of the Hindu middle and lower middle classes. The Muslim situation was so bad in Bengal by the 1870s that British civil servant and writer William Hunter observed in his book, Our Indian Mussulmans, that fifty years back it was impossible to find a poor Muslim in Bengal and in 1870, due to lack of government patronage, it became impossible for them to remain rich.





The Permanent Settlement not only brought about changes in the land system but also transformed the entire Bengali society with new values, new culture, turning nouveau riche Zamindars and their beneficiaries into arrogant feudal lords, rapacious money-lenders and ruthless lawyers. These parasitical classes lived on the masses – Muslim, Namasudra and other “low-caste” Hindus – and despite having modern secular education in English nourished and promoted feudal and pre-capitalist values. With few exceptions, the bulk of the Zamindar-Bhadralok classes on the one hand glorified the British benefactors and on the other promoted Hindu revival and anti-Muslim (actually anti-peasant) sentiment, using hate as the best weapon to subjugate the lowly Muslim Chasha (peasant). Hatred and prejudice bred equal amount of hatred and prejudice among the defiled and ridiculed Muslim Chasha (this is not that different from Newton’s Third Law of Motion). Dominant Hindus ridiculed Bengali Muslims as Nerrey-Mlechha-Javana (skinhead-unclean-foreigner) both in private and public discourse, including literary works by Ishwar Gupta and Bankim Chatterjee. Some Hindu Zamindars in Faridpur, 24-Parganas and Nadia even imposed a “Beard Tax” on Muslim peasants in the 1820s and 1830s. The upshot was a number of peasant insurgencies in the garb of Islam, the Faraizi Movement under Shariatullah and Dudu Miyan in parts of Faridpur-Pabna-Barisal-Dhaka sub-region and the militant uprising by Titu Meer in Nadia-24-Pargana sub-region of Bengal.





Since then Muslim and Hindu communalists/separatists did not look back. While Hindu Zamindar-Bhadralok-Mahajan continued to oppose all government or Muslim initiated attempts to uplift the conditions of the Muslim community in Bengal through the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Acts, education, and redress against the extortionist money-lending system with lame excuses, Muslim peasants, small middle classes and aristocrats resisted the Hindu opposition. During the first hundred-odd years of the British Raj, while Hindus in general remained loyal to the Government, Muslim opposition was directed both against the British and their well-to-do Hindu beneficiaries. With the change of the tide, while sections of the erstwhile loyal Hindus joined the nationalist bandwagon, especially after the Partition of Bengal (1905-11), Muslims in Bengal as elsewhere in India, readily responded to British overtures to win over the Muslim community, which had already started in the 1870s due to the untiring efforts by Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan in north India, and Karamat Ali Jaunpuri and Nawab Abdul Latif in Bengal.





The period between 1905 and 1947 witnessed the bitterest Hindu-Muslim antagonism and conflicts in Bengal. With direct British support (which was in line with their colonial divide-and-rule policy) and patronage, Bengali Muslims started collaborating with the British as they rightly visualized the advantages of their socio-political and economic uplift through collaboration with the British. Hindu aristocrats, professionals, intellectuals, clerks, teachers, shopkeepers, money-lenders in general were very unhappy with the British as they were no longer willing to play the second fiddle as their subjects. By then Muslims had experienced bitter Hindu chauvinism, both within and outside Bengal. Hindu revivalist Arya Samaj and Hindu opposition to Urdu in favour of Hindi (even by men like Lala Lajpat Rai who could not read and write Hindi but Urdu) had already alarmed non-communal Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, who once identified himself as a Hindu (“Muslim-Hindu” as he was born in India or Hind) and considered Hindu and Muslim as two eyes of India. The anti-Partition (1905-11) Swadeshi Movement, which directly promoted Hindu revival and perpetuation of Muslim subjugation in Bengal by Hindu super-ordinates further embittered the Hindu-Muslim relationship. The Hindu opposition to the Dhaka University proposal, by men like Ashutosh Mukherjee and Rabindranath Tagore, and their constantly vociferous opposition to any attempt to grant more rights to Bengal peasants through amendments of the Bengal Tenancy Act during 1923-38, the Free Rural Primary Education Bill, the Money-lenders Bill in the 1930s and 1940s sharply polarized the two communities both within and outside the Bengal legislature. Fazlul Huq, Maulana Bhashani, H.S. Suhrawardy, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Abul Hashim, Nawab Salimullah and Sir Abdur Rahim, among others, championed the Muslim/peasant cause and Hindu politicians, professionals, intellectuals and journalists openly promoted Zamindar-Bhadralok-Mahajan interests to the detriment of Muslims/peasants up to the Partition of 1947.



In view of the above, there is no truth in the assertion that the anti-Muslim communal rhetoric of Bankim, Tagore and Sarat were in reaction to the communal stand of the Muslim League or M.A. Jinnah. While Bankim glorified Hindutva in the 1880s, Tagore did so with subtlety during the first thirty years of the 20th century and Sarat Chatterjee advocated the expulsion of Muslims from India in 1926, long before Chaudhry Rahmat Ali coined the term “Pakistan” in 1934 and the so-called Pakistan Resolution of March 1940. It is absolutely incorrect to ascribe his anti-Muslim speech at a Hindu Mahasbha rally to the Hindu-Muslim rioting at Pabna in 1926. The Pabna rioting was short-lived and much smaller in scale than the Calcutta rioting, which preceded the former. Pakistan demand could not be a cause for rioting rather it was an unfortunate effect of Hindu Chauvinism and Muslim communalism/separatism. And it may be mentioned that Jinnah was agreeable to the Cabinet Mission Proposal of an Indian confederation till Nehru’s rejection of the proposal in July 1946. So, Pakistan was by no means inevitable. Pakistan became inevitable not because of the Punjab or UP Muslims’ desire for a separate homeland. Pakistan became inevitable firstly because of Bengali Muslim peasants’ desire to have better rights and opportunities. Another factor behind the creation of Pakistan was Hindu elite’s desire to partition Bengal after they realized that Bengali Muslims (children of the Chasha, many graduated from the undesirable Dhaka University) would perpetually rule the province by virtue of their number.





So, there is absolutely no point in fabricating or relying on stories about Suhrawardy’s and Sheikh Mujib’s instigating the Calcutta rioting of 1946-47 as there are credible evidences to the contrary. There are documentary evidences, including Suhrawardy’s personal correspondence with Jinnah and Liaquat Ali in 1947 and 1948, which proves beyond any doubt that he tried his best to save both Hindus and Muslims in Calcutta as well as Noakhali (which was again a noisy tea-party in comparison to Great Calcutta Killing of 1946 and the Bihar Carnage of 1947). What we see in Attenborough’s Gandhi, which portrays both Jinnah and Suhrawardy with nothing but tar and what we read and hear about the Noakhali rioting in most books mainly based on Congress and Mahasabha owned newspaper reporting are grossly exaggerated accounts and fabrications. Noakhali carnage was a brutal reaction to the Great Calcutta Killing of August-September 1946. Mainly Bengali Muslim peasants and working classes took part in the killing, raping and “forcible conversion” and marriage of Hindu women in and around Chhagalnaiya Thana. Around 350 Hindus, many of whom were money-lenders, got killed. Golam Sarwar, a local peasant leader was the main agent provocateur. He lost his son-in-law who was a jute mill worker in Calcutta, in the Calcutta rioting of 1946.







In sum, Muslim communalism and Hindu chauvinism in undivided Bengal were by-products of uneven growth and development of the two communities, who historically lived in peace and harmony throughout the Mughal period. The uneven growth and development of the Muslim and Hindus of Bengal was mainly due to the divisive policy of the British rulers and partially incidental on British policy of turning Bengali traders and entrepreneurs into Zamindars to get rid of competitors from Bengali capitalist classes for the benefit of British trade and industries. The British policy of disbanding the pre-existing army and police and replacing the Indian code with British law also hard hit Muslims in Bengal (and elsewhere in India) as they were predominant in these professions under the Mughals. Muslim arrogance and incapability to learn English due to poverty also contributed to their backwardness. With the transfer of the capital from Murshidabad to Calcutta, thousands of Muslim families from the depopulated Murshidabad and Dhaka had to settle in rural areas as peasants and destitute. The emergence of Calcutta as the new metropolis of Bengal (and India) on the one hand signalled the rise of the Hindu professionals and capitalist classes, mainly emanating from the beneficiaries of the Permanent Settlement; and on the other, it also indicated the ruralisation and pauperization of the hitherto dominant Muslim classes. The antagonistic classes of Bengali Hindu “haves” and Muslim “have-nots” fought each other for around two hundred years, the former to perpetuate their stronghold on the political economy and the latter to create a new niche in the body politic of Bengal (and India). They did not shy out from the prospect of replacing the Hindu beneficiaries of the Permanent Settlement and British rule either by reverting to the pre-British Muslim order or by establishing their “peasant utopia” or Pakistan.





In short, the events and process leading to the “Great Divide” or the greatest tragedy for Bengal after the disaster of Plassey to occur up to 1947 tell us how and why fear, hatred, ignorance and prejudice, primarily produced and nourished by the majority and adopted by the minority community with the machinations of the vicious colonial rulers made the Partition inevitable and the hangover of the past bitterness so heady and long-lasting. The un-equal “elite conflict” between the rich and powerful Hindu beneficiaries of the Permanent Settlement and the poor and weak Bengali Muslim victims of the Permanent Settlement is the main theme of the story of Hindu chauvinism and Muslim communalism in Bengal. Since the budding Bengali Muslim elite with jotedar/talukdar [rich peasants] background was too weak to withstand the mighty Zamindar-Bhadralok-Mahajan triumvirate, they had to get the patronage of the Urdu-speaking elite or the ashraf, from within and outside Bengal. The ashraf also needed the jotedar support to reach the middle and lower peasants (Muslim and Namasudra), especially on the eve of the provincial elections of 1937, as by then the Government of India Act of 1935 had enfranchised many well-to-peasants. Northwest Indian ashraf, under the leadership of charismatic Jinnah, in alliance with the Nawab of Dhaka and other ashraf leaders of Bengal forged ties with lower ashraf and Muslim jotedar/talukdar classes of East Bengal. The ulama or Muslim theologians played an important role in the ashraf-jotedar marriage (of convenience). Thus the Muslim Ashraf-Ulama-Jotedar triumvirate came into being to challenge the powerful Hindu Zamindar-Bhadralok-Mahajan triumvirate.





By then, due to the prevalent discriminatory and humiliating behaviour of “upper” caste Hindus towards them, the bulk of the Bengali peasants had first been communalized and then politicized under the influence of the ulama. Hindu opposition to cow slaughtering and treatment of Muslim peasants as “live stock” and untouchables (to paraphrase Nirad Chaudhury, Autobiography of an Unkown Indian, London 1951 and Abul Mansur Ahmed, Amar Dekha Rajnitir Panchash Bachhar, Dhaka 1970) thoroughly communalized the bulk of Bengali Muslims by the 1920s. Afterwards under the influence of the rustic mullah, Bengali Muslims learnt how to classify the Hindus as kafir [non-believer], mushrik [polytheist] and malaun [the cursed one or the Devil]. They also learn how to hate everything Hindu, including their gods and goddesses. Even a dead Hindu was not spared. The mullah taught Bengali Muslims to wish eternal hell fire [fi nare jahannam] to all Hindu souls. This is still done in the region.



Having a well-documented history of the “Great Divide” or the great tragedy may be to our advantage to look back with a view to looking forward to a peaceful co-existence of all South Asians, including Bengalis, irrespective of their religious and other differences.



[ See for details John H. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society:Twentieth Century Bengal, Berkeley 1968; Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided : Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947, Cambridge 2002; Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal 1905-1947, Oxford 1994; Taj I. Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia The Communalization of Class Politics in East Bengal, 1920-1947, Boulder-San Francisco-Oxford, 1992]
http://www.mukto-mona.com/Articles/taj_hashmi/communalism_bengal250506.htm

Indian Muslims in India
Mumbai has brought up the problem of Muslims in India in forefront. Sardar Patel said a problem has to be solved. If it is not done, the problem will take its revenge. Sardar Patel was not ant-Muslim, as erroneously believed by some. Hence let us face facts
Soon after the birth of Congress Party in India in 1885, the British imperialists were alarmed. The English ruled worldwide British Empire on the basis of old rule of imperialists, i.e. divide and rule. The imperialist started saying the Muslims in India were a nation - a big nation of 50 million. The English created communal riots to frustrate Gandhiji's Non-cooperation movements of 1920s and 1930s. Seeing the rise of Congress strength and Indian nationalism during WW II, the English manipulated to unite Muslims under Jinnah's leadership, and an absurd demand of Pakistan. The Quit India movement, the raising of INA by Subhas Bose in SE Asia and the result of trial of 3 INA officers in November 1945, made Viceroy Wavell realize the Indian Army (greatly expanded to 2.5 million to fight against Japanese invasion, thus ending the old ratio of 2 Indians to 1 English soldier in British Indian Army) was no more loyal, and he wrote a top secret letter to Secretary of State (now made public), containing blue print of Pakistan. Pakistan was necessary to protect British interests in Asia and not Muslim interests, as believed in India. Aim was to protect Near East from Soviet expansion to Indian Ocean and oil wells.

To create permanent enmity between India and Pakistan, the British C-in-C of Pakistan Army planned for the invasion of Kashmir in October 1947 by tribesmen with some Pak soldiers in Mufti. The English also manipulated to get Indian complaint of Pak aggression to U.N. and converted the complaint as India - Pak problem. There were nationalist Muslims who opposed Partition. Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan said it was not a partition of India but a partition of Muslims in India. After partition and mass migration during 1947 - 1948, Muslims were not one nation but divided almost equally between India, West Pak and East Pak. But 97% of Hindus were in India. The remaining 3% were in East Pakistan. From October 1947, Jinnah did not permit Muslims remaining in India except from Punjab to migrate to Pakistan. Muslims from U.P. and Bombay who went to W. Pakistan were very miserable and discriminated by locals and called Mohajjirs. Those Muslims from East India went to E. Pakistan were called Biharis. As they sided with Pak Army in the massacre of three million Bengalis (two million of them were HIndus), the so-called Biharis were put in camps, where they remain even now in miserable conditions. They wanted to migrate to Pakistan, but were not allowed to do so by Pakistan. Thus Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan proved to be correct.




Most loud in the demand for Pakistan were Muslims from U.P. and, to a lesser extent from Bihar, even though they were to live in India. They justified their demand on the ground that Muslims in Pakistan would retaliate, if Hindus mistreated Muslims in India. This was false logic. They did not take into account that they would be like hostages in India, if Hindus were mistreated in Pak.

This really happened in 1971, when Pak army killed two million Hindus in E. Pakistan and forced rest of 8 million Hindus to flee Pakistan. But Indira was very wise and very strong. She suppressed this fact to become known in India. The reason was that if this news spread in India, India would be covered in wide spread blood bath by communal rioting and Indian Army instead of defeating Pakistan Army, would have to be fully occupied in stopping communal rioting in India. The result- a resounding victory for India. Pakistan Army had massacred 3 million Bengalis in less than 8 months, but wanted cease-fire only after 4 days of start of war. Pakistan stopped the ceasefire idea at the behest of U.S., which asked Pakistan to continue war as the U.S. and China would come to its aid. This prolonged war by another 6 days. Pak Army surrendered to Indian Army only after loss of 7,000 soldiers. It was disgraceful performance - 93,000 prisoners out of 100,000.

What is the position of Muslims in India today? They must realize the truth and their demand for Pakistan in 1947 was wrong. They are much better off in India than their co-religionists in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Their fate is tied with Indians of other religions. All Indians have to remain united to make it strong, so that India can defeat evil designs of Pakistan, which is a satellite of U.S. and acts against the interest of Muslims of world. Even now many Indian Muslims take the side of Pakistan in cricket matches. This makes Hindus believe that Indian Muslims are Pakistan's spies. It is important for Muslims leaders in India to explain them the mistakes they made earlier as pointed out above. All religions preach brotherhood of man and peace. Instead of creating hatred against each other, all of them should unite to bring peace. This is not to the liking of Imperialists who want to peach hatred for their policy of "divide and dominate". All Non-Aligned nations should join hands (instead of fighting against each other) to defeat the imperialist designs of the US.

(The writer is author of recently published book, titled "Reflections on the History of World in 20th Century")

PK Nigam
http://www.centralchronicle.com/20090102/0201302.htm
THE ROOTS

"Bangladesh has a hundred gates open for

entrance but not one for departure" -Bernier.


Bangladesh is a new state in an ancient land. It has been described by an American political scientist as "a country challenged by contradictions". On the face of it, the recent twists and turns of her history are often inconsistent. It is neither a distinct geographical entity, nor a well-defined historical unit. Nevertheless, it is the homeland of the ninth largest nation in the world whose gropings for a political identity were protracted, intense and agonizing. The key to these apparent contradictions lies in her history


Etymologically, the word Bangladesh is derived from the cognate "Vanga" which was first mentioned in the Hindu scripture Aitareya Aranyaka (composed between 500 B C and 500 A D). Legend has it that Bengal was first colonized by Prince Vanga, the son of King Bali and Queen Sudeshna of the Lunar dynasty. According to linguists, the roots of the term Vanga may be traced to languages in the adjoining areas. One school of linguists maintain that the word "Vanga" is derived from the Tibetan word "Bans" which implies "wet and moist". According to this interpretation, Bangladesh literally refers to a wetland. Another school is of the opinion that the term "Vangla" is derived from Bodo (aborigines of Assam) words "Bang" and "la" which connote "wide plains."



Proto-history and Pre-history
Geological evidence indicates that much of Bangladesh was formed 1 to 6.5 million years ago during the tertiary era. Human habitation in this region is, therefore, likely to be very old. The implements discovered in Deolpota village in the neighbouring state of West Bengal suggest that paleolithic civilization in the region existed about one hundred thousand years ago. The evidence of paleolithic civilization in Bangladesh region is limited to a stone implement in Rangamati and a hand axe in the hilly tip of Feni district. They are likely to be 10,000 to 15,000 years old. New stone age in the region lasted from 3,000 B C to 1,500 B C. Neolithic tools comparable to Assam group were found at Sitakunda in Chittagong. Hand axes and chisels showing close affinity to neolithic industries in West Bengal, Bihar and Orissa have been discovered at Mainamati near Comilla. The thinly forested laterite hills in eastern Bengal dotted with fertile valleys provided a congenial environment for neolithic settlements. However, the archaeological evidence on transition from stone age to metal age in this region is still missing.



Political Dynamics in Ancient Bengal (326 B.C. to 1204 A.D.)
The earliest historical reference to organized political life in the Bangladesh region is usually traced to the writings on Alexander's invasion of India in 326 B.C. The Greek and Latin historians suggested that Alexander the Great withdrew from India anticipating the valiant counter attack of the mighty Gangaridai and Prasioi empires which were located in the Bengal region. It is not, however, clearly known who built these empires. Literary and epigraphic evidence refer to the rise and fall of a large number of principalities in the region which were variously known as Pundra Vardhana (northern Bangladesh), Gauda (parts of West Bengal and Bangladesh), Dandabhukti (southern West Bengal), Karna Subarna (part of West Bengal), Varendra (northern Bangladesh), Rarh (southern areas of West Bengal), Summha Desa (south-western West Bengal), Vanga (central Bangladesh), Vangala (southern Bangladesh), Harikela (North-East Bangladesh), Chandradwipa (Southern Bangladesh), Subarnabithi (central Bangladesh), Navyabakashika (central and southern Bangladesh), Lukhnauti (North Bengal and Bihar) and Samatata (Eastern Bangladesh)


There are two schools of opinion regarding the political evolution of ancient Bengal. According to one school, the Bangladesh region in the ancient period was an integral part of mighty empires in north India. These historians maintain Gangaridai and Prasioi empires were succeeded by the Mauryas (4th to 2nd century B.C.), the Guptas (4th-5th century A.D.), the empire of Sasanka (7th century A.D.), the Pala empire (750-1162 A.D.), and the Senas (1162-1223 A.D.). Specially, the Pala empire which lasted for more than four hundred years and reached its zenith in eighth and ninth centuries under the leadership of Dharmapala and Devapala is cited as an example of Bengal's political genius. The revisionist historians are of the opinion that the traditional interpretation overstates the role of all-India empires in the political life of the Bangladesh region. They maintain that epigraphic evidence suggests that only some of the areas which now constitute Bangladesh were occasionally incorporated in the larger empires of South Asia. In their view, political fragmentation and not empire was the historical destiny of Bangladesh region in the ancient times. Inscriptions attest to the existence of a succession of independent kingdoms in southern and eastern Bengal. These local kingdoms included the realms of Vainyagupta (6th century), the Faridpur kings (6th century), the Bhadra dynasty (circa 600-650 A D), Khadaga dynasty (circa 650-700 AD), Natha and Rata dynasty (750-800 A D ), the rulers of Harikela (circa 800-900), Chandra dynasty (circa 900-1045 A D), Varman dynasty (circa 1080-1150 A D), and Pattikera dynasty (circa 1000-1100 A D).


Opinions differ on the reasons for political fragmentation in Bengal. Some scholars attribute it to Bangladesh's topography specially to difficulties in negotiating its swamps and marshes, its unending maze of rivers and creeks and dislocations caused by the Bengali rainy season. Others emphasize the frontier character of the region which attracted from north India a continuous stream of rebel, heretics, and malcontents who destabilized the political life. Some scholars maintain that political fragmentation was fostered by a lack of corporate life at the village level. Specially, the village organizations were weakest in the eastern and southern areas; the corporateness of villages gradually increased in the western areas. Political fragmentation was, therefore, endemic in eastern and southern areas which now constitute Bangladesh.


The primacy of the individual in social life and the concomitant institutional vacuum in Bangladesh region was not, however, an unmitigated shortcoming. The weakness of social, political and economic institutions provided a congenial environment for freedom of religion. The Buddhist rulers continued to rule Bengal long after the resurgence of Brahmanism in the rest of north India. Nowhere in South Asia were the deviations from the Brahmanical orthodoxy so glaring as in the Bengal zone. The esoteric cults like Vajrayana, Shajayana, Kalachakrayana, Nathism, the Bauls and the folk cults flourished in pre-Muslim Bengal. Throughout history, small kingdoms blossomed and withered like wild flowers in this region. In an environment characterized by weak political institutions, heresy, heterodoxy and alien faiths thrived in defiance of the Brahmanical orthodoxy.



Contribution of Bangladesh to Ancient Civilisation
Bangladesh is the frontier of South Asian civilization. It is the natural bridge between South and South East Asia. Because of its location, Bangladesh was the intermediary in trade and commerce between the South Asian sub-continent and the Far East. This region, as a distinguished historian observed, "played an important part in the great cultural association between the diverse civilizations of Eastern and South Eastern Asia which forms such a distinguished feature in the history of this great continent for nearly one thousand and five hundred years."


Tradition has it that Sri Lanka was colonized by a Bengalee Prince Vijayasingha who established the first political organization in that island. Gadadhara, another Bengalee, founded a kingdom in the Madras state in South India


Bangladesh region also played a seminal role in disseminating her beliefs, art and architecture in the wider world of Asia. The Bengali missionaries preached Mahayana Buddhism in the Indonesian archipelago. Kumaraghosha, the royal preceptor of the Sailendra emperors of Java, Sumatra and Malaya peninsula, was born in Gauda. The Bengali scholar Santirakshit was one of the founders of the Buddhist monastic order in Tibet. The great Buddhist sage Dipankara Srijnana, also known as Atish ( 10th-l1th century) reformed the monastic order in Tibet. The Bengalee scholars Shilabhadra, Chandragomin, Abhayakaragupta, Jetari and Jnanasrimitra were venerated as great theologians in the Buddhist world.


Ancient Bangladesh also witnessed the flowering of temple, stupa and monastic architecture as well as Buddhist art and sculpture. There was discernible influence of the Pala art of Bengal on Javanese art. There was a close affinity between the scripts used on certain Javanese sculptures and proto-Bengali alphabet. A group of temples in Burma were built on the model of Bangladeshi temples. The architecture and iconographic ideas of Bengal inspired architects, sculptors and artists in Cambodia and the Indonesian archipelago. The influence of Pala art in Bengal could be easily traced in Nepalese and Tibetan paintings, as well as in Tang Art of China.



Evolution of Mediaeval Bengal (1204-l757)
The Middle age in Bengal coincided with the Muslim rule. Out of about 550 years of Muslim rule, Bengal was effectively ruled by Delhi-based all India empires for only about two hundred years. For about 350 years Bengal remained virtually independent. The Muslim rule in Bengal is usually divided into three phases. The first phase which lasted from 1204 to 1342 witnessed the consolidation of Muslim rule in Bengal. It was characterized by extreme political instability. The second phase which spanned the period 1342 to 1575 saw the emergence of independent local dynasties such as the Ilyas Shahi dynasty (1342-1414), the dynasty of King Ganesha (1414-1442) and Husain Shahi dynasty (l493-1539). The third phase which lasted from 1575 to 1757 witnessed the emergence of a centralized administration in Bengal within the framework of the Mughal empire. The Mughal viceroys in Bengal curbed the independence of powerful landlords who were known as Bara Bhuiyas and suppressed the Portuguese pirates who frequently interfered with the flow of foreign trade.


There were two major achievements of Muslim rule in the region. First, prior to Muslim rule in this area, Bengal was an ever-shifting mosaic of principalities. The natural limits of Bengal were not clearly perceived till its political unification by the Ilyas Shahi rulers in the fourteenth century. The political unification of Bengal was thus a gift of the Muslim rulers. Secondly, the political unity fashioned by the Muslim rulers also promoted linguistic homogeneity. Unlike their predecessors, the Muslim rulers were ardent patrons of Bengali language and literature. Prior to Muslim rule, the Bengali vernacular was despised for its impurities and vulgarities by Hindu elites who were the beneficiaries and champions of Sanskrit education. The spread of Islam challenged the spiritual leadership of upper caste Hindus. The intense competition between Islam and resurgent Hinduism in the form of Vaisnavism for capturing the imagination of unlettered masses resulted in an outpouring of their stirring messages in the vernacular.


The Muslim rule in Bengal also witnessed the gradual expansion of Islam in this region. Contrary to popular beliefs, the Muslim rulers in Bengal were not in the least idealists and proselytizers; they were primarily adventurers whose sole aim was to perpetuate their own rule. The preponderance of the Muslims in Bangladesh region stands out in striking contrast to signal failure of the Muslims in converting local people in other parts of north and south India. The distribution of Muslims in different regions of South Asia clearly contradicts the hypothesis that the patronage of the temporal authority was the most crucial variable in the spread of Islam. If this hypothesis was correct there would have been Muslim preponderance in areas around the seats of Muslim rule in North India. The fact that the Muslims remained an insignificant minority in the Delhi region where they ruled for more than six hundred years clearly suggests that Islam in South Asia was not imposed from above. In Bengal also, the share of Muslims in the total population was higher in areas remote from the seats of Muslim rule.


Islam was propagated in the Bangladesh region by a large number of Muslim saints who were mostly active from the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. Among these missionaries Hazrat Shah Jalal, Rasti Shah, Khan Jahan Ali, Shaikh Sharafuddin Abu Tawamah, Shah Makhdoom Ruposh, Shaikh Baba Adam Shahid, Shah Sultan Mahisawar, Shaikh Alauddin Alaul Huq, Shah Ali Bagdadi, etc. deserve special mention. While similar Muslim missionary activities failed in other regions of South Asia, Islam ultimately succeeded in penetrating deeply into Bengal because the social environment of this region was congenial to the diffusion of a new religion. In much of South Asia, strong village communities were impenetrable barriers to the spread of alien faiths.


In Bengal, the corporateness of village institutions was weak in eastern areas; it gradually increased towards the western areas. The distribution of Muslim population also followed similar spatial pattern in this region. The Muslims in Bengal were concentrated in the eastern areas and the share of Hindu population was much higher in western areas.


The Muslim rule in Bengal contributed to economic polarization and cultural dichotomy. Except the brief interludes of the northern Indian empires, pre-Muslim Bengal was ruled by local potentates. Most of the Muslim rulers either acted as agents of Delhi or tried to use Bengal as a stepping stone for attaining political authority in Delhi. Economic exploitation intensified during this period owing to transfer of resources to north India. The main victims of this exploitative system were locally converted Muslims and low caste Hindus. The sole aim of the Muslim rulers was to mobilize as much resources as possible. The size of the immigrant Muslim ruling elite was small. Furthermore, different factions of the ruling elite did not trust each other. Consequently, Muslim rule in Bengal became, in effect, a coalition of immigrant Muslims and upper caste Hindus


The gradual process of conversion to Islam in Bengal resulted in an intense interaction between Islam and Hinduism. At the folk level, however, there was less confrontation and more interaction between Hinduism and Islam. A syncretic tradition developed around the cult and pantheons of pirs. The actual practices of local Muslim converts were an anathema to both Hindu and Muslim religious leaders. The orthodox Hindus, despite their political reconciliation with Muslim rulers, despised the local Muslims as untouchables (Mlechhas). The Muslim religious leaders were equally scornful of the customs and practices of local converts. Hated by immigrant religious leaders for their ways of life and by the local aristocracy for their adherence to an alien faith, local converts faced a dichotomy of faith and habitat which found expression in an emotional conflict between religion and language. This dichotomy can be traced in Bengali literature as early as the fourteenth century. 'Those who are born in Bengal but hate Bengali language", asserted the seventeenth century poet Abdul Hakim "had doubtful parentage. Those who are not satisfied with their mother tongue should migrate to other lands".



The Glory that was Mediaeval Bengal
The Bangladesh region reached the zenith of economic affluence during the mediaeval period. It was known as one of the most prosperous lands in the world. The Moorish traveller Ibn Batuta who visited Bengal in the fourteenth century described Bengal as the wealthiest and cheapest land of the world and states that it was known as "a hell full of bounties". In the same vein, the seventeenth century French traveller Francois Bernier observed: "Egypt has been represented in every age as the finest and most fruitful country in the world, and even our modern writers deny that there is any other land so peculiarly favoured by nature; but the knowledge I have acquired of Bengal, during two visits paid to that Kingdom inclines me to believe that pre-eminence ascribed to Egypt is rather due to Bengal".




Because of her fertile land and abundance of seasonal rainfall, Bengal was a cornucopia of agricultural products. Famines and scarcity were virtually unknown as compared to other areas of Asia. Bengal was the focal point of free trade in the Indian Ocean since the 14th century. She was the virtual store-house of silk and cotton not only of India and neighbouring countries but also of Europe. The Dhaka region used to produce the finest cotton in the world. A very large quantity of cotton cloth was produced in different areas of Bengal. The best and well-known variety of textile was muslin produced in Dhaka. Some of the muslins were so fine that, as the seventeenth century traveller Tavernier notes, "even if a 60 cubit long turban were held you would scarcely know what it was that you had in your hand". Some of the muslins were so fine that a full size muslin could be passed through a small ring. Bangladesh also had extensive export of silk clothes. According to Tavernier, Bengal silks were exported to other parts of India, Central Asia, Japan and Holland. The Bangladesh region was also one of the largest producers of sugar. The sugar from this region used to be exported to other parts of South Asia and the Middle East.



British Rule in Bangladesh (1757-1947)
The greatest discontinuity in the history of Bengal region occurred on June 23, 1757 when the East India Company - a mercantile company of England became the virtual ruler of Bengal by defeating Nawab Siraj-ud Daulah through conspiracy. Territorial rule by a trading company resulted in the commercialization of power. The initial effects of the British rule were highly destructive. As the historian R.C. Dutt notes, "the people of Bengal had been used to tyranny, but had never lived under an oppression so far reaching in its effects, extending to every village market and every manufacturer's loom. They had been used to arbitrary acts from men in power, but had never suffered from a system which touched their trades, their occupations, their lives so closely. The springs of their industry were stopped, the sources of their wealth dried up". The plunder of Bengal directly contributed to the industrial revolution in England. The capital amassed in Bengal was invested in the nascent British industries. Lack of capital and fall of demand, on the other hand, resulted in deindustrialization in the Bangladesh region. The muslin industry virtually disappeared in the wake of the British rule.


In the long run, the British rule in South Asia contributed to transformation of the traditional society in various ways. The introduction of British law, a modern bureaucracy, new modes of communication, the English language and a modern education system, and the opening of the local market to international trade opened new horizons for development in various spheres of life. The new ideas originating from the West produced a ferment in the South Asian mind. The upshot of this ferment were streams of intellectual movements which have often been compared to the Renaissance. Furthermore, the Pax Britannica imposed on South Asia created an universal empire that brought different areas of the sub-continent closer to each other.


The British rule in Bengal promoted simultaneously the forces of unity and division in the society. The city-based Hindu middle classes became the fiery champions of all-India based nationalism. At the same time, the British rule brought to surface the rivalry between the Hindus and Muslims which lay dormant during the five hundred years of Muslim rule. The class conflict between Muslim peasantry and Hindu intermediaries during the Muslim rule was diffused by the fact that these intermediaries themselves were agents of the Muslim rulers. Furthermore, the scope of exploitation was limited in the subsistence economy of pre-British Bengal.


The economic exploitation of the British provoked an intense reaction against the Raj in Bengal. However, the grievances against the British rule varied from community to community. The Hindu middle class, which styled itself as the bhadralok, was the greatest beneficiary of the British rule. The Hindu middle class primarily originated from trading classes, intermediaries of revenue administration and subordinate jobs in the imperial administration. On the contrary, the establishment of the British rule deprived the immigrant Muslim aristocracy (ashraf) of state patronage. The immigrant Muslim - upper caste Hindu coalition which characterized the Muslim rule was replaced by a new entente of the British and the caste Hindus. The new land settlement policy of the British ruined the traditional Muslim landlords. The Muslim aristocracy which had hitherto been disdainful of their native co-religionists sought the political support of the downtrodden Muslim peasantry (atraf) who were exploited by Hindu landlords and moneylenders. The Muslim elite in Bengal manipulated to their advantage the social insecurity of the less privileged without giving up their exclusiveness.


The conflict between Muslim peasants and Hindu landlords was reinforced by the rivalry between Hindu and Muslim middle classes for the patronage of the imperial rulers. In the nineteenth century, both Hindu and Muslim middle classes expanded significantly. The Muslim middle class did not remain confined to traditional aristocracy which consisted primarily of immigrants from other Muslim countries. The British rule in Bengal contributed to the emergence of a vernacular elite from among locally converted Muslims in the second half of the nineteenth century. This was facilitated by a significant expansion of jute cultivation in the Bangladesh region. The increase in jute exports benefited the surplus farmers (Jotedars) in the lower Bengal where the Muslims were in a majority. The economic affluence of surplus farmers encouraged the expansion of secular education among local Muslims. For example, the number of Muslim students in Bengal increased by 74 percent between 1882-83 and 1912-13.


Faced with the economic and cultural domination of the Hindu intermediaries in Bengal (bhadralok), the ashraf (traditional Muslim aristocracy), the newly created Muslim jotedars who constituted the vernacular elite and Muslim peasants (atraf) closed ranks. Despite their outward unity, the coalition of various Muslim interest groups in Bengal was fragile. The interests and ideological orientations of these groups were dissimilar. Unlike the jotedars and peasants, the ashraf in Bengal spoke Urdu. The vernacular Muslim elites and peasants in Bengal wanted agrarian reforms; the ashraf was a staunch proponent of absentee landlordism. The Muslim vernacular elite and atraf identified themselves with the local culture and language, the ashraf was enthralled by Islamic universalism. The internal contradictions of the Muslim society in Bengal were naturally mirrored in their political life.


Initially, the leadership of the Muslim community in Bengal belonged to ashraf for two reasons. First, the size of the vernacular elite was too small in the beginning of the twentieth century and the vernacular elite itself tried to imitate the traditional aristocracy. Secondly, because of the institutional vacuum in the rural areas, it was very difficult to mobilise politically Muslim masses in the Bengal region. The easiest means of arousing such masses was to appeal to religious sentiments and emotions. In this charged atmosphere the natural leadership of the Muslim masses in Bengal lay with the immigrant ashraf who monopolized the religious leadership.


The rivalry between Muslim ashraf and Hindu bhadralok first surfaced in the political arena, when the British partitioned the province of Bengal in 1905 for administrative reasons. The nascent Muslim middle class under the leadership of the Muslim Nawab of Dhaka supported the partition in the hope of getting patronage of the British rulers. To the Hindu bhadralok who had extensive economic interests on both sides of partitioned Bengal, the move to separate the Bengali-speaking areas in East Bengal and Assam was a big jolt. They viewed it as a sinister design to weaken Bengal which was the vanguard of struggle for independence. The bhadralok class idolized the "Golden Bengal". Though initially the anti-partition movement was non-violent, the dark anger of the Hindu middle class soon found its expression in terroristic activities. The emotionally charged atmosphere culminated in communal riots. The partition of Bengal ultimately turned out to be a defeat for all. The Raj had to eat the humble pie and annul the partition in 1911. To the Muslims, the annulment of the partition was a major disappointment. It virtually shook their faith in the British rulers. To the Hindu bhadralok of Bengal, the annulment was a pyrrhic victory. "The net result of these developments in Bengal during the first decade of this century, so far as the bhadralok leadership of Bengal was concerned, lay in the exposure of its isolation, its inner contradictions and the essentially opportunistic character of its politics".


The communal politics of confrontation and violence which erupted during the partition of Bengal was interrupted by a brief honeymoon during the non-cooperation movement led by the Indian National Congress and the Khilafat movement of the Indian Muslims in the second decade of 20th century. Bengal witnessed in the twenties the emergence of the charismatic; leadership of Chitta Ranjan Das who had the foresight to appreciate the alienation of the Muslim middle classes. In 1923 Das signed a pact with Fazlul Huq, Suhrawardy and other Muslim leaders. This pact which is known as the Bengal Pact provided guarantees for due representation of Muslims in politics and administration. The spirit of Hindu-Muslim rapprochement evaporated with the death of C.R. Das in 1925. However, even if Das were alive he might not have succeeded in containing the communal backlash. The communal problem was not unique to Bengal, it became the main issue in all India politics. As the communal tension mounted in the 1930s, the Muslim ashraf in Bengal which had close ties with the Muslim leadership in other parts of the sub-continent pursued a policy of communal confrontation.

The Road to Pakistan
The Pakistan Resolution of 1940 at Lahore was the outcome of the political confrontation between Hindus and Muslims. The Lahore Resolution demanded that geographically contiguous units "be demarcated into regions which should be constituted with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary so that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constitutional units be autonomous and sovereign". From the constitutional point of view, the Lahore Resolution asserted that South Asia consisted of many nations and not of two nations. It was, in effect, a blueprint for the balkanization of South Asia and not merely for its partition into two units.


The fervour for the Lahore Resolution sprang not merely from the disillusion of the Muslims with the Hindu leadership. It was also facilitated by the vagueness of the Resolution which promised everything to everybody. The vernacular Muslim elites in Bengal maintained that the Lahore Resolution was legally a charter for a Muslim dominated independent and sovereign Bengal. The immigrant Muslim ashraf in Bengal thought that the Lahore Resolution was a mandate for merging geographically dispersed Muslim majority areas into an Islamic state. Ultimately the demands of the vernacular Muslim elite for an independent Bengal was opposed by both the ashraf and the Hindu middle class. Ironically the formal decision for partition of Bengal was taken not by Muslim but by Hindu leaders who fought for an undivided Bengal four decades ago.


The partition of the South Asian sub-continent into two independent states in 1947 was a defeat for the British policy. It partially undid the Pax Britannica which was the greatest achievement of the Raj. Nevertheless, the partition forestalled the balkanization of the sub-continent which would have swept away the entire political structure which was so labouriously built by the British rulers. The eastern areas of Bengal were constituted into a province of Pakistan and her political boundaries were drawn up arbitrarily.



The Birth of Bangladesh and Resolution of the Identity Crisis
Pakistan, which emerged constitutionally as one country in 1947, was in fact "a double country", the two wings were not only separated from each other by more than one thousand miles, they were also culturally, economically and socially different. "The cure, at least as far as the East Bengalis were concerned, proved to be worse than the disease".


The relationship between the East and the West wings of Pakistan was the mirror image of the Hindu-Muslim relations in the undivided sub-continent. The creation of East Pakistan did not resolve the identity crisis of the majority people in the Bangladesh region. The political leadership in Pakistan was usurped by the ashraf and their fellow-travellers. The spread of secular education and monetization of the rural economy swelled the ranks of the vernacular elite who was intensely proud of the local cultural heritage. This compounded the dichotomy of language and religion. As a recent scholar rightly observes, "The Bengali love affair with their language involves a passionate ritual that produces emotional experiences seldom found in other parts of the world". The Language Movement during 1948-52 which demanded the designation of Bengali as the state language of Pakistan undermined the authority of the ashraf and reinforced the role of the vernacular elite. In British India, the Muslims of Bengal united under the banner of Islam to escape from the exploitation of Bengali Hindus who shared the same mother tongue. In the united Pakistan, the Bengalis of East Pakistan reasserted their cultural and linguistic identity to resist the exploitation of their co-religionists who spoke in a different language. Though history repeated itself in Pakistan, the lessons learnt from Hindu-Muslim confrontation were forgotten. Neither in undivided India nor in united Pakistan, the dominant economic classes agreed to sacrifice their short-term interests. Democratic verdicts were brushed aside and economic disparity between the two wings widened under the aegis of military dictatorships in Pakistan.


The disintegration of united Pakistan is not, therefore, in the least surprising. However, the way in which Bangladesh was born is unique to South Asia. Bangladesh was the product of a sanguinary revolution. The Pakistan army had to be defeated physically in 1971 to establish the new state. The birth of Bangladesh resolved the dichotomy between religion and habitat, and between extra-territorial and territorial loyalties by recognizing both the facts as a reality in the life of the new nation.



The Melting Pot: Ethnic Background
Though the overwhelming majority of the population in Bangladesh forms a homogeneous ethnic group today, the racial mix of diverse races occurred in this region over a long time. Broadly speaking, there are two major racial elements in the people of Bengal: (1) the primitive tribes like the Kols, Sabaras, Pulindars, Hadi, Dom, Chandala and others who were designated as the Mlechchas; (ii) the Aryan and Aryanized elements.


The major pre-Aryan racial elements in Bengal were the proto-Austroloids. There is a striking similarity between the language of the aborigines of Bengal and the people in South-East Asia, the archipelago and the aborigines of Australia. The Dravidian languages of South India also belong to proto-Australoid group. Bangladesh, being the frontier of South Asia, also came into contact with the Mongoloid tribes who lived in the adjoining areas. The Mongoloid influence was dominant in the Chittagong Hill Tracts region where Chakmas and other tribes belong to this category. The Mongoloid influence is, however, limited in other areas. Scholars maintain that there is also a substratum of Negroid racial elements in the racial mix in this region. Thus Bengal was the home of mixed races long before the Aryans came. The Aryan influence in Bengal was primarily limited to upper castes. The gradual stages in the Aryanization of Bengal are not very clear. It appears that the Aryans brought the indigenous people into the framework of Aryan society. This is indicated by the fact that some of the indigenous tribes were classed at Khastriyas (the warrior class). The majority of these pre-Aryan tribes were classified as untouchables. The process of racial mix did not, however, stop with the coming of Aryans. The Semitic traders from the Arab world frequently visited the coastal areas in the Middle Age.



Religion
Bangladesh contains the second largest (after Indonesia) Muslim population in the world. In 1981, 86.6 percent of the population was Muslim. The proportion of Muslims increased from 85.4 percent in 1974 to 86.6 percent in 1981. On the other hand, the proportion of Hindu population dropped from 13.5 percent in 1974 to 12.1 percent in 1981. The increase in proportion of Muslim population may be attributed to higher birth rate among the Muslims. Census records from 1872 to 1981 clearly indicate that birth rate among the Muslims was always higher than that of the Hindus. The Buddhists constituted about 0.6 percent of the population in both 1974 and 1981 censuses. There are about 175,000 Christians in Bangladesh. The percentage of Christians was about 0.3 percent.



Art and Architecture
The Bangladesh region contains relics of the finest specimens of Buddhist monastic architecture. The Buddhist vihara at Paharpur occupied a quadrangle measuring more than 900 feet externally at each site. "No single monastery of such dimensions" asserts an art historian", has come to light in India, and the appellation mahavihara, the great monastery as designating the place, can be considered entirely appropriate". Similar vihara of Deva dynasty has been unearthed at Mainamati. The relics of Mahasthangarh where the ancient city of Pundravardhana was located suggest that a large monastery was built there. Of notable sculptures in ancient Bengal, stone figures of Buddha from Ujani in Faridpur district, Varaha avatara from Bogra (10th century) the Vishnu Stela from Comilla (11th century) and Chandi image from Dhaka district (12th century) deserve special mention. Another remarkable achievement was the terracotta art of Paharpur which drew its inspiration from the simple village life. This depicts the daily life of people with intense human interest. As an art historian observes, "It is impossible to find in the hieratic religious art of India at any given period such a large social content, such variety of human feelings, such intimacy of contact with the events and experiences of daily life, such spontaneous action and movements, depicted with such powerful and purposeful rhythm".


The Middle Age in Bengal saw the construction of a large number of Islamic monuments which were characterized by massive arches and bold clean lines. The emphasis was on utility and simplicity. Among these monuments the Satgambuz mosque of Bagerhat, the mausoleum of Shah Ali Bagdadi at Mirpur and the mosque of Rasti Khan at Hathazari deserve special mention.



Language
Bangla is the language of more than 99 percent of the population. Bangla is the seventh most extensively spoken language in the world after Chinese, English, Russian, Spanish, Hindi and Arabic. The Bengali script is derived directly from Gupta Brahmi script which has close affinity to Cambodian and Thai scripts. The origin of this language is usually traced to the 10th century. Bengali is a rich language capable of expressing the finest nuances of thought and feelings, a language that continuously mirrors the ever-changing play of life. It is rich in poetry, short story, novel, drama, essay and belles-lettres.




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The above article is taken from BANGLADESH TOWARDS 21ST CENTURY , published by the Ministry of Information, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. ASNIC is grateful to the Embassy of Bangladesh in Washington D.C. for providing the book.

http://asnic.utexas.edu/asnic/countries/bangla/bangladeshm.html





A glimpse picture of the status of Religious Minority Women in Bangladesh
Wed, 2008-12-24 07:27
By Sitangshu Guha - Bangladesh Hindu Buddhist & Christian Unity Council, USA

In Feb 2007 in the UN, NY, Ms. Rachel Mayanja, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General of Issues and Advancement of Women in Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) told that: 'regrettably, violence against women and girls remain unabated in whatever form and manifestation, depriving them of the full enjoyment of their human rights'.

We want to echo her statement which is a reflection of the condition of the women in Bangladesh. Two women ran Bangladesh for quite a long time, but that did not improve the situation for women. The life and dignity of half of the humanity in Bangladesh is not safe at all, and human rights' is a day time dream for them. In any sex scandal women are considered responsible for that, and 'Fatwa' (Edict), social bindings, religious rituals made the Bangladeshi women a virtual machine to produce babies.

Let us focus on the issues of religious minority women. When the overall religious minorities in Bangladesh are considered as 'Infidel', it is easily understandable that the condition of the minority women, who are first infidel and then women, a double crime and they have to pay double the price. So the rate of rape of minority women is much higher in Bangladesh. Minority women, often the under aged girls, are subject to conversion to Islam in front of everybody's eyes, and that's a common practice. The problem is that, the administration always sides with the perpetrators. So many cases of rape, victims' even told the names of the rapists, but the police are usually reluctant to register cases.

Usually in Bangladesh, victims of rape are not encouraged to report the tragic incident and only a fewest percentage of rape victims come forward to file cases, even though they don't get justice. Why minority women are raped more? Because they are easy prey, poor and can't afford to go to court. Moreover, rapists are influential, Islamic goons, often Islamists like BNP & Jamaat cadres, and in some cases they are encouraged by the fact that the administration will not take action. The logic behind gang rapes are mainly persecution of religious minorities, rape is just a useful tool. If a girl is raped in a village or a wife is raped in front of husband, or mother-daughter is violated at the same time, the family then will be left with only one option to leave the village. Then entire minority families of that village also feel insecure and pass sleepless nights when their daughter or wives became the target of the Islamists. Slowly the village becomes minority free. Where do they go? India.

In Bangladesh, most of the girls abducted are teens and under aged. After abduction the police will not take cases. Even if the victim's family reports who abducted their girl, the administration looks otherwise. Sometimes, police will say that, it was a love affair; they can't do anything and threaten the victim's family. What next? By this time, two months passed, the girl becomes pregnant and she has no other choice but to convert and sometimes even marry the rapist or abductor. People know and support this, because they believe that, if a Hindu or Christian can be converted to Islam, the door of the heaven will be open for them, society and the government also encourages this.

There is no statistic on how many girls are abducted and converted every year in Bangladesh, but the number will be pretty large. It is not uncommon in Bangladesh that a newspaper advertisement will say: 'I am such & such, a Hindu, daughter of ---, village—age 18 and willingly converted to Islam. My new name is ------- Begum. I marry Mohammed Salam". Most of the time, the poor girl even doesn't know about the advertisement or her conversion, but society will force her to be a Muslim. Once a noted journalist wrote in his column: "When I see an advertisement that a girl became Muslim, I feel good as a Muslim. But when the same advertisement says that I marry Mohammed somebody, I understand something is not right'.

Let's now see how the religious minority women are treated in our own motherland: Purnima Rani, a 12-year-old Hindu girl, was terrified and broke down as she described what happened to her. She described: 'Nearly 30 people came to our house; I recognized many of them as my neighbors. They beat my mother almost senseless. I begged them to stop. They dragged me outside, I resisted but they hit me with sticks. I shouted to my sister to save me but they beat her too. I cannot tell you what happened next'. (Vidal, the Guardian, London. Monday July 21, 2003).

Savitri, A pregnant Hindu woman of village Chardashi, under the district of Gournadi, was gang raped by armed cadres of the Islamic nationalist and extremist groups, in front of her husband with his hands tied up. Rita Rani Das was only 8 on October 4, 2001 when she was gang raped. Sujata, A young Hindu housewife was raped by the Muslim terrorists in her own home in the village of Annada Prasad in October, 2001. Supta 20, Tinku Biswas 18 of a family was burnt alive in Patiya, as miscreants set fire to their house (The daily Star, August, 09, 2003). Bakul Rani Dey (50), a widow, and an assistant superintendent of an orphanage was slashed to death by terrorists. (Daily Janakantha March 6, 2002).

Mrs. X (Name withheld), 30 was raped in front of her husband on 30th October 2005. Both were coming back after a phone call to their son from a telephone booth. While at Hogolpota village, the alleged perpetrators, Kachi Munshi, Al Amin and four other persons stopped them nearby a sawmill. They tied the husband to a tree, beat him and forced the victim to a roadside field where she was raped in front of her husband. Shefali Rani, a village council member in Barisal. Fundamentalists attacked and ransacked her home on October 2, 2001. They beat her up and then gang-raped her

November 16, 2001 - "In one night, nearly two hundred women were raped in Char Fashion of Bhola, and amongst them was an eight-year-old girl, a middle-aged amputee, and a seventy-year-old woman," says Daily Star News. "The women were raped in paddy fields, in the bush; on the riverbank...The village was sprinkled with the bodies of molested women, numb with pain and shock in the aftermath of nightlong abuse." This is the tip of the iceberg.

Ms. Babita Barua, a Buddhist girl had been kidnapped from Uttara, Dhaka on 23rd August 2005 and was converted to Islam. Daily Janakantha wrote on 5th February 2002 that, the ruling party cadres along with Islamic fundamentalists continue their medieval rampage in Mullhahat. Again they have attacked and gang raped a school girl of Buddhist community in broad daylight. She was utterly crying when the reporter asked her to describe the incident, with great remorse she asserted, " I have lost everything, my very self, what more can I tell you …" . According to survey conducted by The Daily Janakantha, February 17, 2002 although the minorities today represent even less than 10% of population their share of the rape victims is an overwhelmingly high 98.68%.

Amnesty International (AI Index: ASA 13/006/2001, 1 December 2001) in its report said, human rights organizations in Bangladesh believe over 100 women may have been subjected to rape.

*A college student was reportedly raped in front of her mother at her home in Azimnagar, Bhanga, Faridpur.

*A school girl was reportedly gang-raped in Delua, Ullapara, Sirajganj on 8 October.

*Two Hindu women were reportedly raped in front of their husbands on 11 October in Khanzapur Upazila in Gournadi, Barisal.

*Two Hindu women were reportedly raped in their home in Bashkandi, Chorfashon, Bhola on 6 October.

*A number of Hindu girls were reportedly abducted. It is not known whether or not they have returned to their families.

*A gang of armed men reportedly abducted three Hindu girls at the village of Nohata in Shreepur in Magura district on 11 October 2001. They also molested the girl's mother and her aunt. There are fears that all of these girls may have been subjected to rape.

Human Rights Watch Report on January 18, 2006 said: Persecution of Minority Communities: Throughout 2005, there were persistent reports of abductions and forced conversions of minorities, and destruction and desecration of religious sites. There were also many reports of forced evictions of Hindus from their properties. In some cases of reported rape of Hindu girls, the police refused to pursue investigations.

Bangladesh: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2005 by U.S. Department of State. March 8, 2006. Bangladesh: Rape, torture, arson, forced conversion to Islam, forced possession of properties, levying "infidel taxes", forced expulsion form the country and other heinous crimes against humanity are routinely perpetrated against Hindus, Buddhists, Christians and other ethnic minorities. The attacks are so endemic that keeping track of all the incidents is impossible.

A leading daily in Dhaka, Bangladesh wrote: An overwhelming 98.68% of the rape victims are minority, and rapists happen to be the cadres of the ruling parties, particularly of BNP. (The Daily Jankantha, Feb. 17, 2002). Nearly "200 Hindu women were gang raped by Muslim men" in Char Fashion, Bhola, in one night at a single spot. (The Daily Star, Nov. 16, 2001). The police do not allow the minorities to press charges against the rapists, and if they insist they are given a run around for a few days so the evidence of rape disappear, and then the police officers themselves persecute them. That is followed by death threat or kidnapping (see, e.g. The Daily Janakantha, Feb. 16, '02). The cadres of BNP have even ganged raped mother and daughter together with the parents forced to watch; and they have raped mother in front of their children (see, e.g., The Daily Janakantha, Feb. 5, '02; April 22, '02). On August 28, 2003 "Nine indigenous women, three of one family, were gang-raped and some others assaulted during a nearly eight-hour mob attacks on at least 10 villages in Mohalchhari Upazila of Khagrachhari district (The Daily Star, August 31, '03).

A Bangladeshi women's group (Mohila Parishad) on 24th Oct 2001 said minority Hindu people in the predominantly Muslim country had been subjected to rape, looting and other abuse. They said: "we have come across at least 10 women from the minority Hindu community who has been raped by political activists from the ruling party," said Maleka Banu, general secretary of the Bangladesh Mahila Parishad (women's council). "In one village, criminals entered the house of a Hindu family and raped a woman and her daughter simultaneously in the same room," she told a news conference in Dhaka. "In one place, six women were abducted and confined to a hideout for seven days and raped by gangsters every day," they said.

Congressman Joseph Crowley, the founder and Chair of Bangladesh Caucus in the U.S. House of Representative said, "Intolerance has taken hold in Bangladesh," (The Daily Star, January 13, 2004).

The Economist: Describing the plight of the minorities of Bangladesh, The Economist wrote: "Bangladesh's religious minorities: Safe only in the departure lounge" (Nov. 29, 2003).

Human Rights Watch World Report 2003 says that: "…Attacks against Hindus in Bangladesh escalated dramatically --------Scores of Hindu women and girls were raped. In some cases, they were gang raped in front of their male relatives. Hindus were also assaulted on the streets, in their homes, and at their workplaces. The government did little to prosecute or investigate the violence".

Being said that let us look into the situation of the Muslim girls in Bangladesh. In October 1996 Shima Chowdhury was drugged and raped while in custody. She died in "safe custody" under mysterious circumstances after reporting the rape ("Bangladesh: Failure by state protects alleged rapist," AI Index, 13 May 1997). On 18 December 2004 at Gokhulkhali outpost, Chuadanga, Bangladesh, police camp in-charge, ASI Abdul Kuddus and Habildar Rokunuzzaman, picked up 20-year-old Dali Khatun and gang raped her. The victim reported: "After gagging me with a piece of cloth, they raped me by turns and beat me throughout the night. They raped me again in a field near the police camp." Mahima, a young woman, was raped by three youth activists of the BNP and one youth activist of Jamaat-e-Islam. Mahima committed suicide. Police brought charges against the four culprits, court sentenced them to death. On 12th March 2006, Mrs. Shahin Sultana Santa (34) beaten by the police in open day on the street. Police continued beating despite her pleas for help considering her pregnancy and diabetics.

You may ask what exactly the situation is now. Let us see some more examples: Mili Malaker (15) Gang Raped for 7 days: "Janakantha", "Jugantor" & "Jugaveri", May 6th 2008. Mother- daughter violated. Bituni survived gang rape, poison, and then was choked to death (Daily Janakantha . Dhaka. Sunday, 18 May, 2008). Lipi (13) Gang Raped: Destitute Hindu School girl (13) gang raped on 23rd June 2008. Local touts trying to conceal the facts (Daily "Samakal", 25th June 2008). On 4th April 2008 about 9 miscreants kidnapped Mrs. Krishna Dey (18) on the way to her father-in-law's home at Chandpur. Where is she now? Nobody knows. Upama Dutta, 15, Where is she? A Minor Minority Girl Abducted in Dinajpur. Rekha Barman Gang Raped. A destitute minority girl gang-raped, (Daily "Samakal dated 6th February, 2008):

A minor minority Girl was kidnapped at Mongla, Bangladesh. On the fateful evening of March 2, 2008 she was abducted by Saiful Molla and associates. Her father Parimal came to the press club and expressed his utter grief with the question "Will they do whatever they want to do to my daughter?". Muslim settlers have kidnapped a sixteen-year old girl Ms Nunu Ujai Marma from Lohajhiri village on 4 February 2007 when she was grazing her cows in the field. Her father Ming Mong Marma reported that the incident to police but no action was taken. Last year the settlers had kidnapped another Marma girl King Chai Marma from the area. She was killed after rape.

The next question, did the government take any action against those rapists? The answer is an emphatic 'No'. Police did not even take the cases. The government denied almost all the allegations. Usually the victims were advised not to open their mouth, or to go out of the country, or to marry the rapist. It may hard to believe but that is reality. Rape is a tool in Bangladesh used to get rid of religious minorities or to drive them out from the country (In 35 year's % of minority population declined sharply).

Finally, let's quote extracts from the report "With intent to destroy?" Rape as Genocide under International Criminal Law - the Case of Bangladesh by Jenny Lundström. Her concluding Remarks were: "[…] there are certainly clear indications that may lead to the conclusion that those rapes could constitute genocide under the ICC statute, article 6 (b). It has been my ambition to illustrate that the rapes in Bangladesh are taking place in a context of general structural discrimination and that the state appears unwilling or unable to acknowledge and/or take action. […] I can conclude that violence against women [rapes] in Bangladesh will not end until firstly, the general structure of discrimination against minorities and women is acknowledged and secondly, the notions and practices of male dominance are challenged, deconstructed and ultimately transformed. As a signatory to the CEDAW and to the ICC Statute, the ultimate responsibility for such endeavors as expected lies within the individual State. Unless the state of Bangladesh takes immediate action to acknowledge these atrocities and expresses its full commitment to bring them to an end, there might be indications that support the claim that the rapes in Bangladesh are committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part the Hindu group as such.

- Asian Tribune -

http://www.asiantribune.com/?q=node/14824